tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5273466116679791032024-03-14T08:05:24.788-07:00美国重返亚洲版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-58993779691621312562013-02-26T12:18:00.000-08:002013-02-27T05:00:29.104-08:00美国“重返欧洲”?<span style="background-color: white; line-height: 16.390625px;"><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">作者:2013年2月26日 </span></span><span style="font-family: SimSun;">综合整理</span><br />
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<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/special-relationship-with-us-may-still-need-a-bit-of-work-as-john-kerry-jets-in-as-new-us-secretary-of-state-8510238.html" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhgJ1amrDZvhqTbU4iYz6nAnEiSh1mUa9IzdjnwyeivUpFN7ydGjEX1dJqBvjw03NXPt9-DRXrDege6VaPZ9aUK6O7qSNkQ8euKGp2LZt57Fv3963S6hxbt_n21Q65ff-iE_9dguvJazJji/s1600/David+Cameron+welcomes+John+Kerry.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">〈编按〉美国新任国务卿克里25日在伦敦与英国首相卡梅伦会谈,完成了他外交出访的“处女秀”。与高举重返亚太大旗的希拉里首次外访选在亚洲不同,克里的“第一次亲密接触”回到了欧洲。</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">欧洲媒体欢呼“</span><b style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">美国-欧盟轴心的复兴</b><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">”;德国外长韦斯特韦勒称赞克里此行发出“</span><b style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">重要的跨大西洋信号</b><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">”。</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: SimSun; text-transform: uppercase;">稍早</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16.390625px;">2</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16.390625px;">月12日</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.5px;">晚上,</span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 22.5px;">奧巴馬</span><span style="font-family: SimSun;">曾</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 22.5px;">說,</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.5px;">“今晚,我宣布我們將推出一個全面的跨大西洋貿易和投資夥伴關係與歐盟的談判”</span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.5px;">,“因為是公平和自由的跨大西洋的貿易將支持數以百萬計的高收入美國就業機會。“(</span><span style="line-height: 22.5px;">And tonight, I’m announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union,” , “because trade that is fair and free across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.”)</span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">这会是美国重新重视欧洲、修正重返亚太战略的信号吗?</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><span style="color: #c00000; font-family: 新細明體, serif; text-transform: uppercase;">英国《独立报》:</span><span lang="EN-US" style="background-color: white; color: #c00000; font-family: Georgia, serif;"><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/special-relationship-with-us-may-still-need-a-bit-of-work-as-john-kerry-jets-in-as-new-us-secretary-of-state-8510238.html"><span style="color: #c00000;">'Special relationship' with US may still need a bit of
work, as John Kerry jets in as new US Secretary of State</span></a></span></span><b style="font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #c00000; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-font-kerning: 18.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16.390625px;">作者 </span><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; text-transform: uppercase;">KIM SENGUPTA</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16.390625px;"> 2013年2月25日 </span><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16px; text-transform: uppercase;">英国《</span><em style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; font-style: normal; line-height: 16px; text-transform: uppercase;">独立</em><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16px; text-transform: uppercase;">报》</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16.390625px;"> </span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">John Kerry’s decision to make London the first destination for an official visit as the new US Secretary of State was seen as a matter of kudos by the British government. And today, on arrival, the former presidential candidate spoke of his determination to reaffirm the “special relationship”.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">It was immediately apparent, however, after Mr Kerry’s breakfast with David Cameron and prolonged meeting with William Hague, that despite the change of personnel the US remains resolute in several differences of opinion with the UK on foreign affairs.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Britain had argued unsuccessfully at an EU meeting in Brussels last week for arming of the “moderate” rebel groups in Syria; London is now pressing for substantive help for the opposition at an international summit in Rome this week.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Standing with Mr Kerry at the Foreign Office, William Hague said that “an appalling injustice is being done to the people of Syria, which the world cannot ignore. In the face of such murder and threat of instability, our policy cannot remain static as the weeks go by, and it is an important opportunity in Rome on Thursday to discuss this with our allies and partners.”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The US Secretary of State for his part said that he was “determined that the Syrian opposition is not going to be dangling in the wind, wondering where the support is, if it is coming”. He was, he added, “not going to Rome just to talk”. But there was nothing to suggest that Barack Obama’s veto on arming of the rebels – despite advice from Mr Kerry’s predecessor, Hillary Clinton, to do so – will be reversed.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">There was one bit of positive news for the organisers of the Rome conference. Moaz Khatib, the leader of the Syrian Opposition Council, who had stated that he would not be attending in a protest at the lack of meaningful backing from America and Europe, announced last night that he may turn up after all after a phone call with Mr Kerry.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On the Falklands, the US signalled that it would not recognise next month’s referendum among Falklanders on their future. The result, the British Government believes, will show that they do not want to be under Argentine rule. Mr Kerry stated: “The United States recognises the de facto UK administration of the islands but takes no position on the question of parties’ sovereignty claims thereto. We support co-operation between UK and Argentina on practical matters.”</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Mr Kerry went on to talk about the importance of the EU while discussing a proposed trade agreement. “The fact is that Europe, free-standing, alone, is the largest economy in the world. When you join that together with the USA, we have a powerful ability to be able to affect the rules of the road and raise standards and, most importantly, create jobs for all of our people.”</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A number of senior members of the Obama administration visiting London recently had warned the Cameron government against holding a referendum on leaving the EU, maintaining that a UK isolated outside would have much less influence in Washington.</span></div>
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<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/special-relationship-with-us-may-still-need-a-bit-of-work-as-john-kerry-jets-in-as-new-us-secretary-of-state-8510238.html" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOEaHFCY2fhM1Q5YceCIOa-54KN_OGMlMPaC8CHHXTvMMJc2Gew2cCZUnw3cRgyxNfhCTaFC3tMhgwG36OM0RmT0Pqfq7XCyEGpI2Iu_JL1f8K5rL1kjKkMoMVr-q1GbSDaf5-CvjkVLp2/s1600/isource.jpg" /></span></a></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #c00000; font-family: Georgia, serif;"><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/20-obama-pivot-europe-galston"><span style="background-color: white; color: #c00000;"><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Obama's Pivot to Europe: Forget China.
An EU trade deal would be the real game-changer.</b></span></span></a></span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #c00000; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 16.390625px;">作者</span>: William A. Galston</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 16.390625px;"> 2013年2月20日 </span>The Brookings Institution</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.5;">At a time when everyone in Washington wants to talk about making a “pivot” to Asia, both economically and politically, it would be tempting to dismiss President Obama's decision, announced in his State of the Union address, to pursue a United States-European Union free trade area. It would also be a big mistake. The fact is, the U.S. and the EU have it in their power to enact a potentially game-changing policy that could boost economic growth on both side of the Atlantic, help the transatlantic allies deal more effectively with a rising China, and fill the void left by the collapse of global trade talks.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The focus on China’s surge during the past decade has obscured the continuing strength of Europe and the United States, and their continuing importance for each other. In 2011, the transatlantic economy represented about half of world GDP and $5 trillion in total commercial sales. Taken together, the EU and US account for 25 percent of global exports and 32 percent of global imports. And despite their recent travails, transatlantic consumers retain enormous purchasing power. GDP per capita is about $50,000 in the US and $32,000 in the EU, compared to about $9,000 in China.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">To be sure, as trade with Asia has surged, the share of global trade represented by flows across the Atlantic has declined. But the absolute amounts have not, and the numbers are huge. According to a study by Dan Hamilton and Joe Quinlan of Johns Hopkins’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, the U.S. exports three times as many goods to the EU as to China, and the EU exports twice as much to the U.S. as to China. U.S.-EU merchandise trade totaled about $650 billion in 2012, up 68 percent from the beginning of the century. In addition, the US and EU are the world’s two leading services economies. In 2011, 38 percent of total U.S. service exports went to the EU, and 41 percent of its service imports came from Europe. Between 2001 and 2011, U.S. services exported to the EU more than doubled, from $102 billion to $225 billion, and despite the recent slowdown in Europe, US exports there continued to rise in 2012. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Despite the surge in exports to China, 45 out of 50 U.S. states still export more to Europe than to China, typically by wide margins—eleven times as much for Florida, nine times as much for New Jersey, four times as much for Texas (the leading state exporter to the EU), and three times as much for Illinois. Even the famously westward-looking state of California exported twice as much to Europe as to China..</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Moreover, the United States and Europe overwhelmingly favor one another as locations for foreign direct investment. Since 2000, the share of total FDI going from the U.S. to Europe has remained steady at 56 percent. European investment represents a remarkable 71 percent of total FDI in the United States. The growth of the Chinese economy has not fundamentally changed this calculus. Since the turn of the century, the U.S. has invested 14 times as much in the Netherlands as in China, and 11 times as much in the UK. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Relatively small gains off this huge base could have a big impact. In recent years, trade talks have been divided between negotiations that are too big to succeed and agreements that are too small to matter. With the failure of the Doha round, the old post-war model—fully global trade treaties—has all but collapsed. Bilateral treaties with countries such as Panama, Columbia, and South Korea have proven to be achievable in recent years. But whatever economic boosts those deals provide are not large enough to produce noticeable gains in U.S. economic growth and jobs. The EU-US talks are obviously different. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Although tariffs between the EU and the U.S. are comparatively low, a study by the European Centre for International Political Economy estimated the gains from a transatlantic zero-tariff agreement at between 0.99 and 1.33 percent of GDP for the U.S., and somewhat less for the EU. Another estimate by ECORYS Nederlands BV, which modeled the impact of a broader FTA agreement convering non-tariff barriers as well as tariffs, placed the increase in overall US exports at 5.7 percent. Encouragingly, the impact on job creation and real wages is projected to be positive for both skilled and unskilled workers. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Of course, that leaves the question of whether an agreement is likely to emerge from the negotiations. From a U.S. domestic political standpoint, prospects for progress appear reasonably good. Because European labor, environmental, and regulatory standards are on a par (at least) with ours, the kinds of objections that have slowed the ratification of bilateral treaties with developing countries are much less relevant. At this point, the AFL-CIO seems willing to go along. And the fact that nearly all the states have substantial skin in the EU trade game suggests the potential for a broad coalition in Congress. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Still, significant obstacles remain. Agreeing on an approach to regulation won’t be easy: Brussels and Washington approach this sphere with very different aims and norms. Because Europe’s government contracting is more open to foreign firms than is ours, procurement reform is likely to encounter U.S. opposition, especially among defense contractors. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Agriculture will be especially challenging. Michael Froman, Obama’s advisor on international economic affairs, described it as the “elephant in the room that we can’t ignore.” Not only is Europe’s agriculture subsidy regime even more distortive than ours; the EU virtually bans genetically modified crops, which have become increasingly important in U.S. agriculture, and it doesn’t much like hormone-treated beef or chlorine-sterilized chicken either. In the hyper-polarized Washington atmosphere, there is agreement across party lines on one point: an EU-U.S. agreement that does not open up Europe to American farm products will be dead on arrival. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In that sense, the greatest impediment to a deal may prove to be France. While Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel is gung-ho for a treaty, the French finance minister has been much cooler, describing his country as “open but vigilant.” France has more to lose from agricultural changes than does any other country, and it will resist intense pressure to relax the regime of cultural protectionism that irritates American producers of films and TV shows. On the other hand, France’s exports have fallen by 8 percent since 2008, 5 percentage points worse than Germany’s performance during that period, the economy is stuck in neutral (GDP declined by 0.3 percent between the third and fourth quarters of 2012), and French unemployment has risen by nearly a percentage point, to 10.3 percent, since 2011. If Europe’s other major economic powers can agree to put growth first, Francois Hollande may decide that he cannot afford to stand in the way of an agreement. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But first, Obama will need to show that his commitment to a deal is more than just a matter of rhetoric. While Europe’s negotiating team is in place and ready to get started, the American side is much less settled. It’s hard to see how such detailed and wide-ranging talks could be run out of the White House; Obama will have to select a strong, credible figure as the next United States trade representative, do what it takes to get his nominee confirmed in a timely fashion, and then make sure the USTR has the staff and resources needed to conduct the negotiations. .</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A policy that commands support across international borders as well as domestic party divisions and promotes long-term growth without spending scarce public dollars sounds too good to be true. And maybe that’s what it will turn out to be. Still, thanks to changing circumstances and quietly effective preparatory work, the chances of agreement appear brighter than in decades. Obama’s endorsement of U.S.-EU negotiations reportedly was a last-minute addition to the State of the Union. It might just turn out to be the speech’s most significant sentence..</span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 1.5;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #c00000; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;"><a href="http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/forget-asia-%E2%80%93-time-pivot-europe-8048"><span style="background-color: white; color: #c00000; font-family: Georgia, serif;"><span style="font-size: large;">Forget
Asia – Time to Pivot to Europe</span></span></a></span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #c00000;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 16.390625px;">作者</span>:</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">Robert A. Manning </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16.390625px;"> 2013年2月1日 </span>The National Interest<br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Don’t look now, but for all the buzz about the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, momentum is building on both sides of the Atlantic for a U.S.-EU free trade agreement that could be at least as consequential in shaping the world order. In fact, considering the messy geopolitical landscape with few opportunities and no shortage of challenges, a successful new U.S.-EU accord could well end up as the signature foreign-policy achievement of Obama 2.0.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A U.S.-EU High Level Working Group is expected to issue a report in February calling for initiating talks on a trade and investment accord this spring. This may seem counter-intuitive: isn’t all the economic action in emerging economies, China, or the BRICs? Europe, in contrast, is engulfed in financial crisis. The continent’s future and currency, the Euro, seem in doubt. But Europe cannot be ignored. Today we are beginning to see signs of the EU financial situation stabilizing, with the first positive net inflows in three years, as investors are returning one hundred billion Euros to the Eurozone.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The sheer magnitude of U.S.-EU economic relations is eye-popping. Despite the recession plaguing the West, the U.S. and EU still account for about 50 percent of the world’s GDP and have more than $3 trillion in foreign direct investment in their respective economies. U.S.-EU trade in goods and services reached $636 billion in 2011, nearly 40 percent of the world total. Reinforcing the transatlantic economic relationship could give new impetus and focus to a sagging U.S.-EU relationship and enhance the global leverage of both actors. Call it the new Trans-<i style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; font-size: 18px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Atlantic</i> Partnership.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Hardly had the votes been counted last November when Europe’s top trade official renewed a longstanding call for a new trade agreement with the United States, a view strongly supported by key allies such as Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel and UK prime minister David Cameron. The private sector on both sides of the Atlantic is no less enthusiastic. In a recent<a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7dd264ea-59c3-11e2-88a1-00144feab49a.html" style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px 0px 1px; vertical-align: baseline;">letter</a> published in the <i style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; font-size: 18px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Financial Times,</i> a group of CEOs from Fortune 500 US and European firms stressed their enthusiasm for “a new and comprehensive deal to boost trade and investment flows across the Atlantic.” Reducing tariffs, regulatory barriers and opening new sectors to investment they argued, could boost U.S. and EU growth by as much as 1.5 to 2 percent a year, according to some studies.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Why now? At time when Washington and the EU’s twenty-seven member states are struggling to achieve growth and fiscal pressures make increased spending an improbable option, a trade accord could provide a stimulus at no cost to taxpayers. Such logic may also explain why the European Commission has given a green light to begin Japan-EU talks on an FTA. During a recent visit to Tokyo, senior Japanese officials stressed to me their bullishness on an EU accord, emphasizing that they sought close consultation with the United States as talks move forward. EU eagerness to pursue both accords may also reflect European concern at the proliferation of Asian FTAs and the U.S.-promoted Trans-Pacific Partnership that seeks to boost trade among APEC members.</span></div>
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<b style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; font-size: 18px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Potential Obstacles</span></b></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">U.S. and EU trade tariffs are already low, averaging between 5 and 7 percent. However, a tariff-free accord would boost transatlantic commerce. But the larger issues are non-tariff, regulatory barriers: standards for testing, certification and licensing where the U.S. and EU diverge significantly. Unlike many previous free trade agreements such as NAFTA, where Congressional pressure to adopt U.S. labor and environmental standards has tended to be a sticking point, this time it’s likely to be EU environmental policies, particularly in regard to climate change, that will be tougher on the United States. Labor should not be an issue, as major unions such as the AFL-CIO appear to be supportive of a U.S.-EU trade accord.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">There are some potential obstacles—mainly divergent regulatory approaches—that could well block a U.S.-EU trade accord. Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, was recently quoted in the <i style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; font-size: 18px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Financial Times</i> as saying, “We have differing takes on food safety, consumer protection, and environmental standards.”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Indeed. There have been some nasty disputes over phyto-sanitary standards (particularly in regard to U.S. beef). One macro-issue is the “precautionary principle,”which holds that if there is a risk of harm, the burden of proof is on the provider. This is a somewhat elastic concept: how certain is science? Is it 100 percent risk-free? One of the most the most dramatic divides is over genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which are increasingly used to enhance agriculture in the United States, China, India, Brazil and other countries. GMOs are viewed by many as an increasingly important part of the answer to meeting the challenge of feeding eight billion people by 2030 and nine billion by 2050. African farmers, who have large markets in Europe, have refrained from drought-resistant GMO crops for fear of not being able to export them.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Similarly, on climate change, the EU has adopted a host of policies to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, such as a cap-and-trade scheme for GHG emissions and a tariff on foreign airlines for GHG emissions.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Under strong protest from the United States—including legislation passed by Congress—the EU has suspended its effort to apply tariffs to foreign airlines. But is there room for compromise on GMO food? There are also divergent regulatory approaches to testing and licensing on chemicals, pharmaceuticals and several other categories of goods.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The idea of “mutual recognition” of regulatory standards is one considered way forward. Last spring the United States and EU did sign an agreement on this basis that facilitiates trade for thousands of “authorized traders.” But the gap on things like FDA approval standards for drugs and the EU’s precautionary principle may be a bit of a reach. More likely is a more modest version of mutual recognition: recognizing certified compliance with respective standards and regulations. While obviously not as sweeping or elegantly simple as full mutual recognition, such an approach would facilitate trade and lower transaction costs.</span></div>
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<b style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; font-size: 18px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Global Impact</span></b></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">If there is sufficient political will on both sides of the Atlantic to reach a U.S.-EU trade and investment accord, the impact would have ripple effects well beyond a new impetus for a transatlantic relationship. An accord could shape new global standards in areas such as intellectual property and investment, as well as emerging new sectors such as industries based on nanotechnology, biotechnology, 3-D printing and electric vehicles.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At a moment when the Doha Global trade round is effectively dead, an agreement covering the world’s largest market and 40 percent of its trade could raise standards for other bilateral and regional trade accords, if not provide momentum for further liberalizing global trade and investment—one of the foundations of the global system. A U.S.-EU accord might, for example, give momentum to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At a time of austerity, when many doubt the future military capabilities of NATO allies as defense budgets shrink, a trade accord could reinforce the EU role as a geoeconomic power. Europe has played a critical role, for example in tightening sanctions on Iran well beyond anything the mullahs anticipated. Collaboration with the EU is also key to pressing China to adhere to WTO rules. Acting in economic concert could be a source of leverage for the transatlantic community at a historic moment when power is diffusing to emerging economies like China, India, Brazil and Turkey.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">There are multiple benefits, both economic and geostrategic, to both partners of a U.S.-EU free trade agreement—or economic partnership, as it is likely to be known. Whether its promise can outweigh the differences that must be overcome may be a key political question for Obama’s second term.</span></div>
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<i style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; font-size: 18px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Robert A. Manning is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the State Department as a senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-93) and on the Secretary’s policy planning staff (2004-08).</span></i></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOEaHFCY2fhM1Q5YceCIOa-54KN_OGMlMPaC8CHHXTvMMJc2Gew2cCZUnw3cRgyxNfhCTaFC3tMhgwG36OM0RmT0Pqfq7XCyEGpI2Iu_JL1f8K5rL1kjKkMoMVr-q1GbSDaf5-CvjkVLp2/s1600/isource.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOEaHFCY2fhM1Q5YceCIOa-54KN_OGMlMPaC8CHHXTvMMJc2Gew2cCZUnw3cRgyxNfhCTaFC3tMhgwG36OM0RmT0Pqfq7XCyEGpI2Iu_JL1f8K5rL1kjKkMoMVr-q1GbSDaf5-CvjkVLp2/s1600/isource.jpg" /></span></a></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">-Central Europe’s Worries About U.S. Foreign Policy</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">【<b>Article Summary and Author Biography</b>】Two of the Obama administration’s high-profile foreign policy gambits, the “reset” with Russia and the “pivot” to Asia, have made central and eastern Europe nervous, and with good reason.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <em style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">A woman sweeps the red carpet before Barack Obama's arrival at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. (Peter Andrews / Courtesy Reuters)</em></span></div>
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<span style="border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><em style="background-color: white; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></em></span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">During the 2012 U.S. presidential election, President Barack Obama accused his rival, Mitt Romney, of harboring a worldview better suited to the Cold War than to the twenty-first century. "The 1980s," the president said to Romney in the final debate, are "now calling to ask for their foreign policy back." It was a catchy campaign line and a useful anticipation of Romney's argument that Obama was wrong to pursue warmer relations with Russia at the expense of ties to traditional allies, particularly Poland. But as Obama prepares his foreign policy team for a second four years in office, he would do well to take this part of Romney's message to heart. The Cold War may be over, but the security equation in central and eastern Europe has not been totally solved; Russia still presents a major geopolitical challenge to Western democracies; and maintaining the strength of U.S. alliances in the region is just as important as ever. Even as it seeks to shift resources to the Asia-Pacific region and sustain positive relations with Moscow, the United States cannot afford to pivot away from central Europe.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">Close ties between Washington and central European countries date back to 1999, when NATO welcomed the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as full members. The enlargement of NATO did wonders to stabilize the region, ensuring that it continued on the path to democracy and prosperity. The United States enjoyed a sterling reputation at the time, as Washington provided political and security anchors that bolstered central Europeans' sense that their countries were moving in the right direction. Soon thereafter, Poland participated in the U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, becoming one of the main troop contributors in both operations, mainly to prove its loyalty. Not surprisingly, Poland remained one of the few Western countries in which U.S. President George W. Bush continued to enjoy favorable ratings, even as his Iraq policy inspired revulsion elsewhere in Europe.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Little of that good feeling is left today. Central Europe has become part of the European Union and has taken on much of the Western European public's skepticism about the intentions of U.S. foreign policy. The real change in sentiment, however, began just three years ago, when the Obama administration initiated its so-called reset with Russia. Coupled as it was with a number of gaffes, the move led central European leaders to believe that U.S. priorities had dangerously shifted. Washington's two-decade-old strategic approach to Russia, which aimed to consolidate a zone of democracy and stability on Russia's western flank, was replaced by a contractual approach that prioritized cooperation with Moscow on global issues.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Harboring bitter memories of Soviet domination, central Europeans have always gauged U.S. commitment by virtue of the United States' willingness to be physically present in the region, whether through armed deployments or military exercises. "The more NATO in Poland, the better for us," stated former Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich in 2010, upon inviting the NATO Response Force to hold its first training exercise in Poland.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Today, Poland and its neighbors worry that NATO's commitment to the region is waning. The alliance is in the process of scaling down its operational capabilities, meaning that it will be able to conduct fewer simultaneous operations than in the past. The withdrawal from Europe of two U.S. combat brigades, consisting of some 7,000 troops, makes central Europe similarly nervous. Washington's deployment of rotational units to the region is perceived on the ground as little more than a token gesture of support.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The ups and downs of the missile defense project have also led central Europeans to question the United States' resolve. Right at the outset of his presidency, Obama scrapped the Bush-era plans for installing a missile defense system in Poland, allegedly hoping to gain Russia's support for sanctions against Iran. The decision was unhelpfully announced on September 17, 2009, the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Union's invasion of Poland. Polish leaders are still reeling from the decision; President Bronisław Komorowski said in August that his country's "mistake was that by accepting the American offer of a [missile defense] shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with a change of president. We paid a high political price." Today, Warsaw is planning to build its own missile defense system as part of the larger NATO shield.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Central European countries feared that the Russia reset would mean not only a reduction of military support for the region but also a move away from a policy based on liberal principles toward one based on realpolitik. They understood that such a policy was exactly what Russia wanted, and that Moscow would exploit it with a vengeance. The ruthlessness with which Russia pursues its interests in Syria, in spite of the Assad regime's atrocities, is a case in point. Over three years after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with the infamous reset button, it remains unclear whether the United States' bid for warmer relations with Russia has paid off. True, Washington and Moscow have been able to cooperate to some degree on Iran policy, but Russia itself already has a strong national interest in preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and likely would have worked with the United States even without prodding from the Obama administration.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">At the same time, Russia has been quick to capitalize on the reset. Russian President Vladimir Putin's concept of a "Eurasian Union," a political and economic grouping of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with designs to expand to other Eurasian states, is a cynical response to both Washington's reduced role in eastern Europe and the European Union's loss of influence in the area. Russia is now attempting to restore elements of its former empire with the autocratic regimes of Belarus and Kazakhstan as the foundation, having introduced among them a customs union and the Eurasian Economic Commission to institutionalize the ties. As a result, central Europe feels that it has been doubly abandoned by Washington, both materially, by means of a more lukewarm U.S. engagement in the region, and in terms of principles, as Obama has not been as steadfast a proponent of the so-called freedom agenda as his predecessor was. Washington's high-profile "pivot" to Asia, coupled with the U.S. Congress' zeal for smaller budgets, has only strengthened this perception.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">A smaller focus on central Europe might seem sensible given the perception that the region has successfully transformed itself into a prosperous and democratic area, and thus does not require as much attention as it once received. To some extent, this is a valid point: Poland, at least, has enjoyed a golden decade of good feelings and rising levels of prosperity.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">But the situation elsewhere is not as straightforward. The Hungarian and Romanian governments have turned their backs on democratic norms. At the same time, the region has not resolved all its security dilemmas. Russia's recent decision to install mobile surface-to-air S-400 missiles in Kaliningrad, near the Polish border, is one example of Moscow's provocative behavior. Russia has indicated to central European leaders that this is the price for agreeing to host the planned U.S. missile defense system, even though it has not yet been constructed and is explicitly directed at Iran, not Russia. As Estonian President Toomas Ilves put it, "We would very much like the allies who have proposed [missile defense] not to leave this area with less security" than before.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">For central European leaders, then, the Obama administration's policy seems to have amounted to a premature and risky withdrawal from a region that has not yet balanced its geopolitical equation. Particularly as the European Union and the eurozone face a political and economic crisis, central Europeans feel that it is not the right time for Washington to retreat from their region.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The U.S. pivot out of central Europe should be measured by not only Washington's backtracking on earlier plans to increase its military presence in the region but also its loss of political influence there. In the 1990s, as the main architect of NATO enlargement, the United States became a major player in central Europe. Far from representing merely an extension of the security umbrella, NATO enlargement proved to the region's publics that their ambitions to rejoin the West would soon be realized. This was a great boost to morale. Today, however, Washington is no longer such a central player. This is largely the result of the region's successful integration into the European Union, a process that the United States has supported and that has had tremendous transformative power. But no matter how close countries such as Poland have drawn to Western Europe, its security remains fragile and could be thrown into jeopardy in the event of a crisis such as a skirmish along the lines of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. </span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">This is not to say that Poland wants the United States to adopt an uncompromising attitude toward Russia. For its part, Warsaw has also pursued rapprochement with Moscow in recent years. Putin voiced commitment to working with Poland during his 2009 visit to Gdańsk on the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. His friendly overtures were rooted in Poland's growing role in the European Union, which was still considered a rising force in world affairs at the time. Today, however, Russian leaders tend to believe that European integration has run its course and that the European Union is a declining power. Meanwhile, Warsaw continues to hope for a rapprochement but believes it can happen only if Russia reexamines its view of the world. "You cannot 'reset' with 1,000 years of history," Komorowski said in a 2010 speech. "But we can invest in new relations with Russia. Reset can happen at the end of the process, not the beginning."</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Central European leaders share Washington's hope that Russia can become a predictable, cooperative, and engaged partner. But in geopolitics, miracles rarely happen by themselves. It would be folly to expect Russia not to exercise its power right up to the limits that other countries, especially the United States, draw for it. Yet ironically, the greatest fear in central Europe today is not Russia's strength but rather its weakness. Russia's economy and state budget are at the mercy of oil and gas prices, and its demographic situation looks bleak. These challenges could very well lead to Russia's behaving in unpredictable and provocative ways. After all, it has been only four short years since Russia's war with Georgia, in which Moscow reacted to Tbilisi's provocations with disproportionate force, invading a former Soviet republic for the first time since the end of the Cold War.</span></div>
<div style="border: 0px; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1.5385em; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The United States need not, however, give up hope for warmer relations with Russia, provided Moscow embarks on a path to reform. A necessary sense of realism can be coupled with support for Russia's transformation. Given the autocratic character of the Russian leadership, the West must verify the country's intentions in world affairs at the same time that it encourages Russia to escape the limitations of its past. This means that the West should seek to integrate Russia more closely into the liberal world order, a process that the country's accession to the World Trade Organization indicates is already under way, at least to some extent.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><em style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="border: 0px; color: #444444; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">PAWEŁ ŚWIEBODA is President of demos EUROPA -- Centre for European Strategy, a public policy institute in Warsaw.</span></em></span></div>
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<br />版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-32659663168032939342013-02-26T11:50:00.001-08:002013-02-26T12:31:27.883-08:00尹永宽:The Asian Sleepwalkers<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">作者:</span><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: 新細明體, serif;">尹永宽</span> 2013</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年</span><span lang="EN-US">1</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">月2</span><span lang="EN-US">9</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">日</span><span lang="EN-US">Project
Syndicate </span><br />
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<a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/east-asia-s-dangerous-diplomatic-failures-by-yoon-young-kwan" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6YY4FvDu8fuPCqQQ1fmPDgCOxop6u7YMkrUe6zdjpgCTOFaUJT8xnC8IN201AyDB27rz72ARvwbDUVlSZnwE0lXPHS42-Z_5lXb9fN6UF2StHY_QkgqxOISJWPz9qfj5QG_-85R-v3Z-M/s320/07-01.jpg" width="250" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">不管东亚政治家和专家学者是否喜欢,该地区最近的国际关系与</span><span lang="EN-US">19</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">世纪欧洲的实力平衡政治,而不是与当下欧洲的稳定状态更为相似<b>。</b>东亚民族主义和领土纠纷正在升级,同时也缺少有效的制度性机制促成安全合作。</span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">尽管中国、日本、韩国和东盟国家的经济联系仍在不断加深,但它们的外交关系充满了敌意和怀疑,一如一战前数十年间欧洲各国。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">彼时和今日的一大共同点是实力变迁。彼时,英国的相对实力在衰落,而德国自</span><span lang="EN-US">1871</span></b><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>年统一后开始崛起</b>。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">类似地,至少在经济实力上(军事姑且不论),<b>美国和日本似乎已经开始了相对中国的衰落过程。</b>当然,这一过程并不是不可逆的。若美国和日本能出现有效的政治领导和成功的民主改革,<b>而中国不能有效管理自下而上的政治压力,则有可能中止这一看似势不可挡的实力变迁之势</b>。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>实力大变迁往往是关键政治领导人可能做出严重外交政策错误决定的时期</b>。事实上,在这个当口出现拙劣的国际关系处理通常会导致大战。<b>崛起势力总是要求在国际政治中拥有更重要的地位,而衰落势力总是拒绝调整</b>,关键决策者可能误解其他国家领导人的意图,对后者的行为作出过度反应。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/east-asia-s-dangerous-diplomatic-failures-by-yoon-young-kwan/chinese" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-J7bJsHC5C6w/USIGwhKw2DI/AAAAAAAAMAY/7bAdjn8BOpE/s1600/%E5%B0%B9%E6%B0%B8%E5%AE%BD.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>从历史上看,崛起势力总是太过自信,操之过急,从而导致鲁莽行事,引起邻国担忧</b>。比如,</span><span lang="EN-US">1890</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年,德皇威廉二世撤去俾斯麦总理之职,并开始破坏俾斯麦精心打造的同盟网,而此时第二帝国形成不过</span><span lang="EN-US">20</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年。<b>他的强硬外交令法国、英国和俄国大惊失色,轻易地使它们形成了反德同盟。</b></span><span lang="EN-US"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">2010</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年,中国显示出新的外交自信</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">紧随</span><span lang="EN-US">20</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">世纪</span><span lang="EN-US">30</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年代以来最严重的金融危机出现</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">这让人们想起了威廉二世的德国。在这两个例子中,不安全并非来自外部威胁,而来自最高决策者自身的行为。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><b>2010</b></span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>年末</b>,中国高级领导人、国务委员<b>戴秉国宣称中国将坚持和平发展道路</b>,这令我长舒一口气。但某些中国官员</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">特别是军方人士</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">对南海和其他争议中国主权主张的说法表明,并非所有中国领导人都会全心全意坚持这条道路。中国新领导人习近平在确定决策时会在多大程度上考虑邻国带来的不安全因素</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">并放弃中国绝对安全的要求</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">将是未来数年中影响东亚安全环境的一大关键变数。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">美国的外交政策是另一个关键因素。<b>如果美国采取的主要是对抗的态度,那么东亚政坛将免不了出现极化,一如</b></span><span lang="EN-US"><b>19</b></span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>世纪的多极欧洲随着德国和英国的剑拔弩张而步入两极秩序。</b>照此看来,美国的所谓</span><span lang="EN-US">“</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>亚洲支点</b></span><span lang="EN-US">”</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">可能是必要的,因为它担心其亚洲盟友对中国的态度。<b>但是,除非美国想让亚洲回到冷战时期的对峙状态,否则它必须更加致力于将中国纳入可行的地区安全结构内</b>。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">此外,<b>美国对中国采取对抗态度还会带来一个新的不稳定因素:日本可能会在外交政策上过于激进。</b></span><span lang="EN-US">19</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">世纪</span><span lang="EN-US">90</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年代,德皇二世停止与俄国的互动后,双边关系开始恶化,德国的盟国奥地利获得了处理塞尔维亚</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">以及更重要的塞尔维亚的俄国保护人</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">事务的外交全权委托。<b>德皇二世就这样在无意中为</b></span><span lang="EN-US"><b>1914</b></span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><b>年大战爆发做出了贡献</b>。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">日本的失误迹象已有所显示。据报道,<b>日本新首相安倍晋三声称正在考虑否认日军在二战期间强奸和奴役亚洲和欧洲妇女的</b></span><b><span lang="EN-US">1993</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年</span><span lang="EN-US">“</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">河野谈话</span><span lang="EN-US">”</span></b><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">。如果安倍晋三真的这么做了,那么日本与韩国和中国的关系将急转直下。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">这不符合任何人的利益,包括日本在内,因为日本与韩国存在大量的共同安全问题。因此,美国必须拿出巧妙的外交手段。<b>它必须减轻中国崛起给日本带来的安全忧虑,同时也要说服日本新领导人谨慎行动,不要做出出格的民族主义行为</b>。坦白说,在经历了二十年的经济停滞后,日本有更重要的事情值得优先考虑。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">与在欧洲的多边努力不同,二战结束后美国在亚洲建立了中心辐射型安全框架</span><span lang="EN-US">——</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">以美国为中心的双边盟友关系。由此带来的一个结果是亚洲国家之间从未建立过直接的安全合作渠道,而这又导致了东亚国家之间缺乏信任,即使是同为美国盟友的日本和韩国。这也是作为美国中等规模盟友的韩国比东北亚其他更大的国家更适合担任促进器的原因。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">导致一战的外交失策给了我们许多教训。克里斯托弗</span><span lang="EN-US">·</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">克拉克(</span><span lang="EN-US">Christopher Clark</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">)在讲述一战前外交形势的新历史著作中将其妙称为《梦游者》(</span><span lang="EN-US">The Sleepwalkers</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">)。如今,美国和东亚领导人面临的问题是他们能不能在给自己造成严重伤害之前觉醒并找到有效的安全合作多边机制。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #414142; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 15px;">Yoon Young-kwan, South Korea's foreign minister from 2003 to 2004, is currently Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University and a visiting professor at the Free University of Berlin.</span><br />
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版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-43109241812593089162013-02-23T23:18:00.000-08:002013-02-28T02:47:08.304-08:00美国重返亚太战略中的日本角色<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 22.383333206176758px; text-align: justify;">作者:</span><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: none; background-color: #fcfbf0; font-family: 宋体; font-size: 14px; line-height: 21px; text-align: -webkit-center;">王鹏 邵丹</span><span style="font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 22.383333206176758px; text-align: justify;"> 2012-11-17 </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">新华国际</span></span></span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9KguvaAKSsOMOG5fZIxRAQFJBk8lKJjNPCqbYK1fQwNKvDLssFnRFerR6Kn6RSYgx4T7_2xs1Cr0Iy5rWl7fF0kxZMPu2gMtdHx1cBKUm6lUtzEINUw6SQC42nCFXJWKO4-kxvPt537tb/s1600/20121206092106173.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="111" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9KguvaAKSsOMOG5fZIxRAQFJBk8lKJjNPCqbYK1fQwNKvDLssFnRFerR6Kn6RSYgx4T7_2xs1Cr0Iy5rWl7fF0kxZMPu2gMtdHx1cBKUm6lUtzEINUw6SQC42nCFXJWKO4-kxvPt537tb/s200/20121206092106173.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: none; background-color: #fcfbf0; color: #444444; font-family: 宋体; font-size: 14px; line-height: 25px; text-indent: 2em;">近日,中日关系因钓鱼岛主权之争降至冰点。日本政府不负责任的言行是造成这一问题持续升温的直接原因,但美国口头中立和行动偏袒日方的态度也或明或暗起着一定的作用。从更深层次看,日美两国之间越来越深的同盟关系,以及美国实行的重返亚太战略都与此有着千丝万缕的联系。</span><br />
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<strong style="background-color: white; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #444444;">历史与现实中的“铁杆”盟友</span></strong></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">日美同盟源于日本特殊的地理位置,日本列岛位于亚洲大陆东岸外的太平洋上,在西方学者眼中,日本扼守着东北亚陆权国家通向太平洋的重要通道,是抵御陆权国家东扩的桥头堡。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">在现代地缘政治中,日本九州岛、琉球群岛是第一岛链的组成部分,其北海道、本州岛、小笠原群岛又是第二岛链的组成部分。因此,作为西太平洋地区举足轻重的一颗“棋子”,日本天然地成为西太平洋地区陆权与海权国家对抗的焦点。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">日本自明治维新后因“脱亚入欧”战略取向所形成的侵略本性,造成了其与亚洲邻国地缘政治关系的长期紧张,也使日本倾向于同域外的强国结盟。日本从近代开始先后缔结了日英同盟、日俄协约和德意日三国同盟。三次结盟的共同特点是都与欧美强国结盟,而与亚洲国家为敌。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">东亚地缘政治环境、日本地缘战略取向、日本国力的结构性缺陷和日本文化的亲欧美倾向等多种因素,使日本成为亚洲最具对外结盟“偏好”的国家。而从二战结束后保持至今的日美同盟,也是这种政治传统的延续。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">日本对美战略地位重要性的体现始于冷战,尤其是朝鲜战争的爆发,凸现出了日本对美全球战略在亚太地区的支撑作用。日本则是出于重建的需要确定了自己“亲美”的战略取向。1951年,美日签订《日美安全保障条约》,日美同盟的序幕就此拉开。美国不但承担了日本的安全与防务,更是将其作为在亚洲地区对抗苏联社会主义阵营的重要一翼。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">1960年1月19日,美日重新签订了《日美共同合作与安全保障条约》,日本地位被抬升至“同盟”,开始分担美国在亚太地区的防务责任,两国正式联手对抗苏联。日本此时对自身的定位也逐渐明晰,由最初的被动依靠美国逐步向主动投靠美国转变,甚至提出充当西太平洋的“反共防波堤”。上世纪80年代初进一步提出成为防止苏联向西太平洋扩张的“不沉的航空母舰”。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;"> 苏联解体后,日美同盟关系一度进入“漂流”状态。但在上世纪90年代后半期,面对中国的迅速发展,两国又一次找到了新的共同目标——遏制中国。1996年4月17日,美日签订《日美安全保障联合宣言》,明确日美同盟的新作用是共同保卫日本和应付日本周边事态。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">从日美同盟形成的历史可以看出,这种同盟是建立在稳固的双向需求基础上,两国属于相互利用的共同体。而在当前的现实环境中,这种需求就更为强烈了。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">从全球战略环境来看,欧洲一体化的进程大大削弱了美国对欧洲事务的主导权和控制权,迫使美国将战略重心由欧洲转向亚太地区。2011年,美国开始高调提出重返亚太战略,其主导亚太、应对中国的意图十分明显。日本正是这一重心转移最佳的落脚点,美国需要日本助其顺利完成新的战略部署。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">同时,日本面对的现实环境也需要稳固的日美同盟作其强大的后盾。除了与中国的钓鱼岛主权之争,日本当前还面临着日俄北方四岛、日韩独岛等诸多主权争端。仅凭一己之力,日本难以应对。正是有了美国这个“靠山”,日本才能以“自卫”为名不断扩军增容,在近年的岛屿问题处理上态度也日趋强硬。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">曾在今年4月至7月担任日本防卫大臣助理的日本帝京大学教授,也是自民党国家战略本部成员的志方俊之在其撰写的《日本的国家安全战略》一文中对日美同盟的地位和方式有着透彻的分析。他认为,“日本的国家安全保障应以日美安全保障为基石,日本应发展以美日防务合作为前提的自卫力量,追求美军为矛、自卫队为盾的责任分担,认清驻日美军起着维护亚太地区稳定与繁荣的作用,支援美军在亚太地区的前沿部署。”</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">长期以来,驻日美军虽然因个别官兵军纪败坏在日本民众心目中造成了恶劣影响,并招致日本民众强烈反对,甚至连日本地方政府也时不时在驻日美军基地搬迁和建设问题上表达强硬态度。但应该清醒地看到,这些话题的炒作更多属于日本民族情绪的宣泄和释放,一旦触及日美同盟的根本利益,这些就都不是问题了。</span></span></div>
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<strong style="background-color: white; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #444444;">苦心经营的驻日美军基地</span></strong></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">美国对日本战略地位的高度重视,最集中和具体的体现就是战后驻日美军基地的建设。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">经过长期苦心经营,美军在亚太地区构建了以东北亚基地群、东南亚基地群、关岛基地群和澳大利亚基地群4大基地群为支撑的军事基地体系。其中,东北亚基地群最为重要,而东北亚基地群又以驻日美军基地为主体。</span></span></div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-VbdaiQk2lTs/UKivs9emZ5I/AAAAAAAAAZA/KNvNmLK_ahU/s1600/%E6%A8%AA%E9%A1%BB%E8%B4%BA%E6%B5%B7%E5%86%9B%E5%9F%BA%E5%9C%B0.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: white; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><span style="color: #444444;"><img border="0" height="285" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-VbdaiQk2lTs/UKivs9emZ5I/AAAAAAAAAZA/KNvNmLK_ahU/s400/%E6%A8%AA%E9%A1%BB%E8%B4%BA%E6%B5%B7%E5%86%9B%E5%9F%BA%E5%9C%B0.jpg" width="400" /></span></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">横须贺海军基地</span></span></td></tr>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">从总体上看,驻日美军基地不但数量多、功能全,而且部署的兵力规模大、作战能力强。2011年年底美国防部公布的《2011年度基地结构报告》显示,驻日美军有空军基地35个、海军基地38个、海军陆战队基地21个、陆军基地15个,基地总数为109个。其中,起骨干支撑作用的大中型基地有14个,最具代表性的包括:部署“乔治·华盛顿”号核动力航母的横须贺海军基地、部署V-22“鱼鹰”的普天间陆战队基地、可部署F-22“猛禽”的嘉手纳空军基地。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">以形成体系的驻日美军基地为依托,美日的军事合作也越来越实。1997年9月,两国重新修改了《防卫合作指针》,提出美日“平时合作、日本有事时合作和发生周边事态时合作”的三大合作机制。其军事合作最集中的体现就是两国共同举行的联合军事演习,这也是宣示两国密切同盟关系的最佳方式。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">美日联合军事演习始于20世纪50年代,演习的类型和数量随着时间的推移不断增多,到现在已增至16种之多。如代号“山樱”、“北风”和“东方盾牌”的美陆军和日陆上自卫队联合演习,代号“森林之光”、“铁拳”的美海军陆战队与日陆上自卫队联合演习,代号“对抗北方”的美空军与日航空自卫队联合防空演习,代号“利剑”的美日联合演习。这些演习在内容上既有指挥所图上演练、计算机模拟推演,也有实兵对抗。值得注意的是,近年来美日联合演习课目的进攻性越来越强、演习范围越来越广,针对中国的指向性也越来越明确。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">近日备受关注的美日联合演习就是年度例行的“利剑”演习,演习内容包括两栖登陆、空中远程对海攻击、防空压制等现代登陆作战课目。此系列演习的目的是加强美日对“西南诸岛”的攻防,向外界释放了日本在“视为必要”的情况下可能使用武力解决岛屿争端的危险信号。</span></span></div>
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<strong style="background-color: white; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #444444;">“空海一体战”中的日本角色</span></strong></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">冷战结束后,美国的战略准备方向和预设作战对象都发生了较大变化,日本从昔日遏制苏联的次要战场转变为今日遏制中国的主要战场,对美国战略地位的重要性不但没有降低,反而得以大幅度提升。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">2007年,美国兰德公司曾发布过一份名为《中国的反进入战略及其对美国影响》的报告,将中国视为未来妨碍美国在亚太地区利益的主要对手。2010年5月18日,美“战略与预算评估中心”在国会高调推出酝酿已久的“空海一体战”理论。2011年8月,美国正式组建“空海一体战”办公室,该理论成为美军在亚太地区进行战争准备的指导思想。美军拿出了冷战时期以“空地一体战”理论对抗苏联的劲头来应对中国,而日本这一次在其中扮演了更为重要的角色。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">在“空海一体战”理论中,日本被赋予了两项重要职责:一是抗打,即扛住来自中国的“第一击”,并且要保存尽可能多的有生力量;二是反击,即作为美军实施大规模海空反攻的前进基地。总揽美日近些年在日本本土进行的军事建设,不难看出美日正是以此为出发点,加强了在太空、空中和海上的战场建设。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">空间战场建设是近年日美关注的重点,被视作未来两国实施反导作战的基础。自2006年美国在日本北部地区的日本航空自卫队车力基地部署第一部探测距离达6000公里的AN/TPY-2 X波段导弹预警雷达后,美日两国还要在日本南部地区为第二部该型雷达选址部署,以增强日本预防弹道导弹的能力,将日本打造成反导的第一道防线。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">在空中战场建设中,美军驻冲绳嘉手纳基地一直是其在本土以外快速反应作战能力最强、规模最大的综合性空军基地,也是美海军重要的航空站。该基地机场最多可容纳100架飞机,美军战机从这里出发不到20分钟即可飞抵中国大陆。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">自2007年以来,美军多次将F-22“猛禽”战机“临时部署”于该基地,以展现其对日本防务承担的责任。而“临时部署”的方法也用心良苦,既是为了让“猛禽”熟悉战场环境和保持基地对该型机的保障能力,在某种程度上讲也是一种避免将这一最为宝贵的战斗资源置于可能“威胁”之下的防护措施。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">对于海上战场的建设,美国虽然在日本已有佐世保、横须贺和白滩等大型港口,足以满足航空母舰、核潜艇等各型舰艇日常保障的需要,但在2012年1月,根据日本《每日新闻》报道,美国海军又将日本秋田、新、下关、博多、长崎等6个港口定位为“重要港口”,以作为后勤补给和发起攻击的据点。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">之所以确定这些“动员港”,意在弥补当前海军基地布局的缺陷,以免支撑太平洋美海军作战的“重心”过重且数量太少而易遭打击,形成冗余度更大、生存能力更强的海军港口基地体系。同时,日美还要以P-3C反潜巡逻机、新型声呐和近程鱼雷构筑“亚太反潜链”,专门用于对抗中朝潜艇。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">总的来看,近年美日战场建设和军事准备有两个特点极为突出:一是针对东亚大陆的目的性很强。明为应对朝鲜威胁,实则与中国较劲;二是为大规模海空战争做准备的意图很明显。按照“空海一体战”的思路,美国必须要以强大的海空力量全面压制中国以常规导弹部队、一体化防空系统为代表的“反进入”力量,才能在军事对抗中取胜。</span></span></div>
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<strong style="background-color: white; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #444444;">钓鱼岛之争与日美同盟</span></strong><br />
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<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dCW2bXwA2Ms/UKisOooRp1I/AAAAAAAAAYw/hrbMShUqdxM/s1600/%25E9%2592%2593%25E9%25B1%25BC%25E5%25B2%259B%25E4%25B8%25BB%25E6%259D%25835.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;"><img border="0" height="156" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dCW2bXwA2Ms/UKisOooRp1I/AAAAAAAAAYw/hrbMShUqdxM/s320/%25E9%2592%2593%25E9%25B1%25BC%25E5%25B2%259B%25E4%25B8%25BB%25E6%259D%25835.jpg" width="320" /></span></span></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; text-indent: 2em;">此次中日钓鱼岛之争持续升温,美国的立场对日本很重要,这也是对日美同盟关系的一次考验</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">美国所表现出来的态度值得玩味。一方面,美国宣布采取“不持特定立场”的“中立”态度;另一方面美国又对日本单方面取消“利剑”演习的夺岛内容,以避免刺激中国的做法表示不满。这实际上表明了美国态度的两面性,既不愿意站在前台与中国发生正面冲突,但也不愿意中日双方在钓鱼岛问题上能够息事宁人。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">究其原因有两点,一是钓鱼岛本身是日本的利益而非美国的利益;二是钓鱼岛问题从日本的角度讲是主权归属问题,而在美国看来,钓鱼岛的位置则与封堵中国的海上岛链密切相关,失去这一环节无疑是在链条上打开了一个缺口。从地缘战略的角度考虑,美国当然不愿意让钓鱼岛归于中国。因此,美国在钓鱼岛问题上虽然口头中立,但在行动上毫无疑问支持和偏袒日本。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">10月29日,印美日第三轮三边会谈在印度新德里举行。美国副国务卿威廉·伯恩斯在会谈之前就曾表示,“近来在东中国海和南中国海出现的摩擦清楚地提醒我们,民族主义正在迅速抬头”。三方的接触有助于“密切注意该地区的不良趋势”。不言而喻,这就是美国的一种表态。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">从另一个角度来看,美国之所以在一开始就以默许的态度静观日本将钓鱼岛问题由发酵至爆发,再到持续升温,目的在于让日本民众真切体会一下来自中国的“威胁”,这样日本民众才会发自内心地感受到美军驻日的必要性。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">11月9日,日本共同社报道,日美两国政府磋商于12月修改1997年修订的日美防务指针,内容将以强化冲绳西南诸岛附近的警戒监视活动的“动态防卫合作”为主,重点把中国因素考虑在内。不难看出,日本对于钓鱼岛问题的解决仍寄希望于日美军事同盟的加强上。这种思路和做法不但不能从根本上解决争端,只会进一步加深矛盾和恶化局势。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">今天的钓鱼岛问题实际上不但已经成为日本强化日美军事同盟的借口,也成为了美国加速实行重返亚洲战略的一个着力点。而对于中日两国之间历史遗留下来的这个难题,妥善解决的关键在于双方的诚意与理解,但从目前的形势来看,还有相当长的路要走。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #444444;">(作者单位:空军工程大学、空军指挥学院)</span></span><br />
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<br />版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-30890694634118970072013-02-23T23:15:00.001-08:002013-02-28T03:33:17.293-08:00朱锋:奥巴马政府“转身亚洲”战略与中美关系<span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; word-break: break-all;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 18px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; word-break: break-all;">朱锋 </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 22.383333206176758px; text-align: justify;">2012年</span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 25px;">《现代国际关系》</span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 25px;">第</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 25px;">4</span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 25px;">期</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 25px;"> </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">〔内容提要〕</strong>奥巴马政府“转身亚洲”战略的出台虽然不代表美对华政策发生了根本性转变,但美国随之采取的一系列军事和外交调整与行动表明,美已将战略重心转移至亚太地区,其对中国的认识与判断正在出现新的重大变化,已经将中国作为最主要的军事“假想敌”。</span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在东亚地区安全上,美国不再依赖“中美合作”,而是侧重以继续强化美在该地区战略存在和战略主导、协调与盟国及新兴伙伴关系的方式来稳定地区安全秩序; 同时扩大以制衡中国为主体的安全体系。该战略代表着美国亚太政策的又一次重大转型,中国对其战略含义与动向绝不可低估。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> </span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;"> </span><strong style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"> 〔关键词</strong><strong style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">〕</strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">“转身亚洲”战略 奥巴马政府 中美关系</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 2011 年 11 月 10 日,美国国务卿希拉里于APEC 夏威夷首脑会议前夕在夏威夷大学东西方研究中心发表演讲,提出了美国将“转身亚洲”( Pivo-ting Asia) 的新概念。与此同时,美国总统奥巴马也在檀香山的演讲中强调美全球经济、安全和战略重心将全面转向亚太。“转身战略”出台伊始,许多分析认为这一新的政策宣示很可能“虚多实少”。其原因一是美国不可能忽视与中国的经济和外交利益而全面转向同中国的对抗政策; 二是美国目前面临着严峻的联邦财政赤字,为了“减赤”,将不得不压缩军费甚至削减军力; 三是中东局势因为伊朗、叙利亚和阿以冲突问题都在短期内难以解决,美国即便想要“转身亚太”,恐怕也有心无力; 四是奥巴马上台伊始即提出“重返亚洲”的口号,强化了对亚洲军事、经济与安全事务的参与,2011 年提出“转身战略”,不过是在姿态上更高调。然而,在“转身亚洲”概念提出半年后,这一战略的新内涵已经逐步清晰化。“转身亚洲”很大程度上确实代表了冷战结束以来美国亚太战略的又一次重大转型。对其战略含义与动向,中国绝不可低估。这一战略很可能会给未来东亚安全格局的演变带来新起点和新态势。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"> “转身亚洲”战略的基本内容</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 从奥巴马政府主要官员的讲话、2011 年 11 月之后陆续公布的政策文件一直到所采取的相关行动看,美“转身亚太”战略的主要内容已经越来越明确。首先,“转身亚洲”战略是全面巩固 21 世纪美国在亚太主导地位的“世纪领袖型”战略。美国将加大对亚太地区的政治、经济和外交投入,在 21 世纪坚定地扮演亚太地区领袖的角色,并承担地区安全与稳定责任。奥巴马 2011 年 11 月 17 日在澳大利亚国会发表演讲时提出,美国的目标是在亚太地区“扮演更大和更为长远的角色,以便重塑亚太地区和它的未来”。在谈及美国军费削减时,他承诺不会削减美在亚太地区的军事存在。国务卿希拉里则强调亚太地区的繁荣和稳定需要美国的“坚强领导”,称美要扮演亚太地区“一个世纪的”领袖角色。奥巴马不仅在 2011 年 11 月 20 日的东亚首脑峰会( EAS) 上高调谈论南海问题,还誓言将坚定履行美对亚太地区盟友、伙伴的“承诺”。在南海问题上,美力主东盟国家主导的多边对话和解决机制。虽然白宫表示美对南海争议岛屿的主权归属没有特定意见,但奥巴马政府竭力强调南海问题是“航行自由”问题的做法,表明在中国与东盟有关国家的南海争议中,美国已经全面偏向了后者。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 其次,“转身亚洲”战略是美全球战略重点转移到亚太地区的“战略重心型”战略。这不仅是为美在“后伊拉克—阿富汗时代”寻找新的战略方向,同时也表明美对今后全球安全战略态势的评估正在出现重大变化。2011 年 12 月 18 日,美完成从伊拉克全部撤军,并决定 2013 年提前结束在阿富汗的军事行动。未来美军全球战略态势将如何重新规划? 此外,受联邦财政赤字居高不下的影响,美军未来势必面对一个军费开支削减、“过紧日子”的时代。“转身亚洲”战略代表了奥巴马政府既要紧缩军备开支,又要继续保持美军在全球战略部署和战略目标应对情况下的新选择。为此,美宣布将在澳大利亚北部的达尔文港建立美军新的基地,计划 2 -3 年内部署 200 名、并最后增加到 2500 名海军陆战队士兵; 在新加坡部署 4 艘濒海战斗舰; 在菲律宾选择以轮换方式定期驻扎军队。这是冷战结束 20 年后,美重新在亚太扩大军事基地数量。力图进一步加强美军在亚太地区战略影响力的“转身亚洲”战略,设定了美准备推行的新军事战略的基调。美 2012 年 1月 5 日推出的《维持美国的全球领导地位: 21 世纪国防优先事项》报告,明确将在亚太地区进行的“战略再平衡”作为美军未来调整军事力量、优化全球战略部署以及确认应对威胁的新军事重点任务的核心环节。为此,美准备削减未来海外维稳行动的军事投入,计划将陆军从现有的 58 万人削减到 49万,将 22 万人的海军陆战队削减到 18 万。但美军所拥有的 11 艘航空母舰将不做任何削减; 而被称为史上最昂贵的 F -35 战机的生产和采购计划即便有所调整,也仍然会以针对中国的军事需要进行装备和部署。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 第三,“转身亚洲”战略是美国促进亚太地区国家“遵守规则”、并为地区安全热点问题制定和提供规则的“规则导向型”战略。这一战略的核心就是要用国际规则和规范约束和引导中国,使美将来面对和处理“中国话题”时,能联合地区其他国家在“规则制定”和“规则适用”的范畴内共同对付中国。按照美国家安全事务助理多尼隆的说法,“转身亚太”战略的最终目标,是“帮助亚洲重新形成和制定相关规则与规范、保证国际法和国际规范得到普遍的尊重,以促进和保障美国在该地区的利益。与此同时,商业和航行自由将不会受到任何损害,新兴大国可以和邻国建立信赖,争议可以得到和平解决而不至于使用威胁或者强制”。自 2011 年 11 月以来,推动中国遵守和履行各种国际规则和规范,成为奥巴马谈论中国政策时的重要内容。2012 年 1 月奥巴马在接受《时代》周刊专访时特意强调,“中国认为自己是发展中国家,因此不能与美国和欧洲适用一样的规则”,但中国已经长大,是世界第二大经济体,所以“无论在航海或贸易议题上,中国不能只选择对自己有利的,而必须遵守游戏规则,这也是亚太国家所希望的”。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 第四,“转身亚洲”战略更是美重振对亚太地区经济竞争力、反应其经济活动的规模和深度已从欧洲转向亚太的“经济强身型”战略。近十年来,美国与亚太地区的经济、贸易及金融联系不断深化和扩大,美国经济与亚太的关联度远远超过了美与其他地区的经贸联系( 参见表1 和表2) 。“转身亚太”战略在外交、经济和战略等领域“多管齐下”,谋求美从亚太经济中获益和让亚太区域贸易成为美出口振兴战略突破点的同时,进而主导区域经济合作的未来发展方向。奥巴马在2009 年宣布美加入“跨太平洋战略经济伙伴关系计划”,并一直将推动“跨太平洋战略经济伙伴协定”( TPP) 框架的成型作为美参与亚太投资与贸易自由化进程最重要的手段。美目前在亚太区域经济合作进程中竭力“以我为主”,拉拢日本、澳大利亚等国打造 TPP,无非是要设置合作中的“美国标准”,以此规范中国,提升美在经济领域全面针对中国及其他国家的贸易竞争优势。但另一方面,以 TPP 为代表的美对亚洲出口振兴计划,也深刻反映了美面对中国崛起的新的战略忧虑——美经济实力的相对衰落有可能使其在与中国的战略竞争中无以为继。TPP 涉及的美国亚太贸易振兴战略很大程度上是稳定和巩固美亚太战略存在的经济基础。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">“转身亚洲”战略的基本特点</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 与冷战后美国历届政府的东亚和亚太战略相比,奥巴马政府的“转身亚洲”战略有以下显著特点。其一,冷战结束 20 年来,美第一次显著扩大在亚太地区的军事存在,不惜推行新的军事扩张主义,加深和加强美应对中国崛起带来的地区安全局势新变化。尤其是美军针对中国的“区域拒止/反介入战略”( Area - denial& Anti - Access) 所做出的一系列旨在构建和执行“空海一体战”( Air- sea Battle) 的军力发展构想,代表了美今后军事力量结构和军事战略的重点建设方向。美在亚太地区的军事战略重点,已明显开始聚焦于中国军力现代化有可能沿着“拒止战略”的构想而给美带来的挑战。美 2012 年 1 月 5 日的国防报告直接将中国的军事“拒止”能力列为美所面临的重大军事威胁,并首次明确宣布美军的作战任务之一,就是要“在即便拒止能力发展的情况下,也有军事投掷和穿透的能力”。该报告将针对中国的“反拒止能力”同“打击恐怖主义和非正规战争”、“阻止和挫败侵略”、“保持安全与高效的核战略”、“保卫美国本土和支持文官政府”等并列为美军在 21 世纪的基本军事目标。报告最后一部分展望“2020 年美军联合作战”前景,重申美将加强海空联合作战能力,以便必要时采取行动,“确保美国及其盟国与伙伴能够在反拒止、电脑网络攻击以及其他有争议的行动环境中作战”。2012 年 1 月 17 日,美参谋长联席会议主席邓普西( Martin E. Dempsey)签署并发表了“联合作战介入理念”报告( JointOperational Access Concept,简称 JOAC) ,具体提出了美“反拒止”战争行动的协同与作战计划,进一步细化了美军正在构建中的“空海一体战”构想。根据该报告,未来美军可以在任何空间维度上进行军事行动,包括使用太空武器,电脑网络攻防战,空中、水下和地面的攻击与防御行动,以摧毁“假想敌”的军事攻击与反击能力。邓普西指出,该报告是 1 月 5 日报告的延续。该军事文件的出台,既是对 1 月 5 日美军未来发展战略指导计划的“局部放大”——将该计划报告中的“反拒止”军事任务演变成具体的、纲领性的军力发展报告和作战规划,又进一步烘托了“反拒止”作战在未来美军力量建设、海空军协同行动以及海外战争构想中的核心地位。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国全球战略重心转移至亚太、以中国为最主要军事“假想敌”,是美全球战略的重大转折。这一转折的标志,并非只是驻军规模、出现动荡的“问题程度”以及美军军事任务的扩大,更体现在美军对防范未来“军事威胁”的重视程度以及战略资源投入的优先顺序。20 世纪 80 年代美国所推出的“空地一体战”实现了冷战结束初期战争模式的重大改变,由空中提供火力支持的地面作战完全为远程空中打击所取代,陆地作战不再是决定战场形态的首要因素。“空地一体战”在经历海湾战争、科索沃战争、阿富汗战争以及伊拉克战争后,已完全成熟,而美军未来的主要军事对手也由顶多是中小国家中的“流氓国家”转向了中国这样的地区性大国。随着“空海一体战”从军事概念走向操作性行动计划,以中国军力现代化为打击目标的美军战斗行动的战略与战术设计,正在走向一个新的“历史性平台”。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 事实上,美国从来没有完全离开过亚洲,过去十年更是一直在进行着“战略东移”的各种实质性准备。2003 年 5 月美军攻陷巴格达不到一个月,美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德就宣布了在亚太地区进行“轴—辐调整”的新军事行动,大力加强美军在亚太地区军事部署的实战规划,强化应对中国崛起的长期性同盟责任。2009 年 1 月,奥巴马在就职演说中宣告“反恐”不再是美战略重点。2010 年 6 月推出的美《国家安全战略报告》提出了“亚太战略重心”的新概念。“转身亚洲”战略并非只是在战略重点上宣告向亚太的转移,而是在美军的全球战略态势、欧洲及中东和亚太军事部署的技术性调整、以及应对美国内政治所需要的政治说服力等问题上,进一步明确了“战略东移”的全面可操作的军事、外交与政治方案。这一方案包括削减欧洲驻军,降低对卷入伊拉克和阿富汗战争这类“非亚太区域”军事行动的战略兴趣,以及未来防务预算在全球各大区域内的分配和各军兵种未来的预算投入等。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美军目前因国内财政困难而被迫“瘦身”的军费削减,与亚太战略重心的重新确定并不矛盾。冷战后美军在力量结构上虽然几经调整,但总体保持了以应对冷战时期可能发生的、与同级别军事大国苏联这样的敌人进行全面战争为目标的人员、装备和后勤基地配置。但从 20 世纪 90 年代后期,美就已经很清楚地认识到,苏联的解体已经不可能带来俄罗斯向前苏联的回归; 而中国尽管崛起迅速,但很长时期内都不可能具备苏联那样的对美军事威胁,其挑战美军事能力长期来说更可能出现在“拒止战略”的能力水平上。“瘦身”可以使美军在军备、人员和力量结构上适应后冷战时代的需要,将重要的国防资源用于更新武器装备和军事技术,保持美军“不受挑战”的力量优势。“瘦身”战略不仅不会阻碍美军战略重心向亚太转移,反而可能为美军军力结构和作战行动方式的革命性变革提供机遇。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 其二,将印度和南亚次大陆纳入“亚太区域”早已有之,但将南亚包括进东亚等其他太平洋区域、共同组成地理概念上的“亚洲枢轴”( Asian Pivot) ,却是奥巴马政府首创。冷战后相当长时间内,美对“亚太”的定义主要包括太平洋西岸以及大洋洲地区,20 世纪 90 年代克林顿政府发表了 4 份“东亚安全战略报告”,都未强调印度对美不可或缺。印度从来都不是亚太经合组织( APEC) 成员。这说明美当时对东亚和南亚的地缘战略联系远不如今天这么重视。随着中国的崛起和地区外交、经济与军事影响的扩大,美高层从布什政府开始重新认识印度,美印战略关系不断加强。21 世纪的头十年是印度开始崛起的十年,也是美印战略关系成型的十年。美一直将印作为“全球伙伴”来打造两国关系。奥巴马政府最终对什么是亚太地区或者说美国心目中的“战略亚洲”的地理概念做出了重新定义: “亚太”或“亚洲”,就是指东北亚、东南亚、南亚的印度洋沿岸国家,以及大洋洲的澳大利亚、新西兰和南太平洋国家。希拉里在《美国的太平洋世纪》一文中说得很清楚,“从印度次大陆一直延伸到美国西海岸,亚太区域横跨两个大洋———印度洋和太平洋,它们越来越因为航运和战略的因素而连接到了一起”。将南亚次大陆包括进亚太地区,反映了美国对于南海、马六甲海峡以及连接东南亚和南亚的缅甸地区的高度战略重视。在今天的亚洲地缘政治生态中,南亚、东南亚和东北亚已经不可分离。特别是 2001 年起印度逐步成为美在亚洲的重要战略伙伴之后,鼓励印发挥更加重要的区域安全与政治角色,充分利用印在“牵制”中国崛起中的战略作用,一直是美亚太战略的重要内容。奥巴马政府明确将“亚太”定义为包括印度在内的“印度洋—太平洋区域”,显示了美有意在更为广阔的地缘范围内努力主导亚洲均势体系。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">其三,美国更为深入和广泛地参与到亚太地区外交与政治事务中来,特别是将更多地介入地区多边机制,通过与其盟友、伙伴的合作,推进地区事务的解决方式和路径能从长远上体现美战略利益。“转身亚洲”战略表明奥巴马政府的中国政策开始“成型”。美国并非立足于美中合作来解决区域安全与政治议题,而是立足于同盟、伙伴与新兴友好国家的合作来促成亚太地区的稳定。2009 年奥巴马上台伊始美国在中国政策上所谓“一头热”的做法,是想要鼓励中国与美国一起“分担责任”和“分享领导地位”。2010 年的“天安号事件”和“延坪岛炮击”让美对华政策开始迅速转向。再加上美国内经济振兴、扩大亚太出口的现实需要,“中国崛起”成为美国眼中亚太地区安全与经济领域最大的不确定因素。奥巴马政府转而寻求全面提升美国的领导地位,不再寻求任何给人以“G2”印象的外交和战略操作手法; 将稳定和强化美国在亚太地区的“领导作用”和依赖同盟、友邦及新兴伙伴关系,作为实现区域内国家与美全面合作的“战略抓手”。希拉里2010 年 10 月 28 日在夏威夷大学东西方研究中心的演讲,清晰地透露出美亚太外交战略的显著调整;她在《美国的太平洋世纪》一文中更加强调美国处理与中国关系的“原则认识”,这就是“立足现实、注重实效,忠实于美国的原则和利益”。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"> “转身亚洲”战略的成因、目标及影响</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> “转身亚洲”战略与美军“瘦身”战略结合,代表了美亚太战略自 20 世纪 90 年代中期以来最大规模的调整。随着中国崛起、朝核局势僵持以及亚太安全出现新动向,美亚太安全战略谋求更新和扩展是必然的。新美国安全研究中心高级研究员罗伯特·卡普兰( Robert D. Kaplan) 认为,美亚太战略面向中国崛起进行调整,是“20 年前就应该做出的”。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 这一变化有三个核心含义。一是美对来自中国的“威胁评估”已经从传统的意识形态争议及双边关系中涉台、涉藏问题的结构性争议,转向了美眼中越来越具有挑战性的中国“能力”和“意图”的评估。二是随着中国崛起,美在亚太地区传统盟友和防务伙伴对美在该地区的安全责任和战略能力开始有所怀疑,奥巴马政府需要“再确认”美在亚太地区的战略优势和战略决心,重申只有美掌握亚太地区的“战略制高点”,同时对中国崛起的地区担忧做出及时的强势反应,以保证美在本地区的战略资产———美国的同盟关系、防务合作伙伴以及“新型伙伴关系”不至于流失。三是面临 2012 年总统大选,奥巴马政府也需要在对华政策上表现得更为强硬,以避免受到国内政敌的过多攻击。国内选举政治的考虑,不希望给世人留下美因为国内经济困难和预算削减而“变弱”的印象,这些因素确实在美这一波高调进行的亚太攻势中占据很重要的位置。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 降低联邦财政赤字以及由此带来的可能延续未来十年的军费削减计划,是美“转身亚洲”战略出台的另一大重要原因。如何削减政府财政赤字以及政府债务上限提高到多少,一直是 2011 年美国内政的焦点话题。目前美国政府背负 14. 62 万亿美元的沉重债务,过度的国防开支一直是美国内批评的对象。“9·11事件”后,美军费从2001 年的3160 亿美元上涨至 2011 年的 6880 亿美元,10 年来上涨幅度超过了78%。2011 年 6 月底国防部长罗伯特·盖茨离任之前,提出了未来 5 年 780 亿美元的国防开支削减设想。然而,共和与民主两大政党恶斗的结果之一,就是在 2011 年 8 月 1 日美国政府新财政年度来临的前 1 天才通过了新的延长债务上限的决定。当天美国国会通过《预算控制法案修正案》( BudgetControl Act Amendment) ,授权美国政府到 2012 年12 月底提高政府债务上限到 1. 2 万亿美元,同时将国防开支削减作为降低政府赤字的主要项目。法案规定未来 10 年美将总体削减 1. 5 万亿美元的政府开支,其中 3500 亿美元国防开支削减是“计划内”需要削减的,另外 6000 亿美元的国防开支削减执行与否,要依据两党国会特别委员会是否能达成具体削减政府开支的协议。如果该委员会到 2012 年 12月31 日仍然无法达成协议,从2013 年开始,这6000亿美元的国防开支削减将在 10 年内自动进行。美国将不得不结束以往在军费上“大手大脚”的做法,转而在今后相当长时间内进入国防和安全经费的“节俭”时代。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> “转身亚洲”战略在外交层面上就是美军事战略的侧重点从不稳定地区的“维稳行动”转向中国军事力量和政治影响上升的“反拒止”能力,显示了美对于中国未来在亚太区域可能给其带来长期战略挑战的重视。目前来看,奥巴马政府这一战略的基本目标有以下几个方面。首先,不再依赖“中美合作”的方式来应对美心目中的亚太地区安全问题,而是侧重以美继续强化战略存在和战略主导地位、协调与盟国及新兴伙伴关系的方式来稳定地区安全秩序。在区域外交的优先次序上,从追求中美合作、甚至一定程度的“中美共治”,转向着重建立和发展与区域内国家的广泛政治、外交和战略联系,争取形成日益对美有利的区域政治和外交环境,压缩中国的战略与政治影响,在亚太区域培植可持续的、有利于美对华竞争与制衡政策的政治、经济和社会氛围。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 其次,全面加强与中国进行直接军事冲突的准备,其亚太军事战略从“看管和威慑中国”转向实战性地与中国进行直接的“军事对抗”。其中最具代表性的措施就是“空海一体战”构想,该构想直接用意是压制中国的“区域拒止/反介入”军事能力发展。为此,希拉里在这波“亚太攻势”中对所谓的“中国威胁”进行了前所未有、甚至有点耸人听闻的“新定义”。她提出,与中国的关系是美国有史以来“需要管理的最具挑战和影响的双边关系之一,需要进行审慎、稳定和动态的管理”。这样的措辞中,中国的挑战明显被视为超越了二战时期的日本和德国,甚至超越了冷战时期的苏联。目前美军“瘦身战略”的核心是以中国为最重要参照物,美不仅要避免中长期美中军力对比出现不利于美国的变化,更要集中地将保持对华军事和战略优势及建设可靠、高效的“反拒止”能力作为目标。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 第三,推动扩大“制衡中国”为主体的区域安全体系。美 20 世纪 90 年代后的东亚安全战略一直以“制衡中国”为中心,其主体是美前沿驻军和同盟支柱。2003 年之后,这一体系又进行了主次调整,转变为更具战略和战术展开行动的“轴—辐体系”。而美这一波亚太战略调整的要点之一,是利用南海、东海和黄海问题扩大“制衡中国”的区域体系。美已大幅提升“制衡中国”的地缘政治范围,将 20 世纪 90 年代中期开始的以前沿驻军和军事同盟为基础的对华军事能力和台湾问题的防范与制衡,扩大至整个亚太范围、以战略节点地区为重点的对华地缘战略影响力的防范与制衡。罗伯特·卡普兰在其“中国的权力地理”一文以及新作《季风: 印度洋和未来的美国权力》中,都将焦点对准了中美似乎不可避免的地缘战略竞争和冲突。这还最典型地体现于美国在澳大利亚达尔文港设立新的军事基地、深化与越南的军事合作以及准备向新加坡派驻新型舰艇等等。奥巴马更是早在 2010 年 5 月就提出了要在亚太地区打造新型地区安全体系的设想。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 然而,奥巴马政府亚太安全战略的转变并不必然意味着美国的中国战略发生了根本改变。受制于国内经济低迷和巨额预算赤字的困扰,即便美亚太战略进行了重大调整,五角大楼决心在亚太扩大军事和战略存在,短期来看奥巴马政府在相应举措上仍难免捉襟见肘。中美在经贸和金融领域广泛而深入的相互依赖关系也决定了美国的中国政策不管心里想什么,都难以“一刀切”地将对华关系变成简单的“接触”或“遏制”。美对华政策仍将继续保持政治上接触、经济上合作以及战略上“防范”和“看管”的基本态势。换句话说,美并没有改变其 20 世纪90 年代中期以来追求对华“软遏制”的战略选择,其对华战略的本质还是“两面下注战略”( hedgingstrategy) ——既准备应对美中关系中出现最坏的可能性,又争取在引导和影响中国的同时寻求两国合作发展的合理现实。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 将“转身亚洲”战略等同于美国更多地谋求对华遏制政策,并非合理的看法。“遏制战略”是一个特定的概念。美冷战时期对苏联、1972 年尼克松访华前对中国所采取的对抗、渗透和颠覆战略是“遏制战略”。其前提,一是要不惜代价搞垮对手; 二是美拥有广泛的同盟体系支持和跟随它采取行动; 三是美必须随时准备为“遏制战略”承担战争代价。今天中美关系的高度相互依赖和复杂性,决定了美国既要“防范中国”又要“合作中国”。但总的来说,美中之间的“战略互疑”已经明显上升。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国的“变”已经开始,而且明显“变”得比中国快。这一“变”如果要打一比喻来说明的话,那就是美对华政策机器确实发生了试图重新改变中国政策定位“方向”上的变化。如果说以前这一政策机器是“脸”冲着那一面的,那么现在真的已经开始“转过来”,准备将“脸”朝向另外一面。事实上美这一变化过程不是现在才有的,最近十年以来就一直在酝酿和探讨中,只是从来没有像 2011 年这样如此清晰地表现出来。例如,2011 年美国防部提交给美国会的《中国军力报告》第一次将中国的军力发展与中国在亚太的地缘战略影响联系起来,分析中国军力增长的同时更重视对亚太区域安全秩序的作用。我们对于美国这一次亚太战略调整的战略含义绝不能低估。即使短期内美国不会对中国“翻脸”,但包括中美关系在内的东北亚地区政治的未来走向都将继续深受这一波战略调整的重大影响。中国所面临的地区安全环境存在着恶化的风险。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 奥巴马政府的“转身亚太”战略虽然并不代表美国的中国政策有了决定性变化,但说明了美今天的“中国认识”和“中国判断”正在出现新的重大变化。随着美“转身亚太”战略的出台,中美在亚太地区的竞争、合作、甚至某些具体问题上的潜在对抗都已经进入了一个新时期。当美高调宣布战略重心重返亚太时,“狼”真的来了。简单将这一战略调整归纳为“遏制中国”既有悖于现实也于事无补。除非中美撕破脸对抗,恐怕中美关系永远是重要而又复杂的关系,“斗而不破”的务实基调仍然会继续存在。但无论是 2011 年 11 月奥巴马宣布战略重心重返亚太,还是 2012 年 1 月 5 日宣布新军事战略,美对中国的战略评估都已经从原来的意识形态、政治体制和双边关系中的结构性难题,转向了对中国能力和意图的评估——中国的军事能力在高速增长,挑战美国的意图正变得越来越清晰。这一份新军事战略显示的还是美在中国政策上的“两难”——战略上越来越把中国当成对手,但政治和经济上难以割舍与中国的合作。美针对中国崛起的新的实力变化必然采取更多制衡措施的做法,生动地体现了大国政治依然是权力政治的本质。正如布热津斯基所言,“面对中国开始强大而可能出现的亚太权力结构倾塌的危险,美国必须显示足够的战略决断”。</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 中美如何共处、共存,特别是在力量对比逐步发生变化、美国不愿意放弃唯一超级大国地位而中国公众又急于“自证强大”的心态下,其对中国朝野的心理冲击其实要大于现实挑战。此时此刻,我们一方面需要牢记习近平副主席访美时的重要思想,“太平洋足够宽广,可以容得下中美两个大国”,平稳心态、长期谋划、以我为主、谋求共赢; 但另一方面更需要努力发展、学会成长。真正意义上的中美亚太竞争的大幕还远远没有拉开。</span></div>
<br />版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-32436908789370160662013-02-18T02:18:00.000-08:002013-02-28T03:36:24.417-08:00Justin Logan:China,America, and the Pivot to Asia<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.390625px; text-align: justify;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">许媚</span><span style="line-height: 22.390625px; text-align: justify;"> 2012年2月18日</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">中道网</span></span></div>
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<a href="http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/china-america-pivot-asia" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="110" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIZTwu1dQcZbC-JlWqg97uXJni-H9Fy35vp4qbbODLx2xTlcu55AMt3OoVC8oKeBpQmU1KNNixzhTJYqvV4v0ksscuZT7T-by7cgFFGZvLEawMb-wV6TBRyEow2rbHNe32RDDBkgVOREke/s200/Cato+Institute.gif" width="200" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">近来,美国的战略重心从中东转向亚洲。这一战略转移的背后是中国经济和军事实力的加强,同时也隐藏着美国遏制中国的企图。</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 日前,美国著名智库卡托研究所(Cato Institute)外交政策研究主任<b>贾斯汀·洛根</b>(Justin Logan)在该智库网站上发布政策研究报告,系统分析并批判了美国国内有关中国崛起的两种思想流派,以及美国的对华政策。<b>报告据此认为,美国应调整其对华政策,建议美国在亚洲减少扮演“保护者”的角色,而坐收渔翁之利</b>。</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 洛根首先回顾并总结了美国国内针对中国崛起的两种主流学派--<b>乐观派和悲观派</b>。乐观派认为,中国崛起不会对美国造成安全威胁,而国际机构将制约中国的行为。对乐观派而言,中美利益冲突的主因是,中国不是一个民主国家。该流派据此认为,美国应加强和中国的经济接触,并借此推动中国的民主进程。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 而悲观派则认为中国的崛起威胁到了美国的国家安全。一个强大的中国将变得越来越富有侵略性,继而希望成为地区霸主,而这并不是美国所乐见的。在这种情况下,中国的崛起势必会导致中美之间的冲突不断升级,从而加大战争爆发的可能性。因此,悲观派建议美国应先发制人,遏制中国的经济军事发展,确保美国的国家安全。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 事实上,美国政府的对华政策融结合了这两种流派的观点。目前美国对华政策的核心仍是“遏制加接触”,即在经济上加强和中国的接触,但在政治和军事上加大对中国的遏制。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 洛根认为,上述两种学派及美国的对华政策均存在重大缺陷,进而对其进行了批判。首先,他认为乐观派在国际机构对中国的制约作用,经济发展对中国民主化的推动,以及中国能够接受美国对亚洲的军事控制等三个问题上过于乐观。洛根声称,事实上,国际机构对强大起来的中国不会有太大约束力。一般来说,强国都不会将安全置于他人之手,反而倾向于维护并扩大自身的利益。近几月来,中国在领土争端问题上的态度日益强硬便证明了这一点。不仅如此,许多处于政治转型中的国家,其民族主义情绪高涨,其战争风险也因而加大了。很明显,现在中国国内民族主义情绪高涨,不可能接受美国在军事上主导亚洲。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 洛根认为,悲观派并不清楚为何中国的崛起会对美国造成威胁,以及美国如何才能遏制中国的经济发展。首先,中美经济关系紧密,若要压制中国经济,势必会对美国经济造成重大影响。而且,该做法未必能得到其他国家和地区的支持。最后可能搬起石头砸自己的脚,即经济遏制对美国自己造成的消极影响反而远大于中国。其次,现在并无证据表明,崛起的中国对美国国家安全造成重大威胁。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <b>尽管美国政府再三否认,但美国在亚洲的军事行动的主要目的就是遏制中国</b>。而经济上加强和中国的接触,无疑有助于中国缩小和美国的实力差距。美国的这一对华战略,即经济上和中国接触,军事上遏制中国,本身就是矛盾的。另外,洛根还认为,美国因为担心失去对盟友的控制,造成军备竞赛,增加战争风险等,而承担了过多的责任,实施了过度的保护,因而导致盟国没有承担其应有的责任而过度依赖美国的保护。其结果就是,随着中国的日益强大,美国的负担也越来越重。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在这种情况下,<b>洛根呼吁新一届美国政府重新审视美国在亚洲地区的战略布局。洛根主张,美国应减少在亚太地区的军事存在,逐渐减少对盟友的过度保护,而让其独立承担相应的责任和进行自我保护</b>。美国应该做的是帮助盟国建立起强大的军事实力,并鼓励盟友之间相互合作以增强对抗中国的实力。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 此外,洛根还概括了美国减少其在亚太地区的投入这一建议可能引发的三种反对意见,并一一进行反驳。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 第一种反对意见认为,美国的亚洲盟友缺乏对抗中国的实力。而洛根认为,<b>根据预测,到2030年,中国经济可能占世界经济份额的23%,美国的亚太盟友是22%。这使美国的盟友具备和中国进行军事对抗的基础。</b>此外,影响军事实力的还有人口因素。到2040年,中国因计划生育政策的影响,劳动人口将减少1.1亿。而到2040年,印度的劳动人口则将增加3亿;与此同时,到2030年,印度的高校毕业生将高达7亿,而中国只有0.75亿。人口优势将使印度在和中国争夺亚洲霸主地位的对抗中更具优势。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <b>第二种反对意见担心,如果美国减少对亚太的控制,其盟友可能放弃对抗中国,转而投靠中国。</b>关于这一点,洛根认为,一个国家对抗潜在的对手是为了维护政权的统治,甚至是存亡。因此,<b>美国的盟友不会轻易放弃自己的政权,成为中国的傀儡</b>。而且,如果美国不再对盟友过度保护,它们就会被迫改变策略,不再躲在美国背后,而是努力提高军事力量,承担自己应有的责任,并加强相互合作以更好地对抗中国。近几个月来,东亚各国在与中国领土争端问题上的态度就是一个很好的佐证。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <b>第三种意见认为,任由盟友发展军事力量,可能会造成亚洲地区的军备竞赛,加大战争爆发的风险,由此给美国经济造成不利影响</b>。报告认为,在这种情况下,爆发小规模海上冲突的可能性的确存在,但全球化和国际贸易的发展已经降低了对单个国家的依赖,因此对美国的影响不是特别严重。而且,最近的一项研究表明,中立国的耗费要比参战国低很多。因此,若中国与其邻国开战,美国的损失将远少于中国。不仅如此,洛根还认为,日本在这种情况下发展核武,不会对其他国家造成威胁。核武只是日本自我保护的工具,而不是入侵他国的武器。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在本报告中,洛根虽然对美国重返亚洲的战略进行了批评,建议美国在亚洲地区减少扮演 “保护者”的角色。但这绝不是主张放弃美国在亚洲的利益,反而有坐收渔翁之利之意。因此,不管美国是否会采取“远离”亚洲的战略,亚洲都依然是美国的重要战略利益所在,中国的压力都不会因此而减少。</span></div>
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<span style="color: #990000;"><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/125999912/Justin-Logan%EF%BC%9AChina%EF%BC%8CAmerica-and-the-Pivot-to-Asia" style="font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal;" title="View Justin Logan:China,America, and the Pivot to Asia on Scribd">Justin Logan:China,America, and the Pivot to Asia</a><span style="font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal;"> </span></span></div>
<iframe class="scribd_iframe_embed" data-aspect-ratio="0.772727272727273" data-auto-height="false" frameborder="0" height="600" id="doc_64030" scrolling="no" src="http://www.scribd.com/embeds/125999912/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&access_key=key-24l2iqpu07o8piqfwf99" width="100%"></iframe>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-33641578910020760202013-02-15T19:53:00.000-08:002013-02-28T03:32:54.318-08:00布热津斯基:强而不霸(Giants, but Not Hegemons)<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="line-height: 22.390625px;">作者:布热津斯基(Zbigniew Brzezinski) 2013年2月13日</span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 17.77777862548828px;">International Herald Tribune</span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; line-height: 22px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Today, many fear that the emerging<b> American-Chinese duopoly </b>must inevitably lead to conflict. But I do not believe that wars for global domination are a serious prospect in what is now<b> the Post-Hegemonic Age</b>.</span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Admittedly, the historical record is dismal. Since the onset of <b>global politics 200 years ago</b>, <b>four long wars</b> (including the Cold War) were fought over the domination of Europe, each of which could have <b>resulted in global hegemony by a sole superpower</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Yet several developments over recent years have changed the equation. <b>Nuclear weapons</b> make hegemonic wars too destructive, and thus victory meaningless. One-sided national economic triumphs cannot be achieved in the increasingly interwoven global economy without precipitating calamitous consequences for everyone. Further, the populations of the world have awakened politically and are not so easily subdued, even by the most powerful. Last but not least, neither the United States nor China is driven by <b>hostile ideologies</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Moreover, despite our very different political systems, both our societies are, in different ways, open. That, too, offsets pressure from within each respective society toward animus and hostility. <b>More than 100,000 Chinese are students at American universities</b>, and<b> thousands of young Americans study and work in China</b> or participate in special study or travel programs. Unlike in the former Soviet Union, millions of Chinese regularly travel abroad. And millions of young Chinese are in daily touch with the world through the Internet.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">All this contrasts greatly with the societal self-isolation of the 19th- and 20th-century contestants for global power,<b> which intensified grievances, escalated hostility and made it easier to demonize the one another.</b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Nonetheless, we cannot entirely ignore the fact that the hopeful expectation in recent years of <b>an amicable American-Chinese relationship</b> has lately been tested by ever more antagonistic polemics, especially in the mass media of both sides. <b>This has been fueled in part by speculation about America’s allegedly inevitable decline and about China’s relentless, rapid rise.</b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Pessimism about America’ future tends to<b> underestimate its capacity for self-renewal.</b> Exuberant optimists about China’s inevitable pre-eminence <b>underestimate the gap that still separates China from America</b> — whether in <b>G.D.P. per capita terms</b> or in respective<b> technological capabilities.</b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Paradoxically, China’s truly admirable economic success is now intensifying the systemic need for complex social and political adjustments in how and to what extent a ruling bureaucracy that defines itself as communist can continue to direct a system of state capitalism with a rising middle class seeking more rights.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Simplistic agitation regarding the potential Chinese military threat to America ignores the benefits that the U.S. also derives from <b>its very favorable geostrategic location on the open shores of two great oceans</b> as well as from its <b>trans-oceanic allies on all sides</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In contrast, <b>China is geographically encircled by not always friendly states</b> and <b>has very few, if any, allies.</b> On occasion, <b>some of China’s neighbors are tempted by this circumstance to draw the U.S. into support of their specific claims or conflicts of interest against China</b>. Fortunately, there are signs that a consensus is emerging that such threats should not be resolved unilaterally or militarily, but through negotiation.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Matters have been not helped by the American media’s characterization of the Obama administration’s relative <b>rebalancing of focus toward Asia as a “pivot” (a word never used by the president) with military connotations</b>. In fact, the new effort was only meant to be a constructive reaffirmation of the unchanged reality that the U.S. is both a Pacific and Atlantic power.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Taking all this into account, <b>the real threat to a stable U.S.-China relationship does not arise from any hostile intentions on the part of either country, but from the disturbing possibility that a revitalized Asia may slide into the kind of nationalistic fervor that precipitated conflicts in 20th-century Europe over resources, territory or power</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; line-height: 22px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">There are plenty of potential flash points: North Korea vs. South Korea, China vs. Japan, China vs. India, or India vs. Pakistan. The danger is that if governments incite or allow nationalistic fervor as a kind of safety valve it can spin out of control.</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In such a potentially explosive context, U.S. political and economic involvement in Asia <b>can be a crucially needed stabilizing factor</b>. Indeed, America’s current role in Asia<b> </b>should be analogous to Britain’s role in 19th-century Europe<b> as an “off-shore” balancing influence</b> <b>with no entanglements in the region’s rivalries and no attempt to attain domination over the region</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">To be effective, constructive and strategically sensitive <b>U.S. engagement in Asia</b> <b><span style="color: #990000;">must not be based solely on existing alliances with Japan and South Korea. Engagement must also mean institutionalizing U.S.- Chinese cooperation</span></b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Accordingly, America and China should deliberatively not let their economic competition turn into political hostility. Mutual engagement bilaterally and multilaterally — and not reciprocal exclusion — is what is needed. For example, the U.S. ought not seek a “<b>trans-Pacific partnership</b>” <b>without China, and China should not seek a Regional Comprehensive Economic Pact without the U.S</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">History can avoid repeating the calamitous conflicts of the 20th century if America is present in Asia as stabilizer — <b><span style="color: #990000;">not a would-be policeman</span></b> — and<b> if China becomes the preeminent, but not domineering, power in the region.</b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In January 2011, President Obama and now-departing Chinese President Hu Jintao met and issued a communiqué boldly detailing joint undertakings and proposing to build a historically unprecedented partnership between America and China. With Obama reelected and Xi Jinping preparing to take over China’s presidency in March, <b>the two leaders should meet to revalidate and re-energize the U.S.-China relationship.</b> Whether this relationship is vital and robust, or weak and full of suspicion, will affect the whole world.</span></div>
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<em><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong>Zbigniew Brzezinski</strong> was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. His most recent book is “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.”</span></em></div>
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<br />版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-533074906151043652013-02-03T20:31:00.000-08:002013-02-28T03:39:09.076-08:00Obama’s Geopolitical China ‘Pivot’: The Pentagon Targets China<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 23px;"><span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; word-break: break-all;"><span style="margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all;"><span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all;"><span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 24px; text-align: start; text-indent: 30px;">威廉·恩道尔(F. William Engdahl)</span><i style="line-height: 24px; text-align: start; text-indent: 30px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px;">2012年8月24日</span></span></span></span><span style="line-height: 13.999999046325684px;">Global Research </span></span><span style="background-color: white; border: 0px; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="line-height: 14px;"> </span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; border: 0px; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span style="line-height: 14px;">翻譯:</span>环球财经</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 23px;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 23px;">2012年第12期</span><br />
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<a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-s-geopolitical-china-pivot-the-pentagon-targets-china/32474" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="114" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIgTGUNchu5blwYh4wUi6-VywZeGtCSdft5Ouq4S4NFN0vIPoF1NxDgDMBwTs0It2MvvSnXEM1TtI8wM-8HAk5ausLCFvfOOEYX5L033o73JkFU9-JltEvAZZd3GDZx1-Js8mm_yjg6Ohk/s200/The+Pentagon+Targets+China2.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 23px;">自苏联解体,冷战落幕20多年以来,美国庞大的军事开支不仅没有减少,历届美国国会和总统反而大幅度增加军事开支,以研发新武器系统,扩张在世界范围内永久军事基地,推动北约东扩,东扩的范围不仅仅限于前华约国家,更向俄罗斯的后院紧逼;同时,通过发动阿富汗战争以及相关活动,北约和美国的军事势力已深入亚洲腹地,向中国边境渗透。</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong> </strong><b>五角大楼瞄准中国</b></span></div>
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<a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-s-geopolitical-china-pivot-the-pentagon-targets-china/32474" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="154" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-yxPf_JSzpgo/UQ841ma1a9I/AAAAAAAAKEc/BF6DPGyCihA/s200/F.+William+Engdahl.jpg" width="200" /></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 暂且不考虑国家安全和国防相关政府部门如美国能源部,美国财政部和其他机构的巨额预算,作为纯军事支出单位,美国五角大楼在<b>2011年已花费了大约7390亿美元</b>以满足军事需求。若把美国国防和国家安全有关的其他所有费用计算在内的话,<b>据伦敦国际战略研究机构估计</b>:<b>美国实际年度军费开支超过10000亿美元</b>。<b>比排名2〜43位的42个国家军费开支总和还多</b>,同时也超过绝大多数国家的GDP。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 根据官方数据,<b>中国军费约为900亿美元,仅占美国军费开支的10%</b>。<b>如果把其它防卫相关的武器进口和其它相关开支包括在内,则可能每年大约为1110亿美元</b>。即使中国当局在如此敏感领域未公布其完备数据,其与美国相比仍明显微不足道,何况中国的军事技术起步基础仍远远落后于美国。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 不仅因今日中国充满活力的经济增长和维护主权国家利益的决心,或者只因为中国的存在,<b>她正成为五角大楼的新“假想敌”,这取代了911事件后,由布什切尼政府为了给五角大楼追求全球霸权做辩护而树立的“假想敌”—伊斯兰世界</b>,而在此之前的冷战时期,苏联是美国树立的“假想敌”。五角大楼针对中国的新军事态势,不是因为受到了任何来自中国方面咄咄逼人的威胁。五角大楼决定逐步升级其针对中国的进攻式的军事态势,仅仅是因为中国已经成为在世界经济和地缘政治中强大、充满活力而又独立的世界多极化中的一极国家。而只有附庸国才适用于华盛顿全球化世界的框架范围。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>奥巴马主义:中国是新“假想敌”</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在忽略了美国在东亚的利益近20年后,奥巴马政府于2011年宣布美国将其外交政策的“战略轴心”,在军事、政治上转向亚太地区,尤其是东南亚,更确切地说是中国。“战略轴心”这个术语是英国地缘政治家哈尔福德·麦金德爵士(Sir Halford Mackinder)经典书目中的一个提法。他多次提及,俄罗斯和之后的中国将会成为“轴心力量”,他们的地理位置和地缘政治地位曾经对盎格鲁-撒克逊构成威胁,而在1945年后,又撼动了美国的全球霸权地位。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的军事行动以失败告终,随后在2011年底,奥巴马政府明确了新公共军事威胁的范围以便重新部署新军事态势。在访问远东期间,美国总统在澳大利亚把其奥巴马主义公诸于众。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>奥巴马对澳大利亚人说:</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> “亚洲拥有世界上绝大多数的核国家和约全球一半的人口,这很大程度上决定了未来世界面临的是一个冲突的世纪还是相互协作的世纪⋯⋯因此,作为总统,我必须审慎地做出战略决策—美国作为一个<span id="stock_sh601099"><a class="keyword" href="http://finance.sina.com.cn/realstock/company/sh601099/nc.shtml" style="text-decoration: initial;" target="_blank">太平洋</a></span><span id="quote_sh601099">(6.35,-0.03,-0.47%)</span>国家,在塑造亚太地区及其未来方面将发挥更加重要和长期的作用⋯⋯我已指示我的国家安全团队优先考虑在亚太地区建立我们的军事存在⋯⋯按照我们为将来做出的计划和预算,我们将在亚太地区分配必要的资源,以保证在这一地区强大的军事存在。我们将保持我们在该地区特有的威慑力,确保消除对和平构成的威胁⋯⋯我们在该地区的持久利益要求我们在该地区进驻持久的存在。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> “美国是太平洋国家,这意味着我们在这里必须加强部署力量。事实上,我们已经在整个亚太地区着手现代化美国的防卫。我们将更广泛地分布我们的力量—在日本和朝鲜半岛保持强大的力量存在的同时,加强我们在东南亚地区的存在。我们的姿态将更加灵活—以确保我们的军队能操作自如⋯⋯我相信我们可以应对我们共同的挑战,如武器扩散和包括中国南海合作问题在内的海上安全问题。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 奥巴马访问的核心部分是宣告至少有2500名美国海军陆战队精锐部队将在澳大利亚北部地区达尔文港(Darwin)驻扎。此外,在一系列的重大平行协议中,澳大利亚和美国讨论在偏远的科科斯群岛(Cocos Islands)—澳大利亚在印度洋上的领土,部署美国远程间谍无人机。此外,美国将获得使用澳大利亚空军基地的权力以及增加美国舰队和潜艇通过澳大利亚西海岸珀斯的海军基地前往印度洋的次数。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼的目标是中国</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 为了使北约的欧洲成员国更清楚这点,2012年7月,在华盛顿举行的对北约成员国的讲话中,英国国防大臣菲利普·哈蒙德明确表示,美国新国防战略转向亚太地区意在中国。哈蒙德说,“亚太地区的不断上升的战略重要性要求所有国家,尤其是美国,在战略态势上对全球性大国—中国的崛起做出反应。美国愿意在新的战略上承担起北约带头大哥的角色,而欧洲北约国家应该是欢迎这一事实的,因为他们不需要考虑把国内军事政策向亚太地区倾斜。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼采取的许多军事行动表明,其部署远远比相对较小的2500名战士所体现的军事行动更加深入。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 2011年8月,五角大楼发布了中国军力的年度报告。报告显示,中国已缩小了关键技术上的差距。东亚安全事务副助理国防部长薛迈龙(Michael Schiffer)称,中国的军事投资的速度和范围已“允许中国拥有破坏地区军事平衡的潜在军事力量,增加与周边国家不和与误判的风险,并可能引发地区紧张和恐慌。他援引了中国已整修苏联时代航母,研发了J20隐形战斗机的例子,表明中国发展的新军事力量需要美国进行更积极的军事回应。薛迈龙还列举了中国的太空和赛博行动,他说,中国正在进行“一项多维度计划,目的是提高中国在危机或者冲突时期限制或者阻止敌对国家施展空基战略防御武器的能力”。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>五角大楼的“海空一体作战”</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼在未来战争中如何打败中国的战略细节已经渗透到美国新闻界。这场战略被称为“海空一体作战”。这就要求美国的攻击既具备压倒性,同时又具有协调性。美国隐形轰炸机和潜艇将能够摧毁中国的远程监视雷达和深处内陆的精密导弹系统。初期的“致盲战役”之后将对中国本土进行较大规模的空军和海军突然袭击。五角大楼已经在日本、台湾、菲律宾、越南以及整个中国南海和印度洋悄然开始部署美国海、空军,这是这套具有前瞻性战略至关重要的地方。在澳大利亚部队和海军部署指向具有战略性意义的中国南海以及印度洋。上述行动的动机是为了“保护在马六甲海峡和中国南海航行自由”。事实上,上述的部署是为了在爆发全面冲突的情况下,切断中国的战略性石油运输路线。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 海空一体作战的目的是帮助美军能够禁得住中国初期的进攻,并反击和摧毁中国复杂的雷达和导弹系统。中国的这些雷达和导弹系统把美国军舰挡在了中国海岸线之外。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国对抗中国的“海空一体战”。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 除了在澳大利亚北部地区驻扎美国海军陆战队,华盛顿计划部署美国远程间谍无人机从科科斯群岛(Cocos Islands)起飞。科科斯群岛位于具有重要战略性意义的印度洋,是澳大利亚的偏远领地。同时,美国军用飞机可以使用澳大利亚空军基地,美国军舰和潜艇将增加途径澳大利亚西海岸的珀斯军港前往印度洋的次数。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼针对中国的海空战略设计师是安德鲁·马歇尔(Andrew Marshall),40多年以来,他塑造了五角大楼先进的战争策略,在他的学生中有迪克·切尼(Dick Cheney)和唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德(Donald Rumsfeld)。1982年苏联总参谋长尼古拉·奥加尔克夫元帅(Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov)率先提出的““RMA”或者是“新军事变革”的观点,而自20世纪80年代以来,马歇尔一直是这一观点的推动者。现在已经91岁的马歇尔在五角大楼仍拥有自己的办公桌,显然他在五角大楼里依然拥有巨大的影响力。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 而对RMA作出最好的定义恰恰是马歇尔本人,他认为:“新军事变革(RMA)指由于新技术的创新应用并结合军事理论和军事组织结构概念的日新月异的变革,导致了战争性质的重大变化,这从根本上改变了军事行动的特性和行为方式。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 正是安德鲁·马歇尔(Andrew Marshall)说服了美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德(Donald Rumsfeld)和他的继任者罗伯特·盖茨(Robert Gates)在波兰、捷克、土耳其和日本部署导弹防御系统,以最弱化俄罗斯的任何潜在核威胁,以及在日本部署的弹道导弹防御系统,将能阻止来自中国的潜在核威胁。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>五角大楼“珍珠链”战略</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 2005年1月,安德鲁·马歇尔(Andrew Marshall)向时任国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德(Donald Rumsfeld)发布了一份题为《亚洲的能源未来》的内部机密报告。后来马歇尔的报告全部被泄露在华盛顿报纸上,并且这份报告发明了“珍珠链”战略这一术语,该战略描述了中国对 “美国在亚洲的战略利益”构成的军事威胁在不断扩大。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 这份五角大楼内部报告称,“中国正在与从中东到中国南海的海上通道沿线国家建立战略合作关系,这种战略合作关系的定位既是防御性又是进攻性的,目的是保护中国的能源利益,以及服务于更广泛的安全目标。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 马歇尔的报告中写道:这是第一次运用中国‘珍珠链’战略术语,但是这个战略应当由美国来实施而不是中国。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 该报告指出,中国正在建立“珍珠链”式的军事基地,与“珍珠链”上的国家建立外交关系。这条“珍珠链”从中东延伸至中国南部,包括在巴基斯坦瓜达尔港口(Gwadar)正在建设中的新海军基地。该报告称,“中国已经在巴基斯坦的西南角,离波斯湾最近处的瓜达尔(Gwadar)设立了电子窃听站。该站正在监控着通过霍尔木兹海峡和阿拉伯海的船舶交通。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 马歇尔的内部报告继续罗列了中国的大洋航线战略中的其他‘珍珠链’中的基地,以警醒美国:</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 自2005年发布那份报告以来,五角大楼和美国重要的行动的目的都是为阻止中国欲通过“珍珠链”捍卫自己能源安全的意图。 自2007年起,美国对缅甸的干预经历过两个阶段。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 第一阶段即所谓的番红花革命,即美国国务院和中央情报局支持的2007年缅甸动乱,旨在将缅甸军事独裁的反人权实践成为国际社会关注的焦点,以图进一步在国际上孤立处在战略位置的缅甸,切断除了和中国以外的所有经济联系。美国行动的背景是中国在建设起源于中国西南的昆明,经过旧的滇缅公路,穿过缅甸到孟加拉湾的石油和天然气管道。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 为了防止被迫更为紧密地依赖中国是促发缅甸军事领导人决定在经济方面向西方开放的决定因素之一。他们表示美国经济制裁已经使国家遭受了巨大的损失。因此,总统吴登盛(Thein Sein)制定了自由化开放政策,并释放了美国支持的异见人士昂山素季,并允许她及其党派参加竞选,以换取美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿的承诺,即美国将在该国进行投资和放松对缅甸的经济制裁。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 华盛顿精心挑选了一批进入缅甸的美国公司,以此实行最具破坏性的“自由市场”改革,这一改革将使缅甸陷入动荡之中。美国将不会允许美国公司向缅甸武装部队或国防部所有的实体经济进行投资。美国将有权利制裁“那些破坏改革进程,从事侵犯人权,引发种族冲突或者与朝鲜的进行军事贸易”的人或机构。美国将限制企业或个人与任何“特别指定的国民”或者他们控制的企业进行交易,比如,美国将可以阻止资金流入那些“破坏改革进程”的团体。这是传统的“胡萝卜加大棒”的做法,一边悬着无限好处的“胡萝卜”,一边“大棒”惩罚那些试图抵制国家重要资产被收购的人或者机构。对中国至关重要的石油和天然气有关的公司将会是美国干涉的特别目标。美国公司和个人将被允许投资缅甸国有的石油和天然气公司。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 同时,奥巴马也赋予了美国政府有权对任何威胁缅甸和平的个人强制实施“围堵制裁”。在缅甸投资额超过50万美元的企业将需要向美国国务院提交年度报告,详细列明工人的权利,土地征用和任何向政府机构,包括缅甸的国有企业,支付超过1万美元的款项。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国的公司和个人将被允许投资缅甸国有石油和天然气企业,但任何一个投资者必须在60天内告知美国国务院。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 同时,美国许多“人权”非政府组织,被认为与美国国务院地缘政治设计息息相关。这些“人权”非政府组织包括美国自由之家、人权观察组织、亚洲民主研究所、开放社会基金、人权医师组织、海外反对团体“美国缅甸运动”(U.S. Campaign for Burma)、团结起来停止种族屠杀运动(United to End Genocide)。根据国务卿克林顿在2012年4月的决定,这些机构现在将可以在缅甸境内获准运行。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 处于中国“防御珍珠链”上的另一个重要国家泰国,在过去的几年里面临着非常动荡的局面。现在由腐败的前总理妹妹掌权,美泰关系已显著改善。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 经过数个月的流血冲突后,美国支持的亿万富翁泰国前总理他信·西那瓦设法买通各环节把其妹妹英拉·西那瓦推向总理席位,据报导,他信从国外引回了一系列政策。他本人在2012年夏天,自把妹妹推向总统席位后,就在美国享受生活。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国与他信的妹妹,英拉·西那瓦建立关系是奥巴马“战略重点”转向“中国威胁”论的直接实现。在2012年6月,美国参谋长联席会议主席马丁·登普西,在访问泰国、菲律宾和新加坡后声明:“我们希望到东南亚与各国合作,并能够参与该地区的事务,让我们为共同利益而努力。”这正是五角大楼所谓的“珍珠链”的关键的“珍珠”。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼正与越南秘密协商,想要重新恢复越战后废弃的基地。并计划与泰国政府协商在曼谷以南90英里的乌塔堡泰国皇家海军空军基地创建一个新的“灾难援助”中心。在20世纪60年代,美国军方曾在那里建造过两英里长的跑道,当时是亚洲最长的跑道之一。这是在越南战争期间重要的中途补给和加油基地。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼也正在努力争取获得更多权利,以使美国海军能够访问泰国港口并进行联合侦察飞行,监视贸易航线和军事行动。美国计划在新加坡部署新型近岸战斗舰(littoral combat ship),并定期轮换访问泰国和其他东南亚国家。海军正在向泰国寻求进行联合空中侦察任务的条件。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 此外,国防部副部长阿什顿·卡特(Ashton Carter)在2012年7月前往泰国, 6月,美国国防部长莱昂·帕内塔(Leon Panetta)在新加坡的一次会议上会见泰国国防部长,并接受了访问泰国的邀请。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 到2014年,美海军按计划将开始向太平洋部署新的P-8A“海神”侦察和反潜机来取代P-3C猎户座反潜巡逻机。差不多在同时,海军还准备将把新的高空无人侦察机部署到亚太地区。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>印美防务“东望政策”</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 今年6月,美国国防部长莱昂·帕内塔(Leon Panetta)在印度宣称,与印度的防务合作是美国在亚洲安全战略的关键所在。他承诺将帮助发展印度的军事能力,并与印度联合开发“尖端”军事技术。帕内塔是今年奥巴马内阁中第5个访问印度的大臣。种种迹象表明,对于美国来说,在21世纪,印美关系将成为主要的双边关系。原因是中国的崛起。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 几年前,在布什政府期间,美国采取重大举措,将印度锁定为军事盟友,以应对中国在亚洲的崛起。印度称其为“东望政策”。虽然在现实中所有的说法与此相反,但它仍是一个“瞄准中国”的军事政策。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在2012年8月,国防部副部长阿什顿·卡特评论说,“印度是我们的重新平衡亚太关系的重要国家之一,并且我们认为,平衡亚太的关系一定会为21世纪带来更为广泛的安全和繁荣。美印关系将是全球范围的,如两国都是大国以及两国所产生的影响都是世界范围的。”2011年,美军与印度联合执行了超过50次的重大军事行动。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 卡特在新德里访问后再次表示:“我们的安全利益聚焦在:在整个印度洋地区的海上安全;在阿富汗,印度为阿富汗的经济发展和安全部队做出了巨大贡献;而在更广泛的地区问题上,我们有着共同的长远利益。我应国防部长帕内塔的要求,与美国的技术和政策专家高级代表团一行前来访问印度。”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>印度洋</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 五角大楼针对中国的“珍珠链”战略不是那种“美丽的珍珠项链",而是像一个刽子手的绞索一样围堵中国,以图在爆发重大冲突的情况下完全切断中国的重要原料通道,尤其是从波斯湾和非洲的石油通道。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 前五角大楼顾问罗伯特·卡普兰和现在的斯特拉特福顾问,已经注意到印度洋正在成为世界的“战略重心”,谁能控制这个重心,谁就能控制欧亚大陆,包括控制中国。海洋是重要的水路通道,是中东和中国及远东国家之间的能源和贸易通道。更具有战略意义的是,它是中国、非洲和拉丁美洲之间南-南发展中国家经济轴心的心脏。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 自1997年以来,中国与非洲的贸易已经上涨了20多倍,而仅仅10年内中国与包括巴西在内的拉美国家间贸易增长了14倍。这种发展的势头,如果继续的话,在不到10年的时间内将会使欧盟的经济规模和现在已经不断下降的北美经济黯然失色。华盛顿等国和华尔街一定会不惜一切代价阻止这种事情的发生。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 从索马里到印尼,包括海湾和中亚这些横跨印度洋的伊斯兰国家,必将成为世界新的战略重心。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 没有哪个经济集团可以挑战美国的霸权。前奥巴马地缘政治顾问、英国地缘政治学家哈尔夫·麦金德(Mackinder)爵士的学生兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基(Zbigniew Brzezinski),和在美国权利机构中仍最具影响力的亨利·基辛格,在布热津斯基的《大棋局》一书中,从华盛顿的角度一起总结了印度洋的重要性。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 对于美国来说,在欧亚大陆上要阻止能够主宰欧亚大陆、进而挑战美国的国家出现,这点至关重要。所以,制定一个全面和综合的欧亚地缘战略是这本书的目的。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 对于美国来说,地缘政治的最重要部分是欧亚大陆⋯⋯美国的全球霸主地位直接依赖于美国主导欧亚大陆的时间和效果。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在《大棋局》这本书中写道,美国如何“管理”欧亚大陆是至关重要的。欧亚大陆是全球最大的大陆,是地缘政治轴心。主导了欧亚大陆就等于将控制世界三大最先进、经济上最具生产活力的地区中的两个。我们只要一瞥地图就可以知道,控制欧亚大陆几乎自然而然地致使非洲处于从属地位,使得西半球和大洋洲在地缘政治地位上处于世界中心大陆的外围。约75%的世界人民和几乎所有世界物质财富都聚集在欧亚大陆上。欧亚大陆占世界国民生产总值的60%,并约占世界上已知的能源资源的四分之三。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 印度洋被冠之以有些人所说的伊斯兰凯旋门,即从东非延伸至印尼,途径波斯湾国家和中亚国家。自冷战结束后的20年以来,中国和其他要小得多的亚洲大国在印度洋上第一次挑战美国霸权。尤其在近几年,随着美国经济在全球的影响力急剧下降,而中国的经济影响力引人瞩目地上升.,五角大楼开始重新考虑美国在印度洋的战略性存在。奥巴马的“亚洲轴心”论主张五角大楼需主导性地控制印度洋的海上航线和中国南海海域。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国正在重建其在日本冲绳的基地作为向中国投射美国军事力量的主要中心。截至2010年,共有超过35000名美国军事人员驻扎在日本,另外美国国防部雇佣了5500美国平民,包括总部设在横须贺(Yokosuka)的美国第七舰队,驻扎在冲绳岛的第三海军陆战队远征军。130架美国空军战斗机驻扎在三泽空军基地(Misawa Air Base)和嘉手纳空军基地(Kadena Air Base)。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 日本政府于2011年开始了其旨在对抗日益增长的中国威胁装备计划。日本司令部敦促其领导人请求美国允许其购买F-22A“猛禽”战斗机,目前根据美国法律,出售F-22A“猛禽”战斗机是非法的。韩美军方已经加深了他们的战略联盟关系,超过45,000名美国士兵正驻扎在韩国。韩国和美国声称,他们这样做是因为朝鲜军队实现了现代化。中国和朝鲜谴责为这种行为为不必要的挑衅行为。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国以反恐战争为借口,已经与菲律宾和印尼军队签订了许多重要的军事协议。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 迪戈加西亚(Diego Garcia)军事基地是美国控制印度洋的关键所在。在1971年,美国减少(迪戈加西亚)市民人口以在迪戈加西亚扩建重要的军事设施。美国利用该基地执行入侵伊拉克和阿富汗的作战任务。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 中国有两个致命弱点,分别是波斯湾口的霍尔木兹海峡和新加坡附近的马六甲海峡。约有20%的<span id="stock_sh601857"><a class="keyword" href="http://finance.sina.com.cn/realstock/company/sh601857/nc.shtml" style="text-decoration: initial;" target="_blank">中国石油</a></span><span id="quote_sh601857">(9.45,0.16,1.72%)</span>需要通过霍尔木兹海峡。而约80%的中国石油进口以及主要货运必经马六甲海峡。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 为了防止中国成功崛起成为美国在世界上的主要经济竞争对手,华盛顿在2010年年底发动了所谓的“阿拉伯之春”运动。虽然上百万的突尼斯,利比亚,埃及和其他地方的阿拉伯民众追求自由和民主的愿望不假,但他们实际上不知不觉的充当了美国在整个盛产石油的伊斯兰世界,实行其“混乱”策略和发动伊斯兰内部战争和冲突的炮灰,这场动荡从北非的利比亚延伸至叙利亚,最终将会是中东的伊朗。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国针对主要伊斯兰国家的策略跨越了印度洋,正如战略分析家穆罕默德·哈桑(Mohamed Hassan)指出的:</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国正在设法控制这些资源,以防止这些资源流向中国。这是发动伊拉克和阿富汗战争的一个重要目标,但这两场战争最终都以失败收场。美国摧毁了这些国家,试图建立亲美的温顺政府,然而都失败了。雪上加霜的是,伊拉克新政府和阿富汗政府正在与中国进行贸易!北京不需要花费数十亿美元发动一场非法战争来获取伊拉克的石油:中国公司在完全符合规则的框架内,只要在拍卖会上尽可能买进石油特许权就可以了。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国战略全线溃败。但美国还可以选择一项策略:维持动荡局面,防止这些国家实现稳定,让中国受益。这意味着在伊拉克和阿富汗的战争将会继续,并把战争扩展到如伊朗,也门或索马里等国家。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> <strong>中国南海</strong></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在2012年之前,美国持续煽动中国与南海周边国家的争端是完成围堵中国绞索“珍珠链”的核心。美国的“珍珠链”策略旨在战时切断重要能源的来源和其他产品的进口。据中华人民共和国地质资源和矿业部估计,中国南海可能含有180亿吨的原油储量(科威特也仅130亿吨的原油储量)。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 据最乐观估计,中国南海的南沙和西沙群岛的潜在石油资源(不是探明储量)可能高达1050亿桶,而中国南海的石油总储量可能高达2130亿桶。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 如此巨大的能源储备的存在,使南海争端成为中国重要的能源安全问题也就不足为奇了。在过去的几年里,华盛顿精心计谋干预中国南海、破坏中国利益,尤其是利用越南作为楔子反对中国在南海的石油勘探。2012年7月,越南国民议会通过了一项法律,划分越南海上边界,把西沙和南沙群岛也包括在内。自从越南实行经济自由化以来,美国在该国已经具有决定性影响了。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 2011年的美国军方开始与越南的合作,合作项目包括代号为 “和平”的联合军演。华盛顿一直支持菲律宾和越南在中国南海宣布领土归属,以此为那些小国壮胆,而从来没有鼓励他们寻求外交手段解决争端。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 2010年,美国和英国的石油巨头参与了中国南海的勘探招标。雪佛龙和BP公司的招标加强了总部设在美国阿纳达科石油公司在中国南海的存在。这一举动对于给予华盛顿“捍卫美国公司在该地区的石油利益”借口是必不可少的。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在2012年4月,菲律宾战舰格雷戈里奥皮拉尔号(Gregorio del Pilar)卷入了与中国海监船在黄岩岛附近对峙事件,因为中方和菲律宾都声称黄岩岛是自家领土。菲律宾海军一直在试图逮捕中国渔民,据菲律宾官方称,中国渔民捕捉了受政府保护的海洋生物,但中国海监船阻止了菲律宾海军。2012年4月14日,美国和菲律宾在菲律宾巴拉望岛举行了年度演习。2012年5月7日,中国外交部副部长傅莹传唤菲律宾驻中国大使馆临时代办亚历克斯·蔡会面,对黄岩岛事件作出了严正交涉。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 从韩国、菲律宾到越南,五角大楼和美国国务院正在中国南海极力煽动他们之间的主权冲突,以此暗中插入美国的军事存在以“防卫”越南、日本、韩国和菲律宾的利益。围绕中国的军方刽子手的绞索正在向中国慢慢地勒紧。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 当中国海上庞大的常规石油和天然气资源的开采受到限制时,美国又极力诱导中国在其境内大规模地开采页岩气。诱导中国大规模开采页岩气绝对不是美国对中国的善意。事实上,这是摧毁中国的另一重要武器,即通过环境战的形式达到摧毁中国的目的。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; line-height: 24px; text-indent: 30px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><i>威廉·恩道尔(F. William Engdahl),旅德经济学家、地缘政治学者,著有《石油战争:石油政治决定世界新秩序》、《粮食危机:一场不为人知的阴谋》等多部畅销书。</i></span></span></div>
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版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-9208660732703118952013-02-03T01:44:00.000-08:002013-02-28T03:24:04.359-08:00跨太平洋伙伴关系协定:中国崛起过程中的重大挑战<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">作者:李向阳《国际经济评论》</span><span lang="EN-US">2012</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年第</span><span lang="EN-US">2</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">期</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">【<b>内容提要</b>】跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(</span><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">)是美国</span><span lang="EN-US">“</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">回归亚太</span><span lang="EN-US">”</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">战略的重要组成部分,其动机既有经济又有政治方面的考虑,其中遏制中国崛起是一个不容否认的目标。以</span><span lang="EN-US">2011</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">年亚太经合组织(</span><span lang="EN-US">APEC</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">)峰会为标志,</span><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">已进入实质性谈判阶段。</span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">其未来的发展前景很大程度上将取决于日本及其他东亚国家的立场,至于美国所宣称的亚太自由贸易区协定(</span><span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">)现阶段基本上是一个没有实际意义的符号。一旦</span><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">成为现实,</span><span lang="EN-US">APEC</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">首当其冲将可能会被架空。对中国而言,被排除在</span><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">之外不仅意味着将受到</span><span lang="EN-US">“</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">排他性效应</span><span lang="EN-US">”</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">的冲击,而且过去十年中国所致力推动的东亚区域经济合作进程有可能因此而发生逆转,这将是中国崛起过程中面临的一次重大挑战。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">【<b>关键词</b>】:</span><span lang="EN-US">“</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">回归亚太</span><span lang="EN-US">”</span><span style="font-family: "新細明體","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">战略;跨太平洋伙伴关系协定;亚太经合组织;东亚区域经济合作。</span></div>
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-a21ZRnakXW4/UQ3oLXjRSNI/AAAAAAAAJ58/kj3oH1lfFxE/s1600/%25E6%259D%258E%25E5%2590%2591%25E9%2598%25B3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-a21ZRnakXW4/UQ3oLXjRSNI/AAAAAAAAJ58/kj3oH1lfFxE/s1600/%25E6%259D%258E%25E5%2590%2591%25E9%2598%25B3.jpg" /></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>)尚未正式生效就已经受到了人们的广泛关注。原因在于它的形成与走向<b>将影响全球经济最有活力地区的区域经济合作格局</b>。更重要的是,<b>它背后体现了大国之间的博弈,其中美国、日本与中国之间未来的三边关系将可能因此而重新组合。对中国而言,尽管加入</b><b><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span></b><b>的可能性很小,但<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span></b><b>将对其和平崛起进程构成重大挑战</b>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>一、 <span lang="EN-US">TPP</span></b><b>与美国的「回归亚太」战略<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">1 </span>本文的基本思路于<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年<span lang="EN-US">3</span>月由日本贸易振兴会(<span lang="EN-US">JETRO</span>)与美国战略与国际研究中心(<span lang="EN-US">CSIS</span>)在华盛顿与芝加哥举行的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>东亚经济一体化与日美合作<span lang="EN-US">”</span>研讨会上宣讲。后在日中产学官交流机构在东京举行的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>日中韩经济贸易合作<span lang="EN-US">”</span>会议上宣讲。感谢与会者提出的修改意见。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US">“</span>回归亚太<span lang="EN-US">”</span>战略是近年来美国全球战略调整的核心。这一战略具体是<b>由两个<span lang="EN-US">“</span>轮子<span lang="EN-US">”</span>支撑</b>的:<b>一是安全外交,二是经济合作</b>。<b><span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年可以说是美国实施<span lang="EN-US">“</span>回归亚太<span lang="EN-US">”</span>战略进入实质性的年份</b>。在安全外交领域,美国(与俄罗斯一起)首次参加东亚峰会;同时强化与美国存在军事同盟国家的双边关系。在经济合作领域,<b>以<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年<span lang="EN-US">11</span>月美国主办<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>峰会为契机,正式推出了<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>框架协议</b>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">作为<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的倡导者<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">2</span></span>,美国从一开始就赋予其<b>两个基本特征:一是开放的区域主义</b>,即<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>对所有<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>的<span lang="EN-US">21</span>个成员都是开放的,换言之,<b>只要满足<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的进入门槛就可以自由选择加入</b>。<b>其最终目标是建立覆盖<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>所有成员的亚太自由贸易区协定</b>。<b>二是适应二十一世纪的高质量的自贸区协定</b>。所谓<span lang="EN-US">“</span>高质量<span lang="EN-US">”</span>不仅意味着<b>降低关税,实现贸易投资自由化</b>,而且还要求<b>具有统一的知识产权保护规则、环境保护规则、竞争政策、劳工标准</b>,等。实际上,美国是把<b>北美自由贸易区</b>的规则移植过来了<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">3</span></span>。纵观<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的这两个特征,<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>高质量的自贸区协定<span lang="EN-US">”</span>为许多国家设置了难以跨越的进入门槛,因而<span lang="EN-US">“</span>开放的区域主义<span lang="EN-US">”</span>只是一个幌子而已</b>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国倡导<b><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的动机是什么</b>?这关系到对<b><span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>性质</b>及<b>发展前景</b>的判断,更关系到对中国所可能带来的潜在影响。对此,国内外学术界的看法并不尽一致<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">4</span></span>。总结起来大致有以下观点:<b>第一,分享亚洲经济高速增长的收益</b>。这是美国官方的表述。进入二十一世纪以来,亚洲经济的高速增长令全球所注目,尤其是国际金融危机之后,亚洲经济已经成为全球经济增长的火车头。因而许多人把二十一世纪称之为<span lang="EN-US">“</span>太平洋世纪<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。<b>第二,为奥巴马政府的出口翻番战略创造条件</b>。国际金融危机之后,奥巴马政府提出以<span lang="EN-US">2009</span>年美国的出口规模为基础,通过五年努力实现美国出口翻番目标<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">5</span></span>。<b>第三,重构资源版图与信用体系</b><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">6</span></span>。一个国家和民族<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">的生存权和生存空间是依靠资源维持的,包括国土资源在内的资源版图是任何国</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">2 TPP</span>最早是由<b>新加坡、文莱、新西兰与智利</b>组建的一个自贸区协定,但美国的进入已经改变了<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>原有的性质,并由美国来主导其整个规则的谈判。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">3 JagdishN.Bhagwati</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>)<span lang="EN-US">America’sthreattotrans-Pacifictrade .EastAsiaForum,January10th,2012.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">4 </span>刘中伟,沈加文(<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年)<span lang="EN-US">“</span>跨太平洋伙伴关系协议:研究前沿与架构<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《当代亚太》,<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年第<span lang="EN-US">1</span>期,第<span lang="EN-US">35-59</span>页。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">5 ShiroArmstrong</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>)<span lang="EN-US">TPPneedslesshaste,morecaution.EastAsiaForum,April17th,2011</span>。与此相关的解释是<span lang="EN-US">WTO</span>多哈回合陷于停顿状态,<b><span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>所力图推动的贸易、投资自由化无法满足美国的需求,因而美国要另起炉灶。这种解释是有一定道理的,美国当初在<span lang="EN-US">WTO</span>乌拉圭回合陷入困境之时启动了北美自由贸易区的谈判,客观上对乌拉圭回合谈判最终完成发挥了作用</b>。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">家民族的生命线。对于一个民族国家来说,建立以资源控制为核心,超越传统主权国家领土和版图概念的广义生存空间,这就是一个国家的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>资源版图<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。<b>美国积极推进<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的根本战略目标,就是在摆脱危机的过程中保持和扩大自己的源版图</b>,而要做到这一点,<b>就需要重新构建危机后的信用体系,达到在危机后重新瓜分世界资源和财富的目的</b>,继续持保持美国超级大国的霸权地位。<b>第四,防止把美国排除在东亚区域经济合作进程之外</b>。用美国前国务卿贝克尔的说法,<b>美国不允许在太平洋划出一条界线,把美国排除在外</b><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">7</span></span>。<b>第五,遏制中国的崛起</b><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">8</span></span><b>。这是美国官方一直不承认的动机</b>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">比较<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的上述动机,<b>第一种观点(分享亚洲经济高速增长的收益)客观上是成立的</b>,它所基于的判断是一个国际共识。第二种观点(为出口翻番战略创造条件)过于勉强。理由是,美国的出口翻番战略跨越时间是<span lang="EN-US">2009-2014</span>年,<b>而<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>原计划是在<span lang="EN-US">2015</span>年完成谈判</b>。第三种观点(重构资源版图与信用体系)涵盖范围过宽。照此逻辑,美国还应该通过自贸区协定把欧洲、中东、非洲也囊括进来。<b>第四种观点(防止被东亚区域经济合作排除在外)具有一定的可信度</b>。<b>过去十年间,东亚区域经济合作的多数方案都不包括美国,如<span lang="EN-US">“10+3”</span>、<span lang="EN-US">“10+6”</span>、<span lang="EN-US">“</span>东亚共同体<span lang="EN-US">”</span>等。</b>事实上,从上个世纪末期开始<b>美国就一直反对在亚洲成立不包括美国的区域经济一体化方案</b>(如,日本在亚洲金融危机之后提出的亚洲货币基金)。但如果只是基于这种单纯的防御目标,那么美国的优先选择应该是加入到现行的东亚区域经济合作框架之内,而勿需重起炉灶。<b>第五种(遏制中国)是一个颇具争议的观点</b>。反对者认为,美国政府并没有承认由此动机,因而有<span lang="EN-US">“</span>阴谋论<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的嫌疑。赞成论则认为,中美之间意识形态方面存在天然的分歧,美国把<span lang="EN-US">TPP<o:p></o:p></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">扩展到中国的家门口,遏制中国是很自然的。</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">6 </span>张捷(<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年)<span lang="EN-US">“</span>美国欲重构资源版图与信用体系<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《环球财经》,<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年<span lang="EN-US">1</span>月<span lang="EN-US">13</span>日。</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">7 C.FredBergstenandJeffreyJ.Schott(2010),SpeechesandPapersSubmissiontotheUSTRinSupportofaTrans-PacificPartnershipAgreement.PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics,January25,2010.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span lang="EN-US">8 PeterDrysdale</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>)<span lang="EN-US">China,economiccontainmentandtheTPP.EastAsiaForum,December12th,2011.C. FredBergstenandJeffreyJ.Schott(2010) </span>。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">围绕遏制中国论争议的关键在于中美之间是否存在根本性的利益分歧,如果存在,这种利益分歧的表现形式是什么?我们认为,中美之间尽管存在意识形态的差别,但更重要的两者<b>是一个迅速崛起大国</b>与<b>原有霸主之间的关系</b>。对美国而言,中国经济规模赶超美国只是时间长短问题,美国最担心的是中国崛起之后对其霸主地位的挑战。在核武器时代,大国之间发生战争的可能性越来越小。因而,<b>大国之间的竞争越来越演变为对国际规则主导权的竞争</b>。<b>美国(在一定程度上也包括欧洲)是现行国际规则的制定者与最大受益者</b>。如何能够在中国经济规模超越美国之后保证目前的国际规则体系不受到挑战是<b>美国对华战略的核心所在</b>。过去十余年间,东亚区域经济合作取得了长足的发展,<span lang="EN-US">“<b>10+1”</b></span><b>机制</b>(中国<span lang="EN-US">-</span>东盟、日本<span lang="EN-US">-</span>东盟、韩国<span lang="EN-US">-</span>东盟自贸区协定)已经实现。未来的发展方向将是<span lang="EN-US">“<b>10+3</b>”</span>(<b>中日韩<span lang="EN-US">-</span>东盟自贸区</b>)或<span lang="EN-US"><b>“10+6”</b></span>(中日韩<b>印澳新</b><span lang="EN-US">-</span>东盟自贸区)。鉴于中国经济规模已经超越日本,成为亚洲最大的经济体,同时中国已经成为亚洲大多数国家最大的贸易伙伴或出口市场,尤其是国际金融危机之后中国经济已经成为亚洲经济增长的主要拉动者<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">9</span> </span>,<b>以中国为核心的东亚区域经济合作格局正在浮出水面</b><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">10</span> </span>。这是美国最不能容忍出现的一种结果,因为那意味着美国在全球经济最有活力的地区失去(或部分失去)了对国际规则的主导权。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">如果我们认可<span lang="EN-US">“</span>遏制论<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的动机,那么美国推动<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>从开始就把中国排除在外了,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>所谓的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>开放主义<span lang="EN-US">”</span>特征实际上被<span lang="EN-US">“</span>高质量<span lang="EN-US">”</span>特征所抹杀。区域经济合作发展的历程表明,<b>对大国而言,建立区域贸易协定从来都不是追求纯粹的经济目标</b><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">11</span> </span>。在这种意义上,区域贸易协定与多边贸易协定有着重大的差异。有人建议,中国应该以对待<span lang="EN-US">“</span>入世<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的态度对待<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>。理由是,中国<span lang="EN-US">“</span>入世<span lang="EN-US">”</span>十年的实践证明了,<span lang="EN-US">“</span>入世<span lang="EN-US">”</span>推动了中国的经济体制改革,也使中国以更快的速度融入到了世界经济之中。现阶段中国接受<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>条款尽管还有困难,但可以以此为契机推动中国的经<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">济体制,甚至政治体制的改革。不能因为是美国人提起,就连对的也不做</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: xx-small;">12</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">。</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">9 DonghyunParkandKwanhoShin</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2009</span>)<span lang="EN-US">CanTradewiththePeople’sRepublicofChina<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">10 </span>多年来,东盟一直被奉为东亚区域经济合作的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>驾驶员<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。这是东亚地区大国(中国、日本、韩国)相互竞争的结果。尽管中国官方也一直宣称支持东盟主导东亚区域经济合作的进程,但国际社会对东盟<span lang="EN-US">“</span>小马拉大车<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的质疑却越来越多。伴随中国经济的崛起,以中国为核心的东亚区域经济合作格局是一种客观发展趋势。<span lang="EN-US">11 </span>李向阳(<span lang="EN-US">2003</span>年)<span lang="EN-US">“</span>新区域主义与大国战略<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《国际经济评论》,<span lang="EN-US">2003</span>年第<span lang="EN-US">3</span>期。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>这种观点既混淆了区域贸易协定与多边贸易协定之间的差别</b>,<b>也忽略了中美之间利益的根本分歧</b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: xx-small;">13</span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>二、日本与其他东亚国家对待<span lang="EN-US"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id="_x0000_t75" coordsize="21600,21600" o:spt="75" o:preferrelative="t" path="m@4@5l@4@11@9@11@9@5xe" filled="f" stroked="f"> <v:stroke joinstyle="miter"/> <v:formulas> <v:f eqn="if lineDrawn pixelLineWidth 0"/> <v:f eqn="sum @0 1 0"/> <v:f eqn="sum 0 0 @1"/> <v:f eqn="prod @2 1 2"/> <v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelWidth"/> <v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelHeight"/> <v:f eqn="sum @0 0 1"/> <v:f eqn="prod @6 1 2"/> <v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelWidth"/> <v:f eqn="sum @8 21600 0"/> <v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelHeight"/> <v:f eqn="sum @10 21600 0"/> </v:formulas> <v:path o:extrusionok="f" gradientshapeok="t" o:connecttype="rect"/> <o:lock v:ext="edit" aspectratio="t"/></v:shapetype><v:shape id="圖片_x0020_4" o:spid="_x0000_i1028" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:35.25pt;height:11.25pt;visibility:visible;mso-wrap-style:square'> <v:imagedata src="file:///C:\DOCUME~1\WINXP\LOCALS~1\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image001.jpg" o:title=""/></v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span>的立场</b><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">从美国选择的第一批成员来看,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>对美国的经济利益是微不足道的,因为其他<span lang="EN-US">8</span>个成员的经济规模很小(只占全球的<span lang="EN-US">4%</span>左右),并且有一半的成员(智利、秘鲁、新加坡、澳大利亚)与美国已经签署了双边自由贸易区协定。然而,一旦日本加入,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>在经济上将成为具有重要意义的区域贸易协定。在日本加入之后的<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员中,按经济规模划分,美国占<span lang="EN-US">67%</span>,日本占<span lang="EN-US">24%</span>,其他<span lang="EN-US">8</span>个国家占<span lang="EN-US">9%</span>。如果日本能够以加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>为契机开放市场,尤其是农业和服务业的开放,那么<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员将能获得巨大的收益。<span lang="EN-US">2010</span>年<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员与美国的商品贸易额为<span lang="EN-US">1709</span>亿美元,占美国进出口总额的<span lang="EN-US">5.3%</span>;其中,没有一个国家属于美国的前<span lang="EN-US">10</span>大出口国。而日本加入之后,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员与美国的贸易额将上升到<span lang="EN-US">3518</span>亿美元,占美国贸易总额的<span lang="EN-US">11%14</span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">日本野田政府在<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>夏威夷峰会前宣布参加谈判是<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的一个重大事件<span lang="EN-US">15</span>。反过来,参加<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>谈判的决定也是日本对外政策的一种宣誓。它标志着日本已经从亚洲导向型的区域经济合作战略转向以美日导向型的区域经济合作战略。从上个世纪九十年代亚洲金融危机阶段日本所倡导的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>亚洲货币基金<span lang="EN-US">”</span>到<span lang="EN-US">“10+6”</span>方案、鸠山政府的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>东亚共同体<span lang="EN-US">”</span>都反映了其追随亚洲导向型区域经济合作战略,而野田政府对待<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的立场是与其政治上强化美日同盟联系在一起的。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">日本的区域经济合作战略转向是其近年来<span lang="EN-US">“</span>国家重新定位<span lang="EN-US">”</span>讨论的结果。所谓<span lang="EN-US">“</span>国家重新定位<span lang="EN-US">”</span>是日本在亚洲地位变化的反应:中国经济的迅速崛起使日本越发担忧丧失亚洲第一的结局。从<span lang="EN-US">2010</span>年开始,这种担忧成为事实,中国经济规模<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">12 </span>财新网(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年)<span lang="EN-US">“TPP</span>阴谋论不可信<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,<span lang="EN-US">http://opinion.caixin.com/2011-11-14/100326161.html</span>。财新网(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年)<span lang="EN-US">“</span>以对待<span lang="EN-US">WTO</span>的态度对待<span lang="EN-US">TPP” <span lang="EN-US"><span lang="EN-US">,</span></span>http://magazine.caixin.com/2011-11-18/100329192.html </span>。</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">13 </span>从奥巴马总统<span lang="EN-US">2010</span>年<span lang="EN-US">4</span>月接受澳大利亚广播公司的一段访谈有助于我们理解中美之间对国际规则与秩序的利益分歧。他谈到:<span lang="EN-US">“</span>如果<span lang="EN-US">10</span>多亿中国人口也过上与美国和澳大利亚同样的生活,那将是人类的悲剧和灾难,地球根本承受不了,全世界将陷入非常悲惨的境地。美国并不想限制中国的发展,但中国在发展的时候要承担起国际上的责任。中国人要富裕起来可以,但中国领导人应该想出一个新模式,不要让地球无法承担。<span lang="EN-US">”http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2872726.htm</span>。</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">14 PeterDrysdale</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>)<span lang="EN-US">China,economiccontainmentandtheTPP.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">15 </span>与日本一起参加<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>谈判的还有加拿大与墨西哥。由于未来的<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>规则基本上是参照北美自由贸易区的规则制定的,这两个国家加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>几乎没有什么障碍。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">超越日本位居亚洲第一。过去十余年,日本一直对中日韩自贸区持冷淡态度,对<span lang="EN-US">“10+3”</span>方案采取抵制立场,倡导<span lang="EN-US">“10+6”</span>方案。在这一切的背后是日本对中国崛起的担心,即中日未来谁将主导亚洲区域经济合作的格局与方向。这种主导权之争虽不为官方所承认,但客观上却是阻碍中日合作的重要因素<span lang="EN-US">16 </span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">伴随国际金融危机,亚洲经济格局的变化已经尘埃落定,包括日本在内的亚洲国家对中国经济的依赖程度越来越高。因此,日本的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>国家重新定位<span lang="EN-US">”</span>方向也开始逐渐明朗化,那就是选择一种在中美之间的骑墙战略:经济上分享中国经济与亚洲经济高速增长的收益;政治上强化美日同盟,利用美国<span lang="EN-US">“</span>回归亚太<span lang="EN-US">”</span>来制约中国。反映在区域经济合作战略上,日本既要加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,又不放弃中日韩自贸区选择,但<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>要优先于中日韩自贸区选择。事实上,野田政府对鸠山政府的外交政策一直持否定态度,在其执政之初就宣称<span lang="EN-US">“</span>我们的政权不是以东亚共同体为目标<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。玄叶光一郎外相也认为,<span lang="EN-US">“</span>我们不应该<span lang="EN-US">(</span>将美国排除在外<span lang="EN-US">)</span>把这一区域称之为<span lang="EN-US">‘</span>东亚地区<span lang="EN-US">’</span>,而应该<span lang="EN-US">(</span>将美国包含在内<span lang="EN-US">)</span>称之为<span lang="EN-US">‘</span>亚洲太平洋<span lang="EN-US">’</span>地区<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。而且两位政治家都反复强调一点,那就是<span lang="EN-US">“</span>对于日本来说,在<span lang="EN-US">‘</span>亚洲太平洋<span lang="EN-US">’</span>地区坚持民主主义的价值观,是关乎日本国家兴亡的重要国家利益<span lang="EN-US">”17 </span>。在日本宣布参加<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>谈判之后,日本政府高级官员声称:加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>是要改变由中国主导亚洲区域经济合作规则的格局,变为由美日来决定未来的规则。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">与日本相比,亚洲小国在中美之间实施骑墙战略的动机更为明显,并且还有降低对中国经济依赖程度的倾向。在宣布参加<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的九个成员中就包括四个亚洲国家(越南、马来西亚、新加坡、文莱)<span lang="EN-US">18 </span>。对于美国<span lang="EN-US">“</span>回归亚太战略<span lang="EN-US">”</span>及<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,亚洲小国总体持欢迎心态。在经济层面,由于中国经济高速增长与东亚国际生产网络的强化,亚洲小国对中国市场的依存度越来越高,已成为多数国家最大的出<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">16 </span>在<span lang="EN-US">2010</span>年<span lang="EN-US">10</span>月在北京举行的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>超越障碍,走向未来:中日韩自贸区发展前景<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的国际讨论会上,来自中日韩三国的学者的一个基本共识是,中日韩自贸区的障碍既来自于经济因素,更来自于非经济因素,其中主导权问题是一个难以回避的问题。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">17 </span>转引自:近藤大介(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年):<span lang="EN-US">“</span>日本的南海立场<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《经济观察报》,<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年<span lang="EN-US">10</span>月<span lang="EN-US">24</span>日。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">18 </span>其他一些东南亚国家也表示出对<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的兴趣。同时,美国正在计划使用贸易与投资框架协议<span lang="EN-US">(TIFA)</span>或是与这些国家已经建立的其他对话关系来帮助他们做好加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的准备。据美国贸易代表办公室称,除了与东盟整体达成的一项<span lang="EN-US">TIFA</span>外,美国目前还与柬埔寨、印度尼西亚、菲律宾和泰国达成了一系列<span lang="EN-US">TIFA</span>。参见<span lang="EN-US">“</span>东南亚国家加入《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>)的可能性及其影响<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">口市场。过去十年来,亚洲区域经济合作以多个<span lang="EN-US">“10+1”</span>为主体取得了实质性的进展。尤其是中国<span lang="EN-US">—</span>东盟自贸区的实施迅速扩大了双边贸易和投资的规模,提高了东盟对中国市场的依存度。基于对中国崛起的担忧和市场风险分散化的考虑,部分东盟国家把<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>作为<span lang="EN-US">“10+1”</span>之外的一个新选择。<span lang="EN-US">“10+3”</span>是多年来亚洲区域经济合作的另一个发展方向,但由于东盟对此表示冷淡(担心被边缘化),更重要的是中日韩之间对此尚未达成共识,涵盖整个区域的自贸区协定一直处于空白状态。这种空白状态客观上为<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的出现创造了条件。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在安全层面,<span lang="EN-US">“911”</span>事件之后由于美国把反恐的重点放在了西亚与中东,地区安全作为一种区域公共产品在东亚地区客观上出现了空缺<span lang="EN-US">19</span>。另一方面,在东亚地区,一部分国家在南海问题上与中国存在领土争端;还有部分国家与美国传统上有双边军事同盟关系。因而,美国回归亚太迎合的这种需求,客观上填补了这种<span lang="EN-US">“</span>真空<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">对亚洲国家而言,一方面依赖于中国经济的市场与高速增长,另一方面依赖于美国所提供的安全及<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,这种骑墙战略显然是一种利益最大化选择。当然,亚洲国家骑墙战略目标要取得成功,既需要中美之间存在矛盾,又需要中美之间不能对抗。中美没有矛盾,骑墙战略将丧失前提条件;中美对抗会使这些国家在中美之间被迫做出选择。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">三、<span lang="EN-US"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="圖片_x0020_3" o:spid="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:35.25pt; height:12pt;visibility:visible;mso-wrap-style:square'> <v:imagedata src="file:///C:\DOCUME~1\WINXP\LOCALS~1\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image003.jpg" o:title=""/></v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span>与亚太自由贸易区的前景<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国倡导<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的一个理论目标是最终建立涵盖所有<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>成员的<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>。理由是,既然目前<span lang="EN-US">WTO</span>的多哈谈判无法推动多边贸易自由化体制的实现,那么通过区域主义推动多边贸易自由化体制就成为一种必然选择。按照这种逻辑,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>以<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>为路径就成为多边主义的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>跳板<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,而不是<span lang="EN-US">“</span>绊脚石<span lang="EN-US">”20</span>。看起来这是一幅美好的前景,但<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>自身的特性决定了在可预见的将来<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>很难实现。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">19 </span>这一点与中国的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>不干预<span lang="EN-US">”</span>外交政策与<span lang="EN-US">“</span>韬光养晦<span lang="EN-US">”</span>战略有很大的关系。正如阎学通教授所指出的,在国际安全问题上,如果我国不为周边国家提供安全保障,这些国家就可能寻求美国的安全保障,增加我国战略安全压力。参见<span lang="EN-US">“</span>中国可与美国争夺友好国家<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《国际先驱导报》,<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年<span lang="EN-US">5</span>月<span lang="EN-US">27</span>日。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">20 </span>围绕区域主义与多边主义的关系究竟是<span lang="EN-US">“</span>跳板<span lang="EN-US">”</span>还是<span lang="EN-US">“</span>绊脚石<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,经济学家存在很大的争议。参见,<span lang="EN-US">Baldwin,<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">R.2006),“Multilateralisingregionalism:spaghettibowlsasbuildingblocsonthepathtoglobalfreetrade”,TheWorldEconomy29(11):1451-1518.</span>。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第一,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>本身无法消除亚太区域经济合作内的面条碗效应<span lang="EN-US">21 </span>。所谓面条碗效应是指多个双边自贸区都有自己的原产地规则和其他优惠措施,结果相互重叠的原产地规则和优惠措施抵消或降低了自贸区协定所带来的贸易、投资自由化收益。目前,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>九个成员国之间有<span lang="EN-US">25</span>个自贸区协定。这些协定通常是以损害第三方为前提的。以澳大利亚为例,澳美自贸区协定就排除了美国的糖、牛奶<span lang="EN-US">22 </span>。按理说,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>生效之后,成员国之间原有的双边自贸区协定都应该消除,以便在区域内所有成员国之间实施统一的<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>规则。但美国从一开始就反对这样做,原因是,美国迄今已和<span lang="EN-US">17</span>个国家签署(并生效)了<span lang="EN-US">11</span>项自贸区协定,这些协定都有自己特定的条款(及例外条款),服务于特定的目的。如果<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>不能有效消除成员国之间重叠自贸区协定所带来的影响,那么我们就无法期望<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成为未来<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>的基础。理论上缓解或消除<span lang="EN-US">“</span>面条碗效应<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的出路有:强化涵盖整个区域的自贸区协定;统一最惠国待遇关税;优惠措施的多边化;淡化原产地规则,等<span lang="EN-US">23 </span>。然而,没有美国的支持和推动,这些措施是不可能变为现实的。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第二,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>接纳未来的新成员将实施差别待遇规则,所谓的开放区域主义特征只是一个符号。双边自贸区协定中的例外条款将为未来的新加入者设置障碍。后来者要获得<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员资格,要么必须与每个成员进行单独谈判,要么得到成员国的一致同意,而这又为某些国家行使否决权创造了条件。解决这一问题的出路在于<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>要从规则上对新进入者的条件做出明确、清晰的规定,尽可能减少单个成员国的自主权。对此美国现行的法律制度很难做出让步<span lang="EN-US">24 </span>。依照美国的法律,国会有权逐个对新成员资格进行审核、批准。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第三,<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>成员的差异性难以满足美国推动<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的主要动机。在现有的<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>成员中,既有最发达的经济体,又有最不发达的经济体;既有大国间的意识形态差异,又有大国间对主导权的争夺。而美国推动<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>固然有经济利益方面的考虑,但更重要的是服务于大国之间的博弈目标。且不论<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>内部多个<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">21 PeterA.Petri,MichaelG.Plummer,andFanZhai(2011)Trans-PacificPartnershipandAsia-PacificIntegration:AQuantitativeAssessment.East-estCenterWorkingPaper,EconomicSeries,No119,October24,2011</span>。沈铭辉(<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年)<span lang="EN-US">“</span>跨太平洋伙伴关系协议的成本收益分析:中国的视角<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《当代亚太》,<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年第<span lang="EN-US">1</span>期,第<span lang="EN-US">5-34</span>页。</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">22 iroArmstrong</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>)<span lang="EN-US">TPPneedslesshaste,morecaution.EastAsiaForum,April17th,2011</span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">23 ShiroArmstrong</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>)<span lang="EN-US">AustraliaandthefutureoftheTrans-PacificPartnershipAgreement.EABER<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">WorkingPaperSeries,No.71<br />24 PeterDrysdale</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>)<span lang="EN-US">ArethererealdangersintheTransPacificPartnershipidea?<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">ShiroArmstrong</span>(<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>)<span lang="EN-US">AustraliaandthefutureoftheTrans-PacificPartnershipAgreement.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">小国成员关系的协调困难,仅就这一区域内部的大国(美国、中国、日本、俄罗斯)关系协调就足以阻止<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">回顾历史,美国试图在一个区域内建立由它主导的自贸区并非首次。<span lang="EN-US">1986</span>年欧共体宣布与欧洲自由贸易区(<span lang="EN-US">EEFA</span>)在<span lang="EN-US">1992</span>年建立欧洲统一大市场;作为一种战略反应,美国宣布启动与加拿大的美加自由贸易区协定谈判。<span lang="EN-US">1992</span>年欧盟签署《欧洲统一法》,建立欧洲统一大市场;同年,美加自由贸易区扩展为北美自由贸易区。此后,为了回应欧盟东扩,美国决定启动美洲自由贸易区(<span lang="EN-US">FTAA</span>)的谈判,以求涵盖除古巴之外的所有西半球国家。布什执政后进一步把美洲自由贸易区的建设确立为美国对外经济关系的头等任务,并得到了国会的支持。巴西总统卢拉执政后,以无法接受<span lang="EN-US">FTAA</span>的劳工标准条款为名拒绝了美国的方案,致使<span lang="EN-US">FTAA</span>陷于夭折。美国最后选择与多米尼加、中美洲五国(哥斯达黎加、危地马拉、萨尔瓦多、尼加拉瓜、洪都拉斯)签署了多米尼加<span lang="EN-US">-</span>中非洲<span lang="EN-US">-</span>美国自由贸易区(<span lang="EN-US">DR-CAFTA</span>)。从中我们可以看出,美国推动自贸区的战略目标决非单一的经济目标;它从来也没有把自贸区当成推动多边贸易自由化的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>跳板<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。因而,美国迄今为止的区域经济合作战略并不能证明它会以<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>为<span lang="EN-US">“</span>跳板<span lang="EN-US">”</span>把推动多边贸易自由化作为<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的最终目标。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">四、<span lang="EN-US"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="圖片_x0020_2" o:spid="_x0000_i1026" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:35.25pt; height:12pt;visibility:visible;mso-wrap-style:square'> <v:imagedata src="file:///C:\DOCUME~1\WINXP\LOCALS~1\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.jpg" o:title=""/></v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span>对亚洲区域经济合作格局的影响<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">作为美国<span lang="EN-US">“</span>回归亚太<span lang="EN-US">”</span>战略的一个重要组成部分,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>通过改变东亚区域经济合作的格局将不可避免地会影响中国崛起的进程。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第一,由于<span lang="EN-US">FTAAP</span>还只是一个<span lang="EN-US">“</span>符号<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>内部结构将呈现出<span lang="EN-US">“</span>双轨制<span lang="EN-US">”</span>特征。过去二十年间,<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>一直是亚太地区最大的区域经济合作组织,更重要的是它为该地区领导人就处理区域内事务,甚至全球事务提供了一个交流的场所。一旦<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>生效,<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>成员必然会划分为两大阵营:<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员与非<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员。鉴于<span lang="EN-US">APEC</span>成员所做出的承诺本身就缺乏约束力,未来它对区域合作的影响力将会下降,对非<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>成员的吸引力也会减弱,除非某些成员要以此为平台要求加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第二,以<span lang="EN-US">“10+</span>ⅹ<span lang="EN-US">”</span>为主体的亚洲区域经济合作进程有可能因<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>而陷入停滞。过去十余年,区域内大国围绕东盟所开展的<span lang="EN-US">“10+1”</span>合作业已完成。而尚未取得实质性进展的<span lang="EN-US">“10+3”</span>与<span lang="EN-US">“10+6”</span>本身就不符合东盟的目标,倘若日本成为<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的首批成员<span lang="EN-US">25 </span>,现有的亚洲区域经济合作进程至少会暂时陷于停顿。从美国的角度来看,即便<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>接纳日本会延长谈判时间,甚至有可能还会降低协定的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>质量<span lang="EN-US">”</span>(日本的农业、汽车、服务业开放存在很大的国内政治阻力),美国也会力图接纳日本。日本与部分东盟国家选择加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>会进一步降低对<span lang="EN-US">“10+3”</span>与<span lang="EN-US">“10+6”</span>的需求。原定于<span lang="EN-US">2012</span>年底完成<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>谈判还存在很大的不确定性,短期内<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>也不会给亚洲国家带来经济上的利益,但它很有可能阻碍亚洲区域经济合作现有的发展趋势。这恰恰是美国所需要的。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第三,东盟将丧失东亚区域经济合作主导者的地位。东盟国家在区域内和大国博弈中的特殊地位源于其一体化特征。然而,由于一部分东盟国家已经选择了加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,而另一部分留在<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>之外,东盟内部的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>双轨制<span lang="EN-US">”</span>特征将会愈加明显<span lang="EN-US">26 </span>。至于东盟预定在<span lang="EN-US">2015</span>年建成东盟共同体的目标是否会受此影响尚不得而知。另一方面,以<span lang="EN-US">“10+</span>ⅹ<span lang="EN-US">”</span>为导向的亚洲区域经济合作进程发生变化,东盟将失去<span lang="EN-US">“</span>驾驶员<span lang="EN-US">”</span>或主导者的地位。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第四,亚洲国家<span lang="EN-US">“</span>骑墙战略<span lang="EN-US">”</span>缺乏内在的稳定性。美国回归亚太为亚洲国家实施<span lang="EN-US">“</span>骑墙战略<span lang="EN-US">”</span>提供了可能性,但以中美矛盾为前提条件的这种战略选择并不具备稳定性。进入后危机时代,中国调整经济发展方式的决心是无容置疑的;中国迅速扩大的市场规模是任何国家都无法放弃的。伴随中国的和平崛起,未来中美之间不仅在经济领域,而且在地区安全乃至全球安全领域的合作空间会越来越大,但合作的方式却有很大的不确定性。一旦中美合作的方式发生改变,亚洲国家的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>骑墙战略<span lang="EN-US">”</span>就不得不进行调整。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第五,中日韩自贸区与<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>仍然有并存的可能性。日本的立场对中日韩自贸区和<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>未来的走向有着重要的影响。日本国内对<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>与对中日韩自贸区的收益评估基于不同的标准,因而有着极为混乱的评估结果。这从侧面也反映了<span lang="EN-US">“</span>国家重新定位<span lang="EN-US">”</span>大环境的影响。例如,被誉为<span lang="EN-US">“</span>财界首相<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的经团联会长米仓弘昌认为,<span lang="EN-US">“</span>不加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,日本将沦为世界的<span lang="EN-US">‘</span>孤儿<span lang="EN-US">’”</span>。日本内阁府经过试算认为,若签署<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,<span lang="EN-US">10</span>年内日本<span lang="EN-US">GDP</span>将增加<span lang="EN-US">2.4-3.2</span>万亿日元。经产省认为,日本若不参<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">25 </span>据日本贸易振兴会的专家预测,日本会力争成为<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的创始国,以免作为后来者被迫接受创始国成员所制定的规则。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">26 </span>东盟国家因经济发展水平差异,本身就存在<span lang="EN-US">“</span>老东盟<span lang="EN-US">”</span>与<span lang="EN-US">“</span>新东盟<span lang="EN-US">”</span>之分。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">加<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,韩国一旦同美、中或欧盟签署<span lang="EN-US">FTA</span>协议,日本<span lang="EN-US">GDP</span>将损失<span lang="EN-US">10.5</span>万亿日元,失业人口增加<span lang="EN-US">81.2</span>万。更重要的是,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>将成为事实上的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>美日自由贸易协定(<span lang="EN-US">FTA</span>)<span lang="EN-US">”</span>。这不仅将左右日本未来的政治经济方向,还将影响东亚地域统合,打乱中国的东亚战略。反过来,农林水产省则认为若签署<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>,<span lang="EN-US">10</span>年内日本<span lang="EN-US">GDP</span>将损失约<span lang="EN-US">11.6</span>万亿日元,并将导致约<span lang="EN-US">340</span>万人失业。针对中日韩自贸区,东亚三国的贸易依存度只有约<span lang="EN-US">25%</span>,远低于北美自由贸易区<span lang="EN-US">40-70%</span>的贸易依存度,特别是中国对日韩两国的贸易依存度从<span lang="EN-US">2005</span>年的<span lang="EN-US">21%</span>下降至<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年的<span lang="EN-US">16%</span>。东北亚区域内贸易的潜能巨大,尤其是中日两国经济互补性强,中国欲实现产业升级,与日本的合作将必不可缺<span lang="EN-US">27 </span>。目前,日本在积极参与<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>谈判的同时,也在筹备中日韩自贸区、日欧自贸区的谈判,但就优先顺序而言,<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>无疑是排在首位的<span lang="EN-US">28 </span>。日本这样选择的目的是,以中日韩自贸区、日欧自贸区的谈判向美国就加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>条件施压;反过来,一旦加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>就可以向中韩提出更高的要价。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">第六,一个排除中国的<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>有可能会使亚洲区域经济合作的进程受到损害。就<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>现有的门槛和美国的动机来看,在可预见的将来,中国不可能加入进去。其结果是,中国在经济领域和非经济领域都必然会受到<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>排他性效应<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的冲击。作为亚洲最大的经济体和亚洲经济增长最重要的引擎,中国多年来也是亚洲区域经济合作的积极推动者。面对<span lang="EN-US">“</span>排他性效应<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的冲击,中国未来区域经济合作战略的选择对亚洲区域经济合作的发展方向至关重要。要知道,亚洲区域经济合作进程一直是属于市场驱动型的,而非制度驱动型的。换言之,亚洲区域经济合作发展的基础源于各国之间经济内在的互补性,其中东亚国际生产网络发挥着桥梁的功能。一个排除中国的<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>是否会改变原有区域经济合作的基础,我们还无法做出确定性的判断。如果发生根本性的改变,那么亚洲经济增长的基础就会受到损害;反之,如果没有发生改变,市场驱动型的区域合作就会与制度驱动型(<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>)的区域合作构成冲突。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">对<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>前景与影响的评估很大程度上尚处于模拟阶段,运用经济学方法测<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">27 <span lang="EN-US"><span lang="EN-US">蔡成平(</span></span>2011<span lang="EN-US"><span lang="EN-US">年)</span></span>“</span>日本加入<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>对中国的影响<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,载《金融时报》,<span lang="EN-US">2011</span>年<span lang="EN-US">11</span>月<span lang="EN-US">09</span>日。</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span lang="EN-US">28 </span>许多日本学者和官员强调,通过先开展<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>谈判解决日本国内的农业保护障碍将有助于在下一阶段促进中日韩自贸区的谈判。倘若日本的区域经济合作战略只考虑经济因素,这是一个合理的推论;倘若更多考虑非经济因素,这种推论就值得怀疑了。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">算对不同国家的成本<span lang="EN-US">-</span>收益无疑是必要的。但我们必须有清醒地认识到,如果脱离美国的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>回归亚太<span lang="EN-US">”</span>战略,忽略中美之间的根本利益分歧,我们将无法对<span lang="EN-US">TPP</span>的前景与影响做出客观与理性的判断。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US">作者為</span><span style="line-height: 28px; text-align: -webkit-center;">中国社会科学院亚洲</span><span style="line-height: 28px; text-align: -webkit-center;">太平洋</span><span style="line-height: 28px; text-align: -webkit-center;">研究所所长</span></span></div>
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版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-11443691414405381722013-02-01T08:48:00.000-08:002013-02-28T03:42:30.880-08:00帕内塔:美国的太平洋战调整(America’s Pacific Rebalance)<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px; text-align: justify;">作者:</span>Leon E. Panetta <span style="line-height: 22.383333206176758px; text-align: justify;"> 2012年12月31日 Project Syndicate </span></span><br />
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<a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/renewing-the-us-commitment-to-the-asia-pacific-region-by-leon-e--panetta" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="138" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhb-sC5p-OTsh8573kBNDErGTpgq37mBt-ttGE1efQOl2Zu_J1sWP66JhBgsajYefG3CPz5emnxD4Guye4rzSlgHqQRQ4JimPfaY42Mm-9n1aizXKHePW_Ad3kW2yinkmtKc6RaCsXn_5i1/s200/Leon+E+Panetta+Panetta+Hosts+Honor+Cordon+HOddEMf4Q5il.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; line-height: 24px;">2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后,美国军方历经十余年战争后已开始进行历史性的变革。</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 24px;">我们结束了伊拉克战争;我们正在阿富汗有效落实过渡和裁军;我们在反恐斗争中严重削弱了“基地”组织的领导层。</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">鉴于已经取得的成果和预算紧张的现状,美国已经制订了<b>21世纪新的国防战略(</b></span><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 15px;">a new defense strategy for the twenty-first century</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 15px;"> </span></b></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>)</b>,<b>强调灵活性、技术和力量投射(</b></span><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #414142; line-height: 19px;">emphasizes agility, technology, and force projection.</span><b>)</b><span style="background-color: white;">。</span></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们已开始关注未来的挑战和机遇,很明显未来有众多的决胜因素存在于亚洲。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">毕竟,全球重心正逐步向亚太地区转移,美国未来的繁荣安全与这个快速增长地区的联系比以往任何时候都更为紧密。与此同时,追加军费开支、海上安全难题、从海盗到恐怖主义等非传统安全威胁,以及自然灾害造成的破坏正进一步恶化这一地区的安全环境。美国国防部因此正试图“调整”美国在亚太的战略重心和态势。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">就美国国防部而言,调整有助于确保美国和该地区所有国家像过去70年那样继续受益于安全繁荣的亚太环境。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">四大支柱支撑着亚太战略调整的努力。首先是美国对20世纪成功推动该地区和平安全的一整套处事原则的长期坚持。美国身为一个太平洋大国,在强调国家权利责任和法治忠诚度;开放全球公共海洋、天空、太空和网络空间;不受束缚地发展商业经济;以及避免使用武力解决冲突的公正的国际秩序中拥有永恒不变的国家利益。上述原则可以并且应当支持今天整个地区强劲的经济、外交和军事关系。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我重点关注第二大支柱:即升级、加强和新建美国在亚太地区的联盟和伙伴关系。2011年7月我就任美国国防部长后,为完成这项任务已经四次出访亚洲。我们为此投入更多资源精力用于合作伙伴的能力建设,提高美军和区域军队之间的综合协同能力。我们还努力寻找机会深化信息安全、情报、监视侦察及其他高科技前沿领域(从网络空间到外太空)的合作。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">比方说,我们正在制定美日同盟未来角色、使命和能力的全新双边计划,并就为防止朝鲜安装新的导弹防御雷达的意图达成了协议。我最近访问澳大利亚时签署了一项将空间防御雷达迁移至西澳大利亚州的协议。而我们与韩国签订的2015年战略同盟协议在多个领域规划了未来发展的蓝图,包括在太空和网络空间、智能化和信息共享及指挥安排方面进行合作。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">此外,美国以前所未有的力度与我们在南亚和东南亚的盟友及合作伙伴展开合作。我们已同印度制定了前所未有的双边计划,旨在简化出口程序并深入推进两国的国防贸易及合作生产项目。我们也在海底打捞和救援等防御演习方面寻找新的合作领域,这反映出印度这一关键伙伴的活力正处于不断增长之中。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在东南亚,我们正加强与东南亚国家联盟(东盟)的合作,强化与泰国、菲律宾、新加坡等传统盟国及合作伙伴的双边接触,并和越南、马来西亚和印度尼西亚等国建立合作伙伴关系。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">强化联盟及伙伴关系最重要的方法之一是通过联合训练和演习。2012年,美国增加了整个亚太地区双边和多边演习的规模和数量。例如举行了有史以来规模最大的环太平洋演习(RIMPAC),来自22个国家和地区的超过42艘舰艇和2.5万名人员参与其中,而美中两国也在非洲之角附近举行了首次海上反海盗演习。2013年,我们将首次参与东盟领导下的多边军事演习,而中国已应邀派军舰参与2014年的环太平洋演习。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">以上频繁接触的目的不是建立新的永久性基地,而是通过强化地区存在缔造更强大的联盟和伙伴关系。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国亚太战略调整的第三大支柱是加强我们在太平洋和印度洋的影响力。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在美国军方传统的强势地区东北亚,我们正在进行现代化升级。今年我们向日本部署了F-22和MV-22直升机,并达成重新部署冲绳军队的重要协议。我们继续将关岛建设成重要的战略中心,并计划在日本、关岛和夏威夷组建完整的陆战队陆空特遣队。此外,我们正在保持并提高美军在韩国的战斗力。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国军方也在重新调整亚太地区部署,重点发展在东南亚和印度洋的全新伙伴关系。去年春天,200名海军陆战队士兵抵达澳大利亚的达尔文市,参与和澳军为期6个月的首场轮训并与区域伙伴展开联合行动。我们还增加了美国空军飞机横穿澳大利亚北部的轮飞次数和频率。我们与新加坡达成一致,轮流派遣不超过四艘濒海战斗舰参与新加坡和该地区其他国家的演习、训练和应急处置行动。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">力量投射是美国战略调整的最后一根支柱。到2020年我们计划将60%的海军舰队派遣到太平洋,其后美国的国防预算仍将持续甚至加大对太平洋地区所需更新更强资产的投入力度。我们的支出计划将优先研发部署最新最强的技术,包括弗吉尼亚级潜艇、第五代F-22和F-35战斗机、P-8海上巡逻机、全新电子战及通信能力、制导准确度进一步增强的武器和巡航导弹。一旦我们的行动范围和自由受到威胁,上述武器将确保我们部队的武力投射能力。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">这四大支柱反映了美国国防部建设21世纪和平繁荣亚太地区的综合方案。上述调整属于长期战略,2012年我们为长期成功打下了坚实的基础。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">然而依然存在着问题和误解。有人认为调整以中国为假想敌,但实际情况并非如此。调整的重要组成部分是建设基于持续性实质对话的健康、稳定和持续的对华军事关系,增强我们的合作能力,避免任何形式的误解发生。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我曾于9月成功访华,我对美中重要军事关系的未来保持着清醒乐观的认识。在美国寻求与中国和区域其他国家加强防御关系的同时,我们期待并欢迎其他国家同时加强与中美两国的关系。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">有人认为中东地区的动荡和混乱将阻碍我们完成调整任务。我们新的国防战略和预算明确显示没有这种可能。美军是一支能从容应对多种突发情况的全球力量。即使在调整亚太地区战略的同时,我们也可以在中东保持影响力,在遏制侵略的同时促进稳定。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">最后有人质疑鉴于美国的财政限制,美军是否有充足的资金完成战略调整计划。美军无疑面临着新的财政现实,必须在今后10年实现削减4780亿美元国防预算的目标。但预算可以优先配置,我们已经明确将亚太地区作为我们的重点目标。我们制定了调整预算的详细计划,并已经采取措施让我们的军队更加节约和高效。</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">不管现在还是将来,美国将永远是一个太平洋国家。</span></div>
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版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-61319576473985106822013-01-28T21:02:00.000-08:002013-02-23T22:21:17.333-08:00约瑟夫奈:Work With China, Don’t Contain It<span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者 </span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">约瑟夫·奈</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> </span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">2013年1月29日</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">纽约时报</span></span><br />
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/opinion/work-with-china-dont-contain-it.html?_r=0" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="112" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Pe3IXFN0rNc/UQdXllgzQMI/AAAAAAAAIsU/mpdQhatkdXc/s200/Joseph+Nye.jpg" width="200" /></a><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">CITING an escalating dispute over islands in the East China Sea, The Economist warned last week that “China and Japan are sliding toward war.” That assessment may be too alarmist, but the tensions have bolstered the efforts of some American analysts who have urged a policy to “contain” China.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">During a recent visit to China, I was struck by how many Chinese officials believe such a policy is already in place and is the central purpose of President Obama’s “pivot” toward Asia. “The pivot is a very stupid choice,” Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations, declared publicly. “<b>The United States has achieved nothing and only annoyed China. China can’t be contained</b>,” he added.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Containment</b> was designed for a different era, and it is not what the United States is, or should be, attempting now. At the start of the cold war, containment meant economic isolation of the Soviets and regional alliances like NATO to deter Moscow’s military expansion. Later, to the chagrin of<b> George F. Kennan</b>, <b>the father of containment</b>, the doctrine led to the “<b>domino effect</b>” theory behind the escalation of the Vietnam War.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Cold war containment involved virtually<b> no trade and little social contact</b>. But China now is not what the Soviet Union was then. <b>It is not seeking global hegemony</b>, and the United States not only has an immense trade with China but also huge exchanges of students and tourists.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">When I worked on the Pentagon’s East Asia strategy in 1994, during the Clinton administration, <b>we rejected the idea of containment for two reasons</b>.<b> If we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing a future enemy</b>.<b> If we treated China as a friend, we kept open the possibility of a more peaceful future</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We devised a strategy of “<b><span style="color: #990000;">integrate but hedge</span></b>” — something like Ronald Reagan’s “<b>trust but verify</b>.” America supported China’s membership in the World Trade Organization and accepted Chinese goods and visitors. But a 1996 declaration <b>reaffirmed that the postwar United States-Japan security treaty was the basis for a stable and prosperous East Asia</b>. President Clinton<b> also began to improve relations with India to counterbalance China’s rise</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">This strategy has enjoyed bipartisan support. President George W. Bush continued to improve relations with India, while deepening economic ties with China. His deputy secretary of state, Robert B. Zoellick, made clear that America would <b>accept the rise of China as a “responsible stakeholder.”</b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Mr. Obama’s <b>“rebalancing” toward Asia</b> involves moving naval resources to the Pacific, but also trade, human rights and diplomatic initiatives. As his national security adviser, <b>Thomas E. Donilon</b>, said in November, the American-Chinese relationship “<b>has elements of both cooperation and competition</b>.”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Asia is not a monolith, and its internal balance of power should be the key to our strateg</b>y. Japan, India, Vietnam and other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus <b>welcome an American presence in the region. Unless China is able to attract allies by successfully developing its “soft power,” the rise in its “hard” military and economic power is likely to frighten its neighbors, who will coalesce to balance its power</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A significant American military and economic presence helps to maintain the Asian balance of power and shape an environment that provides incentives for China to cooperate. After the 2008-9 financial crisis, some Chinese mistakenly believed that America was in permanent decline and that this presented new opportunities. A result was that China worsened its relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines — a misstep that confirmed that “<b>only China can contain China</b>.”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>But America’s rebalancing toward Asia should not be aggressive</b>. <b>We should heed Mr. Kennan’s warning against overmilitarization and ensure that China doesn’t feel encircled or endangered</b>. The world’s two largest economies have much to gain from cooperation on fighting climate change, pandemics, <b>cyberterrorism</b> and <b>nuclear proliferation</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>With China becoming more dependent on Middle Eastern energy, we should discuss maritime regulations to ensure free passage of ships and include China in Pacific naval exercises</b>. We should help China develop domestic energy resources like shale gas and encourage China and Japan to revive their 2008 plan for joint undersea gas exploitation. And we should make clear that <b>if China meets certain standards, it can join the negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership</b>, a proposed free-trade agreement around the Pacific Rim.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Containment is simply not a relevant policy tool for dealing with a rising China</b>. Power is the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants, and <b>sometimes America’s power is greater when we act with others rather than merely over others</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;">Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and a former Pentagon official, is the author of the forthcoming book “Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era.”</span></div>
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<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/opinion/work-with-china-dont-contain-it.html?_r=0" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjUBsPGnfQF0HOVF86f_vnzgeFdyLFHqJ-D-qbVO5BCKpvyKbYnsMn3VP8nKzC-aBaH-hvsLkp3mH5_ceyhuvgRLZRWUvMp0tGPC8XQs5cd9EEpUpglUjg06-5UcDOJdPEovxP6HFn7Gc/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13.63636302947998px; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"><br /></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-76885767907534871792013-01-25T19:33:00.000-08:002013-02-23T22:21:53.230-08:00Elizabeth C. Economy:华盛顿是北京所有问题的根源(Washington Source of All Beijing’s Problems)<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">作者 </span><span style="line-height: 22px;">易明(</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">Elizabeth C. Economy)</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> 2012年9月5日 </span><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: none; text-align: right;">Council Foreign Relations</span></span><br />
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s swing through Asia has been marked by a revelation in Beijing: the source of all China’s problems with its neighbors is the United States.</span></span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> A Xinhuaeditorial paints <b>the United States as a “sneaky trouble maker sitting behind some nations in the region and pulling strings</b>.” In the Global Times, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Ni Feng states that the U.S. pivot is “stirring up tensions between China and its neighbors”; while Renmin University scholar Jin Canrong argues that <b>Washington aims to “dominate the region’s political agenda, and build a Trans-Pacific Partnership that excludes China, as well as further consolidate its military edge</b>.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Fortunately, these same media and analysts have a relatively simple answer to the problem: the “U.S. owes China convincing explanation of true intentions of its Asia Pivot policy”; the United States needs to prove that it is “returning to Asia as a peacemaker, instead of a troublemaker”; and a real zinger from the Global Times, “We hope Clinton can reflect upon the deep harm she is bringing to the Sino-U.S. relationship in the last few months before she leaves office and try to make up for it.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">If only it were that simple. Unfortunately, when the problem is misstated, the solution is likely to be as well. China’s problems in the region do not originate with the United States but with China’s own interactions with its neighbors. Some context might help:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">First, take the South China Sea, perhaps the source of Beijing’s greatest concern at the moment. Tensions in the region—particularly between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines—have been heightened over the past year. However, conflict between China and its neighbors (as well as among the neighbors themselves) in the South China Sea has been a fact of life for almost forty years. <b>The year-old U.S. pivot did not create the problem nor did it exacerbate it</b>. U.S. policy has been consistent. In 1995, Washington explicitly supported the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, as well as any diplomatic effort to resolve competing claims peacefully. More than 15 years later, Secretary of State Clinton articulated U.S. policy as follows: “The United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims … but we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation and certainly without the use of force. That is why we encourage ASEAN and China to make meaningful progress toward finalizing a comprehensive code of conduct in order to establish rules of the road and clear procedures for peacefully addressing disagreements.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Second, <b>the United States is not <span style="color: #990000;">a puppet master</span></b>, “<b>sitting behind other countries</b>” <b>and “pulling strings.”</b> Countries in Asia are replete with intelligent leaders and diplomats. They are fully capable of debating the issues surrounding the U.S. pivot and making their own decisions about how to interact with China and the United States. The Philippines kicked the United States out of Subic Bay two decades ago; if it now wants to allow some U.S. submarines to dock there, China should take a step back and ask itself what prompted the Philippines to shift its policy.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Third, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is not a plot against China; negotiations for the agreement started in 2007, well before the current tensions and the pivot (the original negotiations did not even include the United States). The TPP is an effort by the United States to realize the economic benefits of deeper engagement with the most economically robust region in the world—much in the same way that China has done for decades. Moreover, China is welcome to join the TPP under precisely the same conditions as any other member, the United States included. People can disagree about the merits of the TPP, but it represents a recognition of past failings of U.S. trade and economic policy, not an effort to box out China.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Fourth, security relationships in Asia are not exclusionary. China and the United States each have military-to-military relations with a wide range of countries throughout Asia (including with each other), and those countries have security ties among themselves that engage neither Washington nor Beijing. Moreover, China increasingly has military ties throughout the world. In the United States’ backyard, for example, China hosts military personnelfrom at least eighteen Latin American countries and sells arms to countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The United States clearly can’t define the terms of engagement for its neighbors, and China shouldn’t attempt to do so in its neighborhood.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China spent more than thirty years earning the respect and admiration of its neighbors for its economic accomplishments, for its repeated emphasis on “win-win” solutions, and for serving as an important engine of growth in the region. What is causing consternation in the region now is not change in U.S. policy but more assertive Chinese rhetoric and military maneuverings. <b>Once Beijing can acknowledge the real source of its problem, it has the opportunity to identify the correct solution</b>. It is not about the United States assuaging Chinese concerns; it is about China assuaging the region’s concerns.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-43407747677103880222013-01-25T17:41:00.000-08:002013-02-23T22:22:08.336-08:00America’s Pivot: One Big Contradiction<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">作者 </span><span style="border: 0px; line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Justin Logan<i> </i></span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">2013年1月25日 </span><span style="line-height: 11px;"> </span><span style="line-height: 11px;">The Diplomat.</span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Particularly among Asia scholars, there is broad support in Washington for a pivot to Asia in general, and U.S. China policy in particular. Unfortunately, <b>there are two central flaws </b>in U.S. Asia policy that promise big problems for America down the road.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">The first problem</span> </b>is that <b>Washington cannot figure out what it wants from China</b>. Washington supports engaging China economically, and even takes credit for China’s economic growth.According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain.”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At the same time,<b> Washington is ringing China</b> with an array of bilateral alliances and partnerships, <b>all of which are more or less anti-China</b>. It is not <b>paranoid</b> for Chinese to view this as <b>a policy of military containment.</b> When pressed on t<b>he containment question,</b> U.S. policy officials offer absurd responses like that from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in June of last year. According to Panetta, the pivot “<b><span style="color: #990000;">is not about containment of China</span></b>.” Rather, Panetta stated, "it is about the challenge of humanitarian assistance and needs; the challenge of dealing with weapons of mass destruction that are proliferating throughout the world; and dealing with narco-trafficking, and dealing with piracy; and dealing with issues that relate to trade and how do we improve trade and how do we improve lines of communication."</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">Would any American accept such a rationale for China deploying 60 percent of PLAN assets to the Western Hemisphere</span></b>? Dealing with humanitarian assistance and needs, stifling nuclear proliferation, suppressing narco-traffickers, and dispatching pirates<b> do not require more than half the U.S. Navy</b>. Even <b>Richard Armitage</b>, former deputy secretary of state, <b>knows this is nonsense</b>: “<b>When the administration says it’s not about China, it’s <em style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">all</em> about China. China knows this</b>.” If the success of America’s Asia policy relies on Chinese elites believing our official rationale, <b>the policy is in trouble</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But <b>the more basic problem</b> is that <b>economic engagement is working at cross purposes with military containment</b>. If Washington isn’t comfortable with a more powerful China demanding a greater say over Asian security issues, making China wealthier by trading with it doesn’t make much sense. By the same token, if Washington supports the robust trading relationship that helps narrow the relative power gapbetween the two countries, why contain it, especially considering that the trading makes the containing costlier?</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">When I have raised these concerns with U.S. policy officials, they brush off the reasoning as crude and simplistic, but they have little response beyond that. <b>A normal formulation is</b> that <b>America welcomes a “strong, responsible, and prosperous” China </b>that plays a “constructive role” in world politics. “Responsible” and “constructive” go undefined in these responses, however, negating much of their value. <b>Would a responsible China demand control over its sea lines of communication? Would it be constructive for China to continually escalate its demands on Taiwan for reunification?</b></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Or to put it differently, does Washington wish to grade China on these matters the way it would grade itself? <b>Was the Iraq war responsible</b>? <b>Are America’s dozens of formal treaty allies constructive? If so</b>, <b>would Chinese alliances with say, Cuba and Venezuela also be constructive?</b> <b><span style="color: #990000;">Double standards </span></b>and<b><span style="color: #990000;"> fuzzy thinking</span></b> <b>are at the center of the pivot</b>.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">The second major problem</span></b> with the pivot is that instead of playing the role of <b>offshore balancer</b>, monitoring the balance in Asia and ensuring that no power militarily dominates the region, Washington insists on making China’s rise primarily about U.S.-China competition.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In part, this is a consequence of <b>Washington’s hub-and-spokes system of alliances in Asia</b>. As Georgetown’s <b>Victor Cha</b>, who worked on Asia policy in the National Security Council of George W. Bush, points out, the hub-and-spokes system of alliances in Asia was designed on the basis of what he calls a “<b>powerplay</b>” rationale, in which the <b>United States created a number of asymmetric</b>, <b>bilateral alliances</b> in order, in each case, to “<b>exert maximum control over [its] smaller ally’s actions</b>.” Further, Cha writes, Washington sought to “<b>amplify U.S. control and minimize any collusion among its alliance partners</b>.”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Whatever the logic of <b>infantilizing America’s Asian clients</b> during the Cold War, that logic falls short today. Put bluntly, <b>Asian states have a lot more at stake in China’s growing power</b>. Western analysts like Ian Bremmer and David Gordon argue that the U.S. needs Japan as its “best ally” in Asia, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe thinks that “<b>the U.S. needs Japan as much as Japan needs the U.S.</b>”</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>This is exactly wrong</b>. Japan needs the United States far more than Washington needs Tokyo. <b>Without America, Japan would have to scramble to increase its defense spending and strengthen its posture dramatically, possibly including developing nuclear weapons, or else risk putting its sovereignty in even greater jeopardy than it is today</b>. Without Japan, American sovereignty would not be in danger. Although Japan is a friendly state, an important trading partner, and like-minded about China, <b>it has far more at stake when it comes to China’s ris</b>e, and ought to be reminded of this more often.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">When it comes to free riding on U.S. military exertions, Tokyo is hardly the worst offender. This year, after a decade of cuts, Tokyo has proposed increasing defense spending by close to 2 percent. Although one percent of Japan’s GDP is not akin to America’s 4 percent of GDP in absolute terms, $53 billion is a fair amount to be spending on defense, particularly given Japan’s appropriate concentration on the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Still this figure is dwarfed by China’s budget both in absolute terms—the best estimates are that China’s budget is between $150-160 billion per annum, depending on currency estimates—and as a percentage of GDP.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One can hardly fault Japan for spending less than China on defense overall, but the fact that it spends less as a percent of GDP should frustrate Americans—who, after all, are bound by treaty to defend Japan.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">If Washington were to create some distance between itself and its allies and partners in the region, they would likely spend more on their own defense and collaborate with each other more, independently from the United States. In a recent paper published by the Cato Institute, I deal with the three most common objections to this reasoning: that existing allies cannot balance against China effectively on their own; that they could do so but would refuse to; and finally that if they could and did balance on their own, this would have worse consequences than keeping Washington as the Asian balancer of first resort.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>In time, however, U.S. policymakers are going to be forced to rethink the contradiction at the core of its Asia policy</b>. As China continues to narrow the relative balance of power, <b>it will become more and more difficult for Washington to constrain China’s behavior</b>. If states in the region bank on the next 60 years looking like the last 60, the region and the world could be headed for trouble.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><em style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Justin Logan is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. This article is adapted from his recent policy analysis, “</em><a href="http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa717.pdf" style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: initial; vertical-align: baseline;"><em style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">China, America, and the Pivot to Asia</em></a><em style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">.”</em></span></div>
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版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-14215970113882700972013-01-25T09:14:00.000-08:002013-02-23T22:22:31.195-08:00基辛格:The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations-Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">作者 </span></span><span style="line-height: 19.196969985961914px;">Henry A. Kissinger</span><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> 2012 年3/4月 F</span><span style="color: #333333;"><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">oreign Affairs</span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 1.2em;">On January 19, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement at the end of Hu's visit to Washington. It proclaimed their shared commitment to a "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship." Each party reassured the other regarding his principal concern, announcing, "The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region."</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Since then, the two governments have set about implementing the stated objectives. Top American and Chinese officials have exchanged visits and institutionalized their exchanges on major strategic and economic issues. Military-to-military contacts have been restarted, opening an important channel of communication. And at the unofficial level, so-called track-two groups have explored possible evolutions of the U.S.-Chinese relationship.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Yet as cooperation has increased, so has controversy. Significant groups in both countries claim that a contest for supremacy between China and the United States is inevitable and perhaps already under way. In this perspective, appeals for U.S.-Chinese cooperation appear outmoded and even naive.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The mutual recriminations emerge from distinct yet parallel analyses in each country. Some American strategic thinkers argue that Chinese policy pursues two long-term objectives: displacing the United States as the preeminent power in the western Pacific and consolidating Asia into an exclusionary bloc deferring to Chinese economic and foreign policy interests. In this conception, even though China's absolute military capacities are not formally equal to those of the United States, Beijing possesses the ability to pose unacceptable risks in a conflict with Washington and is developing increasingly sophisticated means to negate traditional U.S. advantages. Its invulnerable second-strike nuclear capability will eventually be paired with an expanding range of anti-ship ballistic missiles and asymmetric capabilities in new domains such as cyberspace and space. China could secure a dominant naval position through a series of island chains on its periphery, some fear, and once such a screen exists, China's neighbors, <b>dependent as they are on Chinese trade and uncertain of the United States' ability to react</b>, might adjust their policies according to Chinese preferences. Eventually, this could lead to the creation of a<b> Sinocentric Asian bloc </b>dominating the western Pacific. The most recent U.S. defense strategy report reflects, at least implicitly, some of these apprehensions.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>No Chinese government officials have proclaimed such a strategy as China's actual policy. Indeed, they stress the opposite</b>. However, enough material exists in China's quasi-official press and research institutes to lend some support to the theory that relations are heading for confrontation rather than cooperation.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">U.S. strategic concerns are magnified by ideological predispositions to battle with the entire nondemocratic world. Authoritarian regimes, some argue, are inherently brittle, impelled to rally domestic support by nationalist and expansionist rhetoric and practice. In these theories -- versions of which are embraced in segments of both the American left and the American right -- <b>tension and conflict with China grow out of China's domestic structure</b>. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Universal peace will come</b></span>, it is asserted, <b><span style="color: #990000;">from the global triumph of democracy rather than from appeals for cooperation</span></b>. The political scientist <b>Aaron Friedberg </b>writes, for example, that "<b>a liberal democratic China will have little cause to fear its democratic counterparts</b>, <b>still less to use force against them</b>." Therefore, "stripped of diplomatic niceties,<span style="color: #990000;"> </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">the ultimate aim of the</span> <span style="color: #990000;">American strategy [should be] to hasten a revolution</span></b>, <b>albeit a peaceful one</b>, <b>that will sweep away China's one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place</b>."</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On the Chinese side, the confrontational interpretations follow an inverse logic. <b>They see the United States as a wounded superpower determined to thwart the rise of any challenger, of which China is the most credible</b>. No matter how intensely China pursues cooperation, some Chinese argue, <b>Washington's fixed objective will be to hem in a growing China by military deployment and treaty commitments</b>, thus preventing it from playing its historic role as the Middle Kingdom. In this perspective,<b> any sustained cooperation with the United States is self-defeating, since it will only serve the overriding U.S. objective of neutralizing China</b>. Systematic hostility is occasionally considered to inhere even in American cultural and technological influences, which are sometimes cast as a form of deliberate pressure designed to corrode China's domestic consensus and traditional values. The most assertive voices argue that China has been unduly passive in the face of hostile trends and that (for example, in the case of territorial issues in the South China Sea) China should confront those of its neighbors with which it has disputed claims and then, in the words of the strategic analyst LongTao, "reason, think ahead and strike first before things gradually run out of hand launch[ing] some tiny-scale battles that could deter provocateurs from going further."</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Is there, then, a point in the quest for a cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship and in policies designed to achieve it? To be sure, <b>the rise of powers has historically often led to conflict with established countries</b>. But conditions have changed. It is doubtful that the leaders who went so blithely into a world war in 1914 would have done so had they known what the world would be like at its end. Contemporary leaders can have no such illusions. A major war between developed nuclear countries must bring casualties and upheavals impossible to relate to calculable objectives Preemption is all but excluded, especially for a pluralistic democracy such as the United States.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">If challenged, the United States will do what it must to preserve its security. <b>But it should not <span style="color: #990000;">adopt confrontation as a strategy of choice</span></b>. In China, the United States would encounter <b>an adversary skilled over the centuries in using prolonged conflict as a strategy(</b></span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 28px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国将会发现一个在好几个世纪里精于持久战策略的对手</span></span><b style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 1.2em;">)</b><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 1.2em;"> and whose doctrine emphasizes the psychological exhaustion of the opponent. In an actual conflict, both sides possess the capabilities and the ingenuity to inflict catastrophic damage on each other. By the time any such <b>hypothetical conflagration</b> drew to a close, all participants would be left <b>exhausted and debilitated</b>. They would then<b> be obliged to face a new the very task that confronts them today</b>: <b>the construction of an international orde</b>r in which both countries are significant components.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The blueprints for containment drawn from Cold War strategies used by both sides against an expansionist Soviet Union do not apply to current conditions. The economy of the Soviet Union was weak (except for military production) and did not affect the global economy. Once China broke off ties and ejected Soviet advisers, few countries except those forcibly absorbed into the Soviet orbit had a major stake in their economic relationship with Moscow. Contemporary China, by contrast, is a dynamic factor in the world economy. It is a principal trading partner of all its neighbors and most of the Western industrial powers, including the United States. A prolonged confrontation between China and the United States would alter the world economy with unsettling consequences for all.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Nor would China find that the strategy it pursued in its own conflict with the Soviet Union fits a confrontation with the United States. Only a few countries -- and<b> no Asian ones </b>-- <b>would treat an American presence in Asia as "<span style="color: #990000;">fingers</span>" to be "<span style="color: #990000;">chopped off</span>" </b>(in Deng Xiaoping's graphic phrase about Soviet forward positions). Even those Asian states that are not members of alliances with the United States seek the reassurance of an American political presence in the region and of American forces in nearby seas as the guarantor of the world to which they have become accustomed. Their approach was expressed by a senior Indonesian official to an American counterpart: "<b>Don't leave us, but don't make us choose</b>."</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>China's recent military buildup <span style="color: #990000;">is not in itself an exceptional phenomenon</span></b>: <b>the more unusual outcome would be if the world's second-largest economy and largest importer of natural resources <span style="color: #990000;">did not translate its economic power into some increased military capacity</span></b>. The issue is whether that buildup is open ended and to what purposes it is put. <b>If the United States treats every advance in Chinese military capabilities as a hostile act, it will quickly find itself<span style="color: #990000;"> enmeshed in an endless series of disputes</span> on behalf of <span style="color: #990000;">esoteric aims</span></b>. But China must be aware, from its own history, of the tenuous dividing line between defensive and offensive capabilities and of the consequences of an unrestrained arms race.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China's leaders will have their own powerful reasons for rejecting <b>domestic appeals</b> for an adversarial approach -- as indeed they have publicly proclaimed. <b>China's imperial expansion has historically been achieved<span style="color: #990000;"> by osmosis rather than conquest</span>(</b></span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 28px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">中国历史上的皇朝扩张靠的是同化而非征服</span></span><b style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 1.2em;">)</b><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 1.2em;">, or<b> by the conversion to Chinese culture of conquerors</b> who then added their own territories to the Chinese domain. Dominating Asia militarily would be a formidable undertaking. The Soviet Union, during the Cold War, bordered on a string of weak countries drained by war and occupation and dependent on American troop commitments for their defense. China today faces Russia in the north; Japan and South Korea, with American military alliances, to the east; Vietnam and India to the south; and Indonesia and Malaysia not far away. This is not a constellation conducive to conquest. It is more likely to raise fears of encirclement. Each of these countries has a long military tradition and would pose a formidable obstacle if its territory or its ability to conduct an independent policy were threatened. A militant Chinese foreign policy would enhance cooperation among all or at least some of these nations, evoking China's historic nightmare, as happened in the period 2009-10.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span class="booktitles" style="background-color: white; border: 0px; font-style: italic; margin: 10px 0px 0px; padding: 0px;"><b>Dealing With The New China</b></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Another reason for Chinese restraint in at least the medium term is the domestic adaptation the country faces. The gap in Chinese society between the largely developed coastal regions and the undeveloped western regions has made Hu's objective of a "harmonious society" both compelling and elusive. Cultural changes compound the challenge. The next decades will witness, for the first time, the full impact of one-child families on adult Chinese society. This is bound to modify cultural patterns in a society in which large families have traditionally taken care of the aged and the handicapped. When four grandparents compete for the attention of one child and invest him with the aspirations heretofore spread across many offspring, a new pattern of insistent achievement and vast, perhaps unfulfillable, expectations may arise.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">All these developments will further complicate the challenges of China's governmental transition starting in 2012, in which the presidency; the vice-presidency; the considerable majority of the positions in China's Politburo, State Council, and Central Military Commission; and thousands of other key national and provincial posts will be staffed with new appointees. The new leadership group will consist, for the most part, of members of the first Chinese generation in a century and a half to have lived all their lives in a country at peace. Its primary challenge will be finding a way to deal with a society revolutionized by changing economic conditions, unprecedented and rapidly expanding technologies of communication, a tenuous global economy, and the migration of hundreds of millions of people from China's countryside to its cities. The model of government that emerges will likely be a synthesis of modern ideas and traditional Chinese political and cultural concepts, and the quest for that synthesis will provide the ongoing drama of China's evolution.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">These social and political transformations are bound to be followed with interest and hope in the United States. Direct American intervention would be neither wise nor productive. The United States will, as it should, continue to make its views known on human rights issues and individual cases. And its day-to-day conduct will express its national preference for democratic principles. But a systematic project to transform China's institutions by diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions is likely to backfire and isolate the very liberals it is intended to assist. In China, it would be interpreted by a considerable majority through the lens of nationalism, recalling earlier eras of foreign intervention.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">What this situation calls for is not an abandonment of American values but a distinction between the realizable and the absolute. The U.S.-Chinese relationship should not be considered as a zero-sum game, nor can the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China be assumed in itself to be an American strategic defeat.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A cooperative approach challenges preconceptions on both sides. The United States has few precedents in its national experience of relating to a country of comparable size, self-confidence, economic achievement, and international scope and yet with such a different culture and political system. Nor does history supply China with precedents for how to relate to a fellow great power with a permanent presence in Asia, a vision of universal ideals not geared toward Chinese conceptions, and alliances with several of China's neighbors. Prior to the United States, all countries establishing such a position did so as a prelude to an attempt to dominate China.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The simplest approach to strategy is to insist on overwhelming potential adversaries with superior resources and materiel. But in the contemporary world, this is only rarely feasible. China and the United States will inevitably continue as enduring realities for each other. Neither can entrust its security to the other -- no great power does, for long -- and each will continue to pursue its own interests, sometimes at the relative expense of the other. But both have the responsibility to take into account the other's nightmares, and both would do well to recognize that their rhetoric, as much as their actual policies, can feed into the other's suspicions.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China's greatest strategic fear is that an outside power or powers will establish military deployments around China's periphery capable of encroaching on China's territory or meddling in its domestic institutions. When China deemed that it faced such a threat in the past, it went to war rather than risk the outcome of what it saw as gathering trends -- in Korea in 1950, against India in 1962, along the northern border with the Soviet Union in 1969, and against Vietnam in 1979.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The United States' fear, sometimes only indirectly expressed, is of being pushed out of Asia by an exclusionary bloc. The United States fought a world war against Germany and Japan to prevent such an outcome and exercised some of its most forceful Cold War diplomacy under administrations of both political parties to this end against the Soviet Union. In both enterprises, it is worth noting, substantial joint U.S.-Chinese efforts were directed against the perceived threat of hegemony.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Other Asian countries will insist on their prerogatives to develop their capacities for their own national reasons, not as part of a contest between outside powers. They will not willingly consign themselves to a revived tributary order. Nor do they regard themselves as elements in an American containment policy or an American project to alter China's domestic institutions. They aspire to good relations with both China and the United States and will resist any pressure to choose between the two.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Can the fear of hegemony and the nightmare of military encirclement be reconciled? Is it possible to find a space in which both sides can achieve their ultimate objectives without militarizing their strategies? For great nations with global capabilities and divergent, even partly conflicting aspirations, what is the margin between conflict and abdication?</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">That China will have a major influence in the regions surrounding it is inherent in its geography, values, and history. The limits of that influence, however, will be shaped by circumstance and policy decisions. These will determine whether an inevitable quest for influence turns into a drive to negate or exclude other independent sources of power.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">For nearly two generations, American strategy relied on local regional defense by American ground forces -- largely to avoid the catastrophic consequences of a general nuclear war. In recent decades, congressional and public opinion have impelled an end to such commitments in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan Now, fiscal considerations further limit the range of such an approach. American strategy has been redirected from defending territory to threatening unacceptable punishment against potential aggressors. This requires forces capable of rapid intervention and global reach, but not bases ringing China's frontiers. What Washington must not do is combine a defense policy based on budgetary restraints with a diplomacy based on unlimited ideological aims.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Just as Chinese influence in surrounding countries may spur fears of dominance, so efforts to pursue traditional American national interests can be perceived as a form of military encirclement. Both sides must understand the nuances by which apparently traditional and apparently reasonable courses can evoke the deepest worries of the other. They should seek together to define the sphere in which their peaceful competition is circumscribed. If that is managed wisely, both military confrontation and domination can be avoided; if not, escalating tension is inevitable. It is the task of diplomacy to discover this space, to expand it if possible, and to prevent the relationship from being overwhelmed by tactical and domestic imperatives.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span class="booktitles" style="background-color: white; border: 0px; font-style: italic; margin: 10px 0px 0px; padding: 0px;"><b>Community Or Conflict</b></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The current world order was built largely without Chinese participation, and hence China sometimes feels less bound than others by its rules. Where the order does not suit Chinese preferences, Beijing has set up alternative arrangements, such as in the separate currency channels being established with Brazil and Japan and other countries. If the pattern becomes routine and spreads into many spheres of activity, competing world orders could evolve. Absent common goals coupled with agreed rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to escalate beyond the calculations and intentions of its advocates. In an era in which unprecedented offensive capabilities and intrusive technologies multiply, the penalties of such a course could be drastic and perhaps irrevocable.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Crisis management will not be enough to sustain a relationship so global and beset by so many differing pressures within and between both countries, which is why I have argued for the concept of a Pacific Community and expressed the hope that China and the United States can generate a sense of common purpose on at least some issues of general concern. But the goal of such a community cannot be reached if either side conceives of the enterprise as primarily a more effective way to defeat or undermine the other. Neither China nor the United States can be systematically challenged without its noticing, and if such a challenge is noted, it will be resisted. Both need to commit themselves to genuine cooperation and find a way to communicate and relate their visions to each other and to the world.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Some tentative steps in that direction have already been undertaken. For example, the United States has joined several other countries in beginning negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade pact linking the Americas with Asia. Such an arrangement could be a step toward a Pacific Community because it would lower trade barriers among the world's most productive, dynamic, and resource-rich economies and link the two sides of the ocean in shared projects.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Obama has invited China to join the TPP. However, the terms of accession as presented by American briefers and commentators have sometimes seemed to require fundamental changes in China's domestic structure. To the extent that is the case, the TPP could be regarded in Beijing as part of a strategy to isolate China. For its part, China has put forward comparable alternative arrangements. It has negotiated a trade pact with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and has broached a Northeast Asian trade pact with Japan and South Korea.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Important domestic political considerations are involved for all parties. But if China and the United States come to regard each other's trade-pact efforts as elements in a strategy of isolation, the Asia-Pacific region could devolve into competing adversarial power blocs. Ironically, this would be a particular challenge if China meets frequent American calls to shift from an export-led to a consumption-driven economy, as its most recent five-year plan contemplates. Such a development could reduce China's stake in the United States as an export market even as it encourages other Asian countries to further orient their economies toward China.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The key decision facing both Beijing and Washington is whether to move toward a genuine effort at cooperation or fall into a new version of historic patterns of international rivalry. Both countries have adopted the rhetoric of community. They have even established a high-level forum for it, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which meets twice a year. It has been productive on immediate issues, but it is still in the foothills of its ultimate assignment to produce a truly global economic and political order. And if a global order does not emerge in the economic field, barriers to progress on more emotional and less positive-sum issues, such as territory and security, may grow insurmountable.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span class="booktitles" style="background-color: white; border: 0px; font-style: italic; margin: 10px 0px 0px; padding: 0px;"><b>The Risks Of Rhetoric</b></span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As they pursue this process, both sides need to recognize the impact of rhetoric on perceptions and calculations. American leaders occasionally launch broadsides against China, including specific proposals for adversarial policies, as domestic political necessities. This occurs even -- perhaps especially -- when a moderate policy is the ultimate intention. The issue is not specific complaints, which should be dealt with on the merits of the issue, but attacks on the basic motivations of Chinese policy, such as declaring China a strategic adversary. The target of these attacks is bound to ask whether domestic imperatives requiring affirmations of hostility will sooner or later require hostile actions. By the same token, threatening Chinese statements, including those in the semiofficial press, are likely to be interpreted in terms of the actions they imply, whatever the domestic pressures or the intent that generated them.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The American debate, on both sides of the political divide, often describes China as a "rising power" that will need to "mature" and learn how to exercise responsibility on the world stage. China, however, sees itself not as a rising power but as a returning one, predominant in its region for two millennia and temporarily displaced by colonial exploiters taking advantage of Chinese domestic strife and decay. It views the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural, political, and military affairs not as an unnatural challenge to world order but rather as a return to normality. Americans need not agree with every aspect of the Chinese analysis to understand that lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its need to "grow up" and behave "responsibly" can be needlessly grating.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On the Chinese side, proclamations at the governmental and the informal level that China intends to "revive the Chinese nation" to its traditional eminence carry different implications inside China and abroad. China is rightly proud of its recent strides in restoring its sense of national purpose following what it sees as a century of humiliation. Yet few other countries in Asia are nostalgic for an era when they were subject to Chinese suzerainty. As recent veterans of anti-colonial struggles, most Asian countries are extremely sensitive to maintaining their independence and freedom of action vis-à-vis any outside power, whether Western or Asian. They seek to be involved in as many overlapping spheres of economic and political activity as possible; they invite an American role in the region but seek equilibrium, not a crusade or confrontation.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The rise of China is less the result of its increased military strength than of the United States' own declining competitive position, driven by factors such as obsolescent infrastructure, inadequate attention to research and development, and a seemingly dysfunctional governmental process. The United States should address these issues with ingenuity and determination instead of blaming a putative adversary. It must take care not to repeat in its China policy the pattern of conflicts entered with vast public support and broad goals but ended when the American political process insisted on a strategy of extrication that amounted to an abandonment, if not a complete reversal, of the country's proclaimed objectives.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China can find reassurance in its own record of endurance and in the fact that no U.S. administration has ever sought to alter the reality of China as one of the world's major states, economies, and civilizations. Americans would do well to remember that even when China's GDP is equal to that of the United States, it will need to be distributed over a population that is four times as large, aging, and engaged in complex domestic transformations occasioned by China's growth and urbanization. The practical consequence is that a great deal of China's energy will still be devoted to domestic needs.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Both sides should be open to conceiving of each other's activities as a normal part of international life and not in themselves as a cause for alarm. The inevitable tendency to impinge on each other should not be equated with a conscious drive to contain or dominate, so long as both can maintain the distinction and calibrate their actions accordingly. China and the United States will not necessarily transcend the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry. But they owe it to themselves, and the world, to make an effort to do so.</span></div>
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<a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-a-kissinger/the-future-of-us-chinese-relations" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhU4JSKs3sLQ0vkMdhL2ZWn73xZgBj_ZCkeNU0QtIxMgMBeC8eywdztDjd9P5YNETTuT3ycvHe3D04h4K2x6b5l-t-SvpfKKHzj6t5ubBEFpjg22qtBA6Yf0XkWPRQJ-iiR54ahRwUwTlg/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;"><br /></span></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-88329802522223600262013-01-21T20:59:00.000-08:002013-03-05T11:28:02.831-08:00倪峰:美国“重返”亚洲及其评估<span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">倪峰 </span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">2012年1月</span></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 20px;">中国社会科学院美国研究所</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 20px;">《美国战略研究简报》</span><br />
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<a href="http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_project_ls.asp?id=1543" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="210" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-bVfhW_asOKE/UPomY8KJn9I/AAAAAAAAGGY/NpH6H3KOb5Q/s320/pivot+asia_0.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 20px;">2009年7月,当美国国务卿希拉里在曼谷机场喊出“美国回来了”的口号时,一场新的超级博弈拉开了帷幕。从那时起,在亚洲国际舞台,远在大洋彼岸的美国的身影变得颇为抢眼。美国总统和外交、国防官员,像“走马灯”一样穿梭于亚洲各地。浩浩荡荡的美国舰群,不断在亚洲海域炫耀武力。对这一地区的各种争端, 无论是“天安号事件” 、“钓鱼岛事件” ,还是“南海争端” ,美国都积极介入。所有这一系列举动正在亚太地区持续发酵,深刻地影响着我国的周边安全和发展环境。</span></span><br />
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<a href="" name="more"></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>美国为何“重返”亚洲</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">实际上,“重返”并不是描述奥巴马政府亚太政策的准确词语,因为自1898年美西战争中美国占领菲律宾以来,美国从未离开过亚洲。二战结束之后,美国在这里拥有众多的基地和大量的驻军,并建立了以美日、美韩、美澳同盟为核心的双边同盟体系。冷战结束后,从老布什到克林顿总统,也从未忽略过亚太地区的重要性,克林顿总统甚至提出过“新太平洋共同体”的概念。奥巴马政府上台后之所以高调打出“重返亚洲”的旗号,主要有以下原因:</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>1.上届美国政府的失误与奥巴马政府的“纠偏”</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">在奥巴马的前任小布什执政8年期间,美国全球战略的核心是反恐,资源投放最多的是中东地区。自美国2001年发动全球反恐战争以来,美国的国防预算从3040亿美元猛增到2008年的6160亿美元。10年来,美国的反恐开支每年达 750亿美元。仅在阿富汗和伊拉克的两场战争,就已经耗费了约1.3万亿美元,而且估计后续费用会更加惊人。根据今年1月5日发布的新军事战略报告,在10年战争中死亡的美军士兵达到6200人,另有4.6万人受伤。两场战争已成为消耗美国软、硬实力的巨大黑洞。与此同时,美国对亚太地区有所忽视,小布什政府的官员多次缺席这一地区重要的多边活动,美国在该地区的影响力也有所下降。为此,奥巴马政府上台后不久就表示,要纠正前任政府的做法,其中包括结束两场战争,将更多的资源和战略关注投向亚太地区。正如希拉里在《美国的太平洋世纪》一文中指出的那样,“21世纪美国的外交和经济防线并不在于中东和欧洲,而在于亚洲。”为此,美国要把外交、经济、军事安全和价值观传播的重点全面向亚洲转移或倾斜。她还强调,“从奥巴马政府上任的第一天起,这就是我们的首要任务。” </span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>2.地缘经济原因</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">冷战结束后,亚太地区成为整个世界经济最富于活力的地区。而在金融危机的背景下,亚太地区的经济发展更是成为低迷的世界经济的亮点,其经济增长对世界经济的贡献比重有所加大。世界能源通道、原料通道、产品通道,都逐渐集中在亚太地区。约瑟夫•奈(Joseph Nye)认为,早在1750年,亚洲人口约占世界的五分之三,总产出占全球的四分之三。20世纪初,即西方工业革命之后,亚洲在世界总产出中的贡献缩减到五分之一。然而,到2050年,亚洲的经济水平预计会重新回到300年前的水平。而随着亚太地区逐渐成为21世纪全球战略与经济重心,东亚又将成为美国外交战略的重中之重。</span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">在此背景下,美国与亚太地区的经贸关系持续高速发展。目前,美国与亚洲的贸易额已远远超过与欧洲的贸易额,而且这一差距仍在持续扩大。如下图所示,从出口来看,自2002年起,美国对亚洲发展中国家及地区的出口总额占美国出口总额的比例一直呈上升趋势;从进口来看,自2002年起,美国对亚洲发展中国家及地区的进口总额占美国进口总额的比例也呈现较快上升的趋势;与此同时,美国与欧洲的贸易总额占美国贸易总额的比例在这16年间只增长了不到1%,跟美国与亚洲的贸易发展势头形成鲜明对比。从近16年的数据来看,无论是在进口还是出口方面,亚洲都比欧洲对美国更为重要,而且在可预见的将来,亚洲在美国对外贸易领域的地位不断攀升这一基本趋势不会改变。</span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><br /><span style="line-height: 20px;">2010年,美国对整个亚太地区的商品出口总额为7750亿美元,比2009年增加25.5%,占美国对世界商品出口总额的61%。2010年,美国对该地区农产品出口总额约830美元,占美国对世界农产品出口总额的72%。美国私营服务业在2009年的出口总额为1770亿美元,占美国私营服务业对世界出口总额的37%。2009年,仅美国中小企业对亚太地区的出口总额就达1710亿美元。”根据美国东西方中心在2009年所作的评估,美国出口带来的就业岗位中,有27%是由亚太地区支撑的。2011年11月12日,奥巴马在参加APEC工商领导人峰会时也表示,亚太地区对当前美国经济复苏、创造就业具有关键性的作用。美国将与亚太地区经济体在经济、贸易和安全等方面开展合作。他说:“我们认为没有一个地区比亚太地区更为重要。我们希望与亚太地区伙伴在多个方面合作,确保环太平洋地区的就业、经济增长、繁荣和安全。”</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>3. 应对中国的崛起</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">奥巴马上台后,有三件大事使美国战略界再度反思美国对华战略。</span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">首先,在金融危机的背景下,中美实力对比正在发生巨大变化。2011年,中国GDP达到47.16万亿人民币,约合7.3万亿美元。同年美国的GDP是15.09万亿美元,中国的GDP相当于美国的48.5%,而2001年这一比例仅为12.8%。这意味着,中国仅仅用了10年时间,就将GDP总量从占美国GDP约1/8提升至约1/2,并成为仅次于美国的世界第二大经济体。从未来预期看,美国面临国内经济金融体制调整,经济低迷态势短期内难有改观,而中国后发优势依然强劲。仅从GDP来衡量,国际多个权威机构预测,中国超美很可能在2020年左右。国 际货币基金组织(IMF)的一份报告更大胆预测,这一时间会提前至2016年(按购买力平价计算)。这一对比往往同新兴大国群体性崛起和西方大国整体性低迷而形成的国际格局变迁的大背景联系在一起,更凸显了中美两强对比拉近的态势。</span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">其次,中国军事现代化的迅速发展同美国10年来首次大幅削减军费也形成某种反差。近年来,随着中国经济实力和科技实力的不断增强,国防与军队建设也在实现同步协调的发展,研制了一批先进的武器装备。虽然这些武器装备完全出于中国防御性国防政策的需要,其性能与美国为首的西方发达国家的武器装备相比也相距甚远,但却引起了西方国家特别是美国的高度警觉,并被其大肆渲染,称中国在部署具有威慑性的强大“反进入/区域拒止”部队。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第三,随着实力的快速增长,中国对周边的辐射力和吸附效应正在不断增强。中国已成为包括美国盟国在内的周边国家的最大贸易伙伴。2010年1月1日,中国-东盟自由贸易区全面启动,这标志着由中国和东盟10国组成的贸易区开始步入零关税时代。中国-东盟自由贸易区与欧盟、北美自由贸易区是世界上三大区域经济合作区。它也是世界上人口最多、由发展中国家组成的最大自由贸易区,涵盖18亿人口,成立之初的GDP接近6万亿美元,贸易额达4.5万亿美元。自贸区创建以来,在相互开放的市场中不断密切的合作关系,使双方共同的经济利益日益扩大。因此,美方认为,如果不做出反应,就有可能让出亚洲。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">尽管中美两国的军事、经济差距依然明显,质与量仍然不对等,但这种变化客观上已然引发两国民众心态的巨大变化。美国的战略敏感性和焦虑感明显上升。在美国人眼中,中美之间霸权国与挑战国关系的特征更加凸显。在这一背景下,美国越来越开始不加隐晦地把中国视为其主要战略对手。奥巴马在2012年1月发布的《国情咨文》中五次提到中国,要求用规章制度来约束中国的“不公平贸易行为” 。美国国防部在2012年1月5日发布的《维持美国的全球领导地位:21世纪国防的优先任务》(防务战略指南)报告里,公然将中国与伊朗并列视作美国反“反介入”的主要障碍。报告称,从长期来看,中国作为地区强权的崛起,将从各个方面影响美国的经济和安全利益。美国要“有效地威慑潜在对手(如中国和伊朗)” ,阻止它们达到目的。2012年2月5日,美国公布的一份民调显示,美国最大的敌人系伊朗,中国排名第二。总之,区域性军事对手、全球性经济对手、全面性政治对手的观念,正逐步成为美国精英和公众的“中国意象”,而此次美国重返亚洲的一个核心目标就是应对中国的崛起并在这一地区与中国争夺影响力。</span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>美国如何“重返”亚洲</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">从美国全球战略的发展过程来看,提出将战略关注转向亚洲并不是从奥巴马开始的。冷战结束后,对于当时盛行的“太平洋世纪”的提法,老布什就已经予以关注,认识到亚洲日益增长的重要性,强调美国需要继续留在这个关键地区。在克林顿总统任内,美国政府曾发表了两份专门的《东亚战略报告》,进一步强调这个主题。而此次“重返”与以往相比最突出的特点在于,美国的亚洲政策在其全球战略中的权重上升到前所未有的位置。正如希拉里2011年11月在美国《外交政策》杂志发表的《美国的太平洋世纪》一文中声称的那样,“未来的全球政治将决定于亚洲……今后10年美国外交方略的最重要的使命之一,就是将大量的投入锁定于亚太地区。”而且,美国重返亚洲的规模和实施的全面性,都大大超过以往,在政治外交、经济和军事安全三个方向上同时展开,齐头并进。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>1.政治外交上高调“重返”</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">首先,美国政府高官频繁访问亚太地区。2009年11月,奥巴马首访亚洲。在东京,他宣布自己是首位“心系太平洋”的总统,反复强调美国是“亚太国家”。从2009年到2011年,他连续三年出访亚洲,足迹遍布亚洲几乎所有重要的国家。美国国务卿希拉里上任后,首次出访就选择了亚洲。2010年1月,希拉里在夏威夷发表亚太政策演说,强调美国不是亚洲的“过客”,而是一个“常住国家”。到目前为止,她已7次出访亚洲。前任美国国防部长盖茨更是14次出访亚洲,而新任国防部长帕内塔也将出访的首站选在亚洲。美国高官频访亚洲凸显了亚洲在美国政治议程中的重要地位。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">其次,美国增加了与东盟的互动。小布什政府曾经一度忽视东盟,国务卿赖斯两次缺席东盟地区论坛。奥巴马政府改变了前任对东盟的政策和态度,于2009年7月派国务卿希拉里参加东盟外长扩大会议,与东盟签署了《东南亚友好合作条约》。这为后来美国参加东亚峰会扫清了障碍。2009年11月,奥巴马访问日本期间,表明了美国希望参加东亚峰会的意愿,称“随着东亚峰会在应对当代挑战的过程中发挥作用,美国期待着以更正式的方式与之接触。” 2010年1月,国务卿希拉里在夏威夷的亚洲政策讲话中进一步明确了美国的态度。她说:“我们提议与亚洲的伙伴和盟友开始磋商,探讨美国在东亚峰会中的作用,以及东亚峰会怎样才能融入更广大的制度图景之中。”经过努力,美国于2011年11月正式参加了东亚峰会。通过参加东亚峰会,美国希望影响东亚峰会的议程,进而推动东亚峰会成为地区政治和安全对话的主渠道,并增强其解决问题的能力。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美国对东盟的重视是全方位的,不仅参与东盟地区论坛,而且参加了东盟国防部长扩大会议,正式成立了美国驻东盟外交使团,并派出首任常驻代表。由于美国不肯改变对缅甸的政策,美国与东盟领导人之间的对话一直未能展开。奥巴马政府改变对缅甸的政策之后,美国-东盟领导人峰会得以于2009年11月在新加坡举行,随后在纽约再次举行,并于2011年11月在巴厘第三次举行。2009年7月,国务卿希拉里与湄公河下游国家外长举行会议,启动了湄公河流域行动计划,与湄公河下游国家展开更频繁的合作。2011年11月30日,希拉里抵达缅甸新首都内比都。这是自1955年以来美国国务卿首次访问缅甸,被外界普遍视为美国“外交政策的赌博”。而美国此举希望获得的“红利”之一,就是“削弱中国在该地区的影响力”。东盟逐渐成为美国亚洲政策的重要支柱之一。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第三,美国积极介入区域纠纷,离间中国与周边国家的关系,其中最突出的当属钓鱼岛问题和南海问题。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">钓鱼诸岛位于台湾基隆东北约92海里的东海海域,是台湾的附属岛屿,主要由钓鱼岛、黄尾屿、赤尾屿、南小岛和北小岛及一些礁石组成。钓鱼诸岛自古以来就是中国的领土,和台湾一样是中国领土不可分割的一部分。然而,日本依据国际法中的“无主地先占” 原则和有效治理的事实,坚持钓鱼岛为其固有领土,不承认在钓鱼岛主权上存在争议。对这一争议,美国原先采取“中立模糊”的立场,不愿意得罪中日任何一方。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">然而,2010年9月钓鱼岛“撞船事件”发生后,包括希拉里在内的美国官员一方面公然声称钓鱼岛适用于《日美安保条约》,并举行美日联合岛屿防卫演习;另一方面又力促日本方面通过放人尽快解决危机。美国这样做的真正目的是在中美日这一决定东亚格局的三角关系中,通过保留中日冲突的根源,在中日时而因此发生的冲突中,以居间制衡者的身份,达到左右中美日三角关系的大致走向的目的。事件发生后,曾一度回暖的中日关系大幅受挫,而2009年鸠山上台后一度松动的美日关系得到大幅度增强。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">南海问题本是南海周边国家围绕相关岛礁归属以及海域划分存在的分歧和争端。美国以往历届政府都在这个问题上持中立态度。然而,从2010年5月起,美国官员以非正式场合中中国官员的一些议论为依据,通过媒体炒作“南海事关中国的核心利益”之说 ,从而激化了中国与其他南海争议国家的矛盾,为美国介入此问题找到了突破口。一些南海问题的声索国由于惧怕中国的力量,便试图拉拢外来势力来平衡中国。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">2010年7月,美国国务卿希拉里在东盟外长论坛上声称,“在南海自由航行,保持亚洲海上事务的开放状态,在南海地区尊重国际法,这些都关乎美国利益。”美国由此正式介入南海问题。8月8日,美军航母“乔治•华盛顿”号抵达越南岘港附近的南海海域。10日,美军伯克级导弹驱逐舰“约翰•麦凯恩”号亦到达岘港,并与越南海军展开了为期4天的联合军事演习。越南外交部发言人阮芳娥也公开宣称,“美国军舰进入越南岘港,对越南来说有重大战略意义。这显示了国防事务上的地区平衡。我认为美国将在区域内扮演更加重要的角色。”</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">接着,美国总统奥巴马公然插手南海问题。2010年9月24日,在第二次美国-东盟峰会上,奥巴马与东盟各国领导人在纽约就美国和东盟的关系举行会谈后,发表了联合声明,呼吁以和平方式解决南海的主权争议,强调南海的航行自由很重要。10月11日,美国国防部长盖茨访问越南时声称,亚洲国家应该通过多边渠道解决领土争端。他向亚洲国家保证,美国仍将参与亚洲的安全事务,保护东南亚国家。在10月于河内举行的首届东盟国防部长扩大会议上,盖茨又表示,区内的核心问题包括领土纠纷、恐怖主义活动、打击海盗,但依靠双边关系很难解决这些问题,需要由多边组织处理。在美国的撑腰打气下,一些声索国尤其是越南和菲律宾气焰升高,在此问题上采取了一些更具挑衅性的行动。在美国介入的大背景下,南海问题演化成为中国—东盟关系中的巨大障碍和国际热点问题。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>2.经济上强势引导亚太区域合作</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">奥巴马政府是在席卷全球的金融危机最严重的时刻上台的。为刺激国内经济复苏,美国政府对亚太战略做出新的调整,谋求通过多种渠道,以多种方式,构建、参与和领导崛起中的将可能主导东亚的合作机制,试图以强势引领亚太经济合作的进程,重构亚太合作的体系。概而言之,奥巴马政府主要采取了以下举措:</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第一,以APEC推动亚太自由贸易,敲开亚太市场大门。为了帮助美国迅速走出金融危机的阴影,奥巴马希望尽快消除亚太地区各个经济体之间的贸易壁垒,以贸易自由化打开亚太各国市场的大门,从而扩大美国的出口,重振美国制造业,促进国民就业,最终实现竞选时许诺要提供300万个就业机会的誓言。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">尽管1997年亚洲金融危机过后,APEC失去东亚国家的支持而陷入长期停滞的困境,但APEC目前有21个成员,占全球国民生产总值的55%、全球贸易总额的45%、全球人口总数的40%,仍是重量级的区域经济合作组织。而且,美国的前十大贸易伙伴有4个是APEC成员。因此,美国依然将APEC作为它与亚太经济体进行双边或多边合作、推动地区贸易投资自由化的主要平台。21世纪初,美国国会和行政部门提出,应该对过于宽松、缺乏约束力的APEC现有机制进行改革。2011年11月,美国在夏威夷主办了亚太经合组织峰会。这是18年来美国首次主办亚太经合组织峰会。美国希望通过提升亚太经合组织的重要性来塑造亚太地区的政治、经济和安全议程。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第二,以TPP引领亚太经济合作,重塑亚太经济格局。TPP的全称是《跨太平洋战略经济伙伴关系协定》,最早于2005年由新加坡、文莱、智利、新西兰4个小国(P4)缔结,起初并未受到美国的重视。由于亚太经合组织(APEC)裹足不前,而10+3、中国—东盟自由贸易区等东亚合作机制却稳步推进,美国不禁开始担忧自己会被排斥在亚太经济合作之外。于是,它试图以TPP为突破口签订一个泛太平洋的区域自由贸易协定,力求囊括APEC的所有21个成员,从而建立由美国主导的亚太经济合作体系。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">2009年11月,奥巴马总统在访问日本期间表示,美国有意参与TPP谈判。2010年3月,美国、P4、秘鲁、澳大利亚、越南等八国在澳大利亚的墨尔本进行了TPP第1轮谈判;6月,八国在美国的旧金山进行了第2轮谈判;10月,八国与最新加入的马来西亚在文莱进行了第3轮谈判;12月,九国在新西兰的奥克兰进行了第4轮谈判。截至2011年底,TPP先后进行了9轮谈判。日本、加拿大和墨西哥也先后决定参与谈判,使得谈判参与国数目增至12个。从长期来看,TPP的目标是吸收APEC的21个成员,全面覆盖亚太合作。在2010年11月举行的APEC第18次领导人非正式会议上,TPP与东盟“10+3” 、“10+6”被一起列为实现亚太自由贸易区的可能途径,因而再次成为亚太地区瞩目的焦点。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美国参与TPP的战略意图十分明显。目前,美国只鼓励亚太小国加入TPP,以保证自身在TPP谈判中的主导权,让TPP根据自己的设想建章立制;制度成型之后,才会同意大国加入,最终达成“一个具有广泛代表性和高标准的21世纪区域贸易协议”。从地域范围看,TPP是跨区域国家间的合作机制;从参与国的数量看,TPP目前有12个谈判参与国,尚存在较大的扩容空间;从性质来看,TPP一开始就是具有约束力的自由贸易协定,机制化程度较高,而APEC、东盟“10+X” 、东亚峰会等都不过是官方论坛。综合考虑以上几方面特征,TPP将成为美国影响亚太区域经济合作的重要工具。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>3.军事上点面结合,全面铺开</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">加强和优化美国在亚太地区的军事存在是美国“重返” 亚洲的核心内容之一。早在小布什政府时期,美国已经开始尝试调整其在亚太地区的军事战略。2001年美国公布的《四年防务评估》报告认为,亚太地区存在着“一个拥有可怕资源基础的军事竞争者”(暗指中国)。为应对这些地缘政治发展趋势,美国将发展一个能为美军在关键区域拥有更大灵活性的基地体系,重点发展西欧和东北亚之外的基地;在美国没有永久性实验场和基地的地方提供临时准入外国设施,以进行训练和演习;根据地区威慑需要重新分配军事力量和装备等。九一一事件发生后,尽管美国军事行动的重点一直放在中东地区,但与此同时,美国主要的战略力量,如远程战略轰炸机、航母、核潜艇、巡航导弹以及各种新型战斗机,一直在向位于这一地区的关岛基地集结。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">奥巴马上台后,美国政府和军方对中国的军事现代化进程投以更多的关注。2011年2月发布的《美国国家军事战略》报告认为,中国长达数十年的经济增长预计将促进其持续的军事现代化,并拓展区域内和区域外的利益” ,并暗指中国“展示民族主义和自信,考验美国伙伴的韧性和美国的领导力”,因此美国“将继续仔细监视中国的军事发展”,“关切中国军事现代化的程度和战略意图,以及中国在外空、网络、黄海、东海和南海的自信。” 2012年1月5日美国国防部发表的防务战略指南指出,“美国的经济与安全利益包括西太平洋、东亚,并一直延伸到印度洋和阿拉伯地区。这一弧形地带与美国都有着无法摆脱的联系,是不断变化着的挑战与机遇的混合体。” 为此,报告认为,美军将继续为全球范围内的安全做出贡献,“必须恢复亚太地区的平衡”。而所谓“再平衡”则是美国军方有关“重返”亚洲的另一种说法。在奥巴马政府的主导下,美国的军事“重返”主要表现在以下几个方面:</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">首先,美国在消减军费预算、减少欧洲兵力、抽身两场战争的大背景下,维持和进一步加强在亚太地区的军事部署。当前,美国常年在亚太地区保持10万左右的军力,并将一半以上的航母、核潜艇、“宙斯盾”战舰和战略轰炸机部署到亚太地区。1月5日,奥巴马在五角大楼发表讲话,声称“美国军方将会重组,并且集中于更广泛的挑战,尤其是针对亚太地区。”1月10日,美国海军作战部长格林纳特宣布,美国未来10-15年将把海军1/3的战舰转移至西太平洋。这意味着,美国海军总共285艘战舰中的将近100艘将转移到该地区。他声称,“这些舰只中大约一半部署在日本及其周边地区的前沿海上,包括我们最先进的航空联队、巡洋舰和驱逐舰,以及其他装备和反潜力量。我们将把最精锐的部队放在西太平洋。”2月29日,美国国防部长帕内塔在国会预算委员会指出,亚太与中东地区是美国国家安全最大“威胁”的来源,美军必须在当地保持足够的军力。他称:“为达成重心移转亚太的目标,美军将维持现有的轰炸机队,包括11艘舰艇与10组机队的航空母舰战斗群、大型两栖登陆船队。亚洲驻地部队和陆战队人数都将维持现状。” 3月27日,美国考虑在东印度洋岛屿部署无人机监视南海。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">另外,2010年5月,美国时任国防部长盖茨正式提出了“空海一体战”的概念。作为一种全维作战理念,其实质是强调美军要充分利用在航空航天、网络、电子技术等方面的垄断优势,以关岛和日、韩、澳等盟国的作战和后勤基地为依托,以空海作战力量、太空及网络空间作战力量为主导,联合构成一个以天基系统为核心,由天基平台、空基平台和海基平台构成的多层次立体作战体系,在全维空间内加速实现其各种作战力量的有效融合,在西太平洋战区组织实施战役级别的作战行动,以摧毁作战对手的“反介入/区域拒止”作战能力。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">其次,美国进一步加强了现有的双边军事同盟体系。在这其中,美日同盟被置于首要位置,是美国亚太战略的“基石”。二战后,美国在日本驻扎了大量的海军、海军陆战队、陆军和空军基地。岸上军力约为38000人,海上军力约为11000人。美国的打击力量分布于冲绳等85个基地,设施设备规模从天线到几千英亩的训练区域,大小不等。2010年是美日同盟建立50周年,美国高调要求日本加强军事同盟关系。尽管日本民主党的鸠山政权初期不打算应承,但随着中日钓鱼岛“撞船事件”的发生,日本迅速改变了政策,強化了同盟关系。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 20px;">美韩同盟也因“天安号事件”和延坪岛炮击事件而进一步得到強化。美韩宣布,将原定于2012年4月进行的战时指挥权交接推迟到2015年12月。2010年10月24日,韩国李明博政府宣布将“积极考虑加入”美国在东亚推动数年的导弹防御计划。2010年7月,美韩宣布在黄海进行了有8000人参加的联合军事演习,出动了200多架战机,包括最先进的F22“猛禽”战斗机。值得注意的是,日本以观察员的身份首次参加了美韩的黄海军演。2011年,在日韩国防部长会议上,双方同意互相提供军事后勤支援和军事情报交流。这显示出,美日韩的军事合作有三边融合的趋势。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美菲军事关系也逐步加强。2011年11月,国务卿希拉里访问菲律宾,承诺与菲律宾开展军事及经济领域的合作,升级两国的同盟关系,在南海主权争议问题上支持菲律宾。2012年1月底,两国展开进一步磋商,探讨增加联合军事演习以及美国海军访问菲律宾港口频率的问题。4月16-27日,菲律宾与美国之间一年一度的“肩并肩联合军事演习”在菲国吕宋岛中部及西南隅的巴拉旺省等地举行。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美国与澳大利亚的军事同盟关系也在不断深化。澳大利亚是美国亚太安全战略中的重要支点。美国在澳大利亚设置了很多海军通讯站、导航站、宇宙跟踪站,用于监控太空并为空间力量服务。根据美国和澳大利亚的协商,澳大利亚同意无限制地与美国分享军事情报。这项协议使得澳大利亚在美国亚太军事战略中的地位更加重要。其中坐落在澳大利亚中部的松峡(Pine Gap)情报站,被认为是世界上最大、最复杂的卫星地面站之一。这里收集的信息曾被用于对伊朗和阿富汗实施联合空中打击。2011年11月奥巴马访澳期间,美澳宣布美国将在达尔文部署2500名海军陆战队员,首批250名海军陆战队员已经进驻。这是越南战争结束以来,美军首次增加在澳大利亚的军事部署。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第三,建立和强化新型军事关系。2011年美国国家军事战略报告声称,要在亚太地区“扩大多边演习的范围和参与度”,“扩展同印度、菲律宾、泰国、越南、马来西亚、巴基斯坦、印度尼西亚和新加坡的军事安全合作、交流和演训活动“,在整个东南亚和太平洋地区“寻求推动更大范围地区安全合作的新途径”。这些年来,美国与新加坡、越南、印度等国的军事关系显著加强。目前新加坡已同意部署美国濒海战斗舰,并增加两国军队联合训练与行动的机会。美国和印度、越南之间的军事关系也在呈现升温趋势。2010年,美国对印度出售约80亿美元的武器,使印度成为美国武器的第二大买主。与此同时,美国通过高频度双边和多边军演在亚太地区展示实力。据不完全统计,仅在2010年,美国牵头在亚太地区举行的各种双边和多边军演就达21次之多。截至2012年3月4日,美日、美泰、美日澳、美韩、美菲之间已经举行了5场军演。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第四,大幅提升关岛军事基地的地位。关岛位于北纬13°26',东经144°43',是太平洋西部马里亚纳群岛最南端的一个岛屿,也是该群岛最大的岛屿,面积540多平方公里。关岛是西太平洋空、海交通的重要枢纽,岛上建有国际机场,辟有七条国际航线,加之靠近多条海上国际运输航线,可扼守美国宣布要控制的全球16个航道中的4个。从地理上看,在东南亚和夏威夷之间广阔的太平洋中,惟有关岛的港口所处位置最为优越。如果舰只从关岛出发,4天之内即能抵达日本、菲律宾、澳大利亚北部和马六甲海峡。驻扎在关岛的美国海空军力量,能够遏制北至对马海峡、南至马六甲海峡的广大海域,也可对日本、菲律宾、澳大利亚及亚洲大陆的所有国家进行战略威慑。美军从关岛向北可以威慑朝鲜半岛,控制朝鲜海峡,对我国的华东地区造成威慑,对可能的台湾海峡危机实施及时的干预,还可快速前往南海,控制马六甲海峡的国际航道。同时,关岛基地与印度洋迭戈加西亚基地联动,可对中亚、中东及非洲等地做出反应。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">目前,美国正耗巨资在关岛修建核动力航母停靠的码头、导弹防御系统和实战演习基地等军事基础设施。这一项目是二战后美国在西太平洋推进的规模最大、开支最多的基地项目。关岛军事基地包括安德森空军基地、阿普拉海军基地和阿加尼亚海军航空站。安德森空军基地将变成最大的燃料供应库、太平洋上最大的弹药库、极佳的训练场和战略轰炸机基地。阿普拉海军基地则是美国海军在西太平洋最大的海军基地之一,也是重要的舰艇维修、补给、停泊修整基地。它是西太平洋上唯一的核潜艇基地,能保障一个航母编队所需的装备。阿加尼亚海军航空站则是美国航空兵在西太平洋的主要侦察和反潜基地。2009年月1 月18日,12架来自阿拉斯加埃尔门多夫空军基地的F-22A“猛禽”隐形战斗机进驻关岛。为加强亚太地区的空中监视能力,美国空军 2010年开始在关岛部署“全球鹰”无人侦察机。到 2011年上半年,已有 3架无人侦察机在西太平洋执勤。</span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>如何看待美国“重返”亚洲</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">“重返”亚洲是美国在金融危机持续发酵和阿富汗、伊拉克战争基本结束的大背景下推出的一个重大战略举动。它正在对亚太地区的政治、经济和安全格局产生全面和深刻的影响。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>1.随着“重返”政策的推出,亚太地区首次成为美国全球战略的主攻方向</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美国是当今世界唯一的“超级大国” ,其战略设计固然着眼于全球。但由于实力的制约,其战略实施的过程实际上有着较为严格的“次序安排”和“重点应对。”冷战结束后,固然历届美国政府都对亚太地区高度关注,但是,在冷战结束的头10年,其核心目标是消化冷战成果,主攻方向是捆绑和弱化俄罗斯,为此美国大力推动北约东扩。在本世纪的头10年,由于2001年发生了九一一事件,本•拉登及恐怖主义成为美国全球战略的定位仪,恐怖主义及其滋生的主要地区——中东,成为美国全球战略的主攻方向。正如2002年的美国《国家安全战略报告》指出的那样,美国面临的主要威胁是“激进主义与技术的结合”。 而将亚太地区作为美国全球战略的“主攻方向”,应当说始于奥巴马政府的“重返”亚洲行动。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美国将其全球战略的“主攻方向”锁定亚太地区,这在美国的官方文件和学界各种讨论中都有表述。例如,美国外交关系协会主席理查德•哈斯(Richard N. Hass)就曾指出:“美国有充足的理由更深入地参与亚太地区事务。不管21世纪是否会是另一个‘美国世纪’,可以肯定的是,它将是一个亚太世纪。不管这一事实会带来怎样的结果,美国确保自己扮演主要角色,是很自然和明智的做法。好消息是这一决策似乎得到美国政界的一致支持。极有可能成为共和党总统候选人的罗姆尼承诺加快造船业的步伐,显然与美国要增加在太平洋的实力有关。美国国务卿希拉里也说,美国的重点正从大中东地区转移:‘世界战略和经济重心正在东移,我们也更加关注亚太地区。’”</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">随着这一主攻方向的确定,美国正在大力将资源向亚太地区配置和汇聚,其广度和深度大大超过以往。正如美国著名中国问题专家兰普顿(David M.Lampton)所言:“美国将注意力转向亚洲的这项再平衡政策,不是一项简单的军事政策,而是指将所有国家资源往这个方向的再平衡,包括经济注意力以及文化和外交注意力。”美国作为一个超级大国,它将亚太地区作为全球战略的主攻方向并全方位投入资源,势必极大地影响这一地区的权力结构,从而使有关国家都不得不根据环境的改变而调整其对外和周边政策。 </span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>2. 中国的周边环境更趋复杂化</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">在当前的大国中,中国的周边环境也许是最复杂的。中国周边国家众多,一些历史遗留问题以及与一些国家的边界问题一直没有得到解决,另外周边还存在不少热点问题。尽管在东亚地区,中国总的地缘环境并不十分理想,但是经过中国政府的不懈努力,周边外交取得了积极成果。例如,在东北亚,朝鲜半岛“六方会谈”逐渐机制化;中国与日本的关系也出现缓和。在东南亚,自1997年亚洲金融危机以来,中国与东盟在政治、经济、外交等各个领域都取得了重大进展。然而,随着美国高调“重返”亚洲的推进,我国面临的周边环境正在日趋复杂。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">首先,我国周边的军事安全压力正在不断增大。目前美国正在加强从日本、韩国、关岛直到澳大利亚的网格化基地建设,推出了主要针对亚太地区的空海一体战构想,已将60%的潜水艇部署在亚太,今后还将把60%的航母派往这一地区。与此同时,这一地区的军备竞赛呈加剧之势。澳大利亚计划在今后20年花费2750亿澳元(约合2730亿美元)对军队进行现代化改造,其中包括计划投资近360亿美元建造自己的潜艇编队。日本在2011年投入14亿美元采购P-1反潜巡逻机,不断提高对周边海、空域的情报侦察和作战能力,还计划将现有的16艘潜艇编队扩充至24艘。从2010年至今,印度军队不断加强北部边境地区陆、空基础设施建设并强化前沿兵力部署,其数量、规模和覆盖为近年之最。印度还在研发隐形无人战机,以向俄罗斯租借的方式装备了第一艘核潜艇,并进行了射程为5000公里的洲际导弹试射。越南则在大批购进先进的潜艇、导弹和战机。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">其次,中国与周边国家的关系面临日益增多的变数。在此次“重返”的过程中,美国充分利用中国周边国家对中国快速发展普遍存在的矛盾心态,不仅强化和传统盟友(如日本、韩国、澳大利亚、菲律宾)的关系,而且致力于全面改善与东盟国家的关系,进一步加强与印度的关系,充分发挥越南与菲律宾的作用,并推动美国与缅甸的关系实现突破。美国在实施的手段上也推陈出新,包括充分利用中国与周边国家之间存在的问题和矛盾。如利用“天安号事件”和延坪岛炮击事件,推动韩国疏远中国,强化美韩同盟;利用钓鱼岛撞船事件强化美日同盟;利用中国与越南、菲律宾在南海问题的争议介入南海问题。由于美国的撑腰打气,一些对中国心存疑虑或与中国存在纠纷的国家被鼓动了起来,纷纷在一些问题上采取更具挑衅性的行动,例如菲律宾、越南、印度、日本等国在南海问题上动作频频,并互相抱团取暖。日本《产经新闻》撰文将中国比作中国战国时代的秦国,将越南、菲律宾、美国、日本、印度、澳大利亚比作“六国”,鼓励这六个国家在南海问题上推行连横战略,共同对抗中国。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第三,中国在地缘经济上面临新挑战。奥巴马政府把加强同亚太国家的经济关系、确立美国在区域经济合作中的“领导地位”作为“重返”的优先战略目标。为此,奥巴马政府采取了两大步骤,一是大力提升同亚太国家的经贸关系,将其作为美国实施“出口倍增”计划的主攻方向。这势必会加剧它同中国在这一地区的市场竞争,增大中国对该地区的出口压力。二是美国通过TPP扩大,遏制中国经济影响力的扩张势头,主导亚太经济秩序,架空“10+X”体制,尤其是“10+1”和“10+3”,并对中国形成巨大的规则压力。有国内专家指出,TPP标准之高和覆盖领域之广,远远超过有关国家的承受能力。随着未来日本、韩国、加拿大等可能加入TPP,美国在市场准入、知识产权、金融服务、清除各种贸易壁垒、农业补贴等方面的主张如果被不折不扣地写入协定,很可能会变成新的国际通行的贸易规则。这很可能会影响到中国未来开展的自由贸易协定谈判,形成进一步要求中国“接受更加开放的贸易、扩大其加入WTO时同意的降低贸易壁垒和保护知识产权的最低责任”的强大压力。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>3.美国“重返”亚洲所面临的内外牵制</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">“重返”亚洲是美国为了维持其全球“领导地位”而进行的重大调整。然而,此次“重返”能否持续实施下去,并进而实现其预定目标呢? 目前,美国面临着诸多内外牵制。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">首先,金融危机对美经济实力造成很大冲击。2008年以来,美国深陷经济衰退,失业率居高不下。过去10年在阿富汗和伊拉克的两场战争也给美国造成了巨大消耗,其结果是到2011年11月16日,联邦财政赤字、政府债务突破了历史纪录,分别达到1.4万亿和近15万亿美元。这些都导致美国可用于外交和军事部门的财政投入大幅缩水。2011年8月,国会通过了《2011年预算控制法》,联邦开支中被削减的各项安全项目包括国防部、国土安全部、退伍军人事务部、国家核安全局和国务院的国际事务、情报机构的管理部分。为响应国会的要求,国防部需要在未来10年削减4870亿美元的军事开支。由此可见,美国对外战略的意愿与其能力之间正在出现越来越大的落差。为此,美国的一位国会官员曾对美国的战略东移发出了这样的感叹:“没有预算的战略还能算是战略么?”</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">其次,中东形势依然十分复杂。九一一事件后的反恐战争不仅打破了中东原本就十分脆弱的地区平衡,使中东地区陷入混乱状态,而且也让美国付出了惨重代价,大大耗损了美国的国力。奥巴马总统上台之初就提出了“负责任地结束伊拉克战争”的想法。关于阿富汗的基本策略则是先增后撤。然而,美国从伊拉克撤军后至今,伊局势依然堪忧。阿富汗的局势更是让美国揪心。最近发生的美军士兵焚烧《古兰经》事件和美军士兵故意枪杀16名阿富汗平民事件,让美军的处境和阿富汗的安全形势雪上加霜。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">更为重要的是,美国在这一地区的麻烦远远不止这些。就在美国提出战略东移后不久,自2010年年底开始,中东经历了冷战结束以来规模最大、冲击最广、影响最深的大变局。22个阿拉伯国家中有20个相继迅速陷入程度不同的动荡,使得美国在中东的利益遭受严重挑战。经过这场大变局的冲刷,美国在这一地区的一些盟友要么已发生政府更替,要么正经历严重动荡,要么面临发生动荡的危险。其中,使美国受挫最大的当数埃及穆巴拉克政府的垮台。这导致被美国视作寇仇的“穆斯林兄弟会”势力大增,并将在未来埃及政局中扮演重要角色。如果埃及新政府最终对西方不再言听计从,无疑会打乱美国所主导的中东平衡。与此同时,伊朗在中东格局中的战略处境变得更加有利,其中最突出的表现就是“伊朗核问题”持续升温,对美国来说变得越来越棘手。最近一段时间以来,埃及民众发起了针对军政府的“二次革命”,“基地”组织在也门趁火打劫,叙利亚局势持续动荡,伊朗核危机加剧。中东乱局进入关键期,可谓是一团乱麻。美国在其中左支右绌,唯恐局势失控。其敏感神经被牵制,战略精力亦被牵扯。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第三,美俄关系渐行渐远。冷战结束后,美国一直面临着中俄孰为主要竞争对手的两难选择。但从总体情况来看,在美国主导下通过北约挤占和压缩俄罗斯的战略空间,一直是维持美国全球霸权地位的中心工作。小布什执政初期曾一度视中国为战略对手,然而九一一事件之后,中美关系得到很大改善。在小布什离任之际,中美关系被形容为冷战结束以来“最好的时期”。而与此同时,美俄则经历了一个由热到冷的过程。在俄罗斯宣布积极支持美国的反恐战争之后,美国接纳俄罗斯加入七国集团,并支持推动了北约—俄罗斯理事会的建立,俄罗斯与西方的合作关系一时达到了前所未有的高峰。然而,在小布什第二任期内,美俄关系却由于美国在俄罗斯及周边国家鼓动“颜色革命”和在东欧部署导弹防御系统而一落千丈,跌至冰点。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">奥巴马政府上台后郑重宣布“重启”美俄关系,并在“重启”精神的指导下,在多个领域内加强了与俄罗斯的合作和对话。奥巴马政府的这种“重启”战略得到了俄罗斯的积极回应。这使得在小布什第二任期内曾经陷入低谷的美俄关系重新回暖。然而,由于东欧反导问题,两国关系再度趋冷。尤其是2011年11月俄罗斯杜马选举之后,希拉里在出席欧洲安全与合作组织外长会议时,公开宣称俄罗斯的这次选举既不公平也不公正,并要求俄罗斯对这次选举中的舞弊行为进行调查。两国关系由此急转直下。今年3月4日,普京在俄罗斯大选中无悬念胜出,西方国家对此普遍反应冷淡,美国的态度最为明显。美国国务院的贺电中甚至连普京的名字都没有提,反而敦促俄政府对所有选举违规现象开展独立可信的调查。美国参议员麦凯恩甚至发表言论称:“俄大选是虚假的,普京的时日已经不多,‘阿拉伯之春’已来到俄罗斯,并将持续下去,而且在某个时候还会到中国。”在某种程度上,普京的回归宣告两国关系“重启”无疾而终。美俄矛盾虽然不意味着两国将走向正面对抗,但带来的烦恼之多是美国不能轻易摆脱的。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">第四,亚太国家不愿“选边站”。对于美国“重返”亚洲,这一地区的国家普遍抱一种矛盾的心态。一方面,它们希望把美国“请回来”,以此来平衡中国快速增长的影响力,并指望美国在与华争端事务中为自己撑腰。另一方面,它们又希望搭上中国经济飞速发展的顺风车,为自身谋取巨大的经济利益。现在中国已经是日本、韩国、东盟国家、澳大利亚等多数周边邻国的最大贸易伙伴和主要相互投资伙伴,相互间的重大经济利益是维护周边国家同中国睦邻友好合作关系的强大动力。到2011年11月2日,中国外贸进出口总额突破了3万亿美元大关,中国商务部2011年11月11日发布《中国对外贸易形势报告》预计,全年进出口额将达3.5万亿美元。中国很有可能很快就超越美国,成为世界上外贸进出口总额规模最大的国家。谁能忽视这么一个庞大的市场?新加波总理李显龙在去年的APEC会议上提醒说:“企业家们不要忘记你们从对中国的出口中获得的利益。”相互依存的关系使得各国之间把纷争和处理纷争的方式限制在一定的度之内,否则,两败俱伤。因此,在美国战略东移的背景下,亚太地区的许多国家普遍形成了一种“安全上依赖美国,经济上依赖中国”的奇特场景。它们普遍不希望中美之间发生严重碰撞,从而被迫在其中“选边站”。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">新加坡外长尚穆根最近就明确指出,他注意到,一些美国媒体报道出现了对中国采取围堵策略等充满冷战言论的说法。他认为美国应放弃这种论调,因为那是站不住脚和逃避现实的说法。他指出,中国有13亿人口,人才济济,擅于掌握新的科技,中国会进步是毋庸置疑的,中国是不可能被围堵的。“事实是中国必然会在经济和军事方面变得强大,我们必须面对这个事实。越早接受事实,对所有人越好。美国一旦接受了这个事实,就可以开始思考如何与中国展开合作。……关键是如何创造条件,让中国可以在国际上和区域扮演建设性的角色。”他认为中美之间固然存在竞争,但竞争之余也可合作。“这是一个互惠互依的经济关系,两国可以一起做很多事。可以有竞争,也可以有合作。竞争与合作可以在一个不影响区域稳定的框架内进行。”他同时表示,美国若使用冷战言论会让东南亚国家感到不自在。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">东盟国家还对战略东移的一些具体做法表示疑虑。例如,最近印尼外长马蒂就明确指出:“我们觉得美国海军陆战队员在达尔文驻扎完全没有问题,美国此举的矛头并非对准印度尼西亚。但除非妥善地说明白,否则会在国家之间制造不信任……那里有那么多潜在的冲突燃点。”另外,在去年11月召开的第六次东亚峰会上,印尼、马来西亚等东盟国家抵制了美菲两国试图将南海问题纳入会议议题的提议。而对于美国大力推动的TPP,许多东盟国家也担心它在客观上分化了不少东亚经济体,导致本已动力不足的东亚合作在其压力下基本上处于停滞状态。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">对于亚太国家对美国战略东移所持的矛盾心态以及在一些具体问题上疑虑,美国方面似乎也有所认识。美国两位有影响的东亚问题专家最近就撰文指出,“美国‘重返亚洲 ’的提法让这一地区的各国政府感到困惑。这段时间我们遍访这一地区的国家,所有朋友都在问我们美国‘重返亚洲’这项新政策的含义。那些从不质疑美国承诺的人也搞不清楚‘重返’的提法背后到底意味着什么。他们担心,在事实上美国并没有‘离开’的情况下谈‘重返’,是否意味着美国将在亚洲掀起一股‘巨浪’或‘狂潮’,其中将包含更具进攻性和潜在的不稳定因素的政策。他们尤其担心的是,美国正在准备对中国采取更具对抗性的政策。当然,这并不意味着他们不担心中国和它的意图,但他们希望美国是一种安慰性质的存在,而不是教唆犯。”因此,美国很难在中国周边建立一道“围堵”之墙,但同时要警惕美国在中国与周边国家之间建立一道“隔阂”之墙。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;"><b>4.中美是否会滑向“新冷战” ?</b></span><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">美国高调打出了打造美国的“太平洋世纪”的旗号,明确将亚太定位为美国全球战略中的枢纽,采取的各种举措明显带有针对中国的色彩,导致中美关系呈现出更多的“竞争性”。然而,这并不意味着中美之间会爆发新的冷战,因为中美关系已完全不同于当年的美苏关系。首先,美国“重返”亚洲在安全领域是一种“防范”姿态,在经济和政治领域则是一种竞争姿态,部分具有安抚其亚洲盟国和伙伴对中国崛起担忧的作用,并非全然的对抗态势。第二,无论在全球问题还是地区问题上,中美都拥有很多共同利益。地区的和平与稳定符合两国的共同利益。美国在诸多地区问题上需要寻求中国的合作,显然不可能在谋求对抗中国的同时希望得到中国的合作。第三,虽然中美仍然存在意识形态上的巨大分歧,但两国在经贸领域的合作趋向广深发展,经贸领域的分歧也较安全领域的分歧易于化解。两国的交往亦非冷战时期可比,并且中美之间已经存在60多个对话机制,双边分歧依然处于可控范围,对抗不符合任何一国的利益。美国著名战略家基辛格博士断言,中美之间不可能以冷战方式解决相互间的矛盾,因为这“会导致很长一段时间的对抗,令美中两国精疲力竭,也令不得不和美中两国打交道的国家精疲力竭。” </span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">在经历了不平凡的2010年之后,2011年1月,中国国家主席胡锦涛访问美国,中美两国达成了建立“共同建设、相互尊重、互利共赢的合作伙伴关系”的共识,为中美关系的未来发展设定了新目标,确立了新框架。2012年适逢尼克松访华40周年,中美两国都高调举办了多种纪念活动。习近平访美期间,双方直面彼此间存在和共同关心的问题(如经贸、人权、地区安全、国际热点问题等),坦诚交换了意见。中国并没有自己的“亚太版门罗宣言”,欢迎美国在亚太发挥建设性作用。习近平指出,太平洋是如此之宽,完全可以同时容纳中美两国。 “(中美)排除各种干扰坚持做朋友,做伙伴,是中美双方唯一正确的选项。”在习近平访美17天后,希拉里在美国和平研究所发表讲话认为,“2012年的中美关系是不同寻常的,到达了一个历史的新阶段。美国尝试着与一个正在崛起的大国共同努力,将她的成长塑造成有利于全球安全、稳定、繁荣的积极因素,同时维持和维护美国在世界格局变化过程中的主导作用。我们正在努力防止两国陷入不健康的竞争、对抗和冲突状态;不将获取利益建立在牺牲对方利益和双边关系的基础上;坚持担负起我们对国际社会的责任。我们将共同建立一个新的双边关系模式,即打造一个稳定与双方认可的竞争与合作平衡的模式。这无先例可循。” 她指出,“中美两国不能够解决世界上所有的问题,但是没有中国和美国,全球面临的问题则得不到解决。”所有这些都表明,中美两国高层不约而同地认识到,中美建立新型大国关系是唯一选择,尽管困难重重且无先例可循,但双方愿意努力尝试,大胆试验。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br style="line-height: 20px;" /><span style="line-height: 20px;">总之,面对美国“重返”亚洲的种种举动,只要我们坚定信心,沉着应对,以“巧实力”对“巧实力”,它所带来的风险和战略压力可以逐一破解。中国的崛起不可阻挡,将迟早转化为世界各国发自内心的共识。</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 20px;"><br /></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 13px; line-height: 20px;">本文摘自</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: x-small; line-height: 20px;">中国社会科学院美国研究所</span><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 13px; line-height: 20px;">《美国战略研究简报》</span><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 13px; line-height: 20px;">2012.1 。</span><i style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: small; line-height: 20px;">作者為中国社会科学院美国研究所副所长 </i><br />
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<a href="http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_project_ls.asp?id=1543" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ARWTyFHrmRk/UPollDg1izI/AAAAAAAAGGM/M7CC0gsxqJg/s1600/%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99%E4%BE%86%E6%BA%90.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><i><br /></i></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 20px;"><br /></span></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-7916884987738188412013-01-21T19:45:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:55:28.264-08:00李侃如:The American Pivot to Asia<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">李侃如</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">(</span></span>Kenneth G. Lieberthal<span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">) 2011年12月21日</span></span></span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 16px; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Brookings Institution</span></span><br /><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/12/21-obama-asia-lieberthal" style="background-color: white; clear: left; display: inline !important; float: left; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="200" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-moB54pFhHqA/UP4LJX7dzyI/AAAAAAAAGoA/snp6DxyCRaQ/s200/634941939742862135U5547P31DT20120220135808.jpg" width="156" /></a><br /><div class="lede" style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 20px;"><div style="color: #343434; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il drives home the importance of being able to work not only with U.S. allies but also with China in managing Asia's key threats. This is what makes striking the right balance in America's overall strategy toward Asia so vital.</span></div><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Obama administration's overall posture toward Asia has in fact evolved considerably over the course of the past couple of years. President Barack Obama laid out the result in its fullest form last month, as he traveled to Honolulu, Australia, and Indonesia for a series of major meetings. The message of this remarkable trip warrants careful examination, as it articulated an integrated diplomatic, military, and economic strategy that stretches from the Indian subcontinent through Northeast Asia -- and one that can profoundly shape the U.S.-China relationship. The core message: America is going to play a leadership role in Asia for decades to come.<br /><br />The U.S. media portrayed this message as directed solely at confronting China in Asia, but it is in fact much more complex than that. How realistic is the strategy the president articulated, and how is it likely to affect U.S.-China relations and the roles of both countries in Asia? Does America have the resources to make good on the rhetoric concerning this historic "pivot"?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">What Has Changed?</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Obama came into office as avowedly "the first Pacific president," convinced that George W. Bush's administration had paid too little attention to Asian regional issues and that the United States should restore and then enhance its traditional level of engagement there. Efforts accelerated as China's Asia policy became more hard edged during 2010 and as, during 2011, the United States' military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly declined.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Especially during 2010, the United States did not hesitate to respond to Chinese heavy-handedness in the region. In reaction to North Korea's test of a nuclear device and then launch of deadly provocations against the South, the Obama administration unequivocally supported Seoul, pressured China strongly to rein in Pyongyang, and against China's strong objections carried out naval exercises in the Yellow Sea to serve as a warning to North Korea.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In both Northeast Asia and the South China Sea, the Obama administration formally affirmed its neutrality in territorial disputes involving China but adopted substantive positions that predictably raised hackles in Beijing. When Japan detained a Chinese fishing-boat captain after an incident in the territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the State Department confirmed that the U.S.-Japan alliance covers these waters because the islands are under the effective administrative control of Japan.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Renewed contentiousness over conflicting territorial claims by various littoral countries in the South China Sea led Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in mid-2010 to affirm an American vital interest in freedom of navigation in this region and in keeping the region open for normal commercial activities. At the same time, the secretary stated that the United States would be willing to facilitate a collaborative process for addressing the territorial claims and that the United States believes that all maritime claims must be supported fully by claims to land features. China bristled at the suspicion that Washington was inserting itself into these territorial issues and made clear that Beijing could see no threat that had arisen to freedom of navigation in the region.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In these and other instances, during 2010 the United States made discrete responses to various Chinese initiatives that were seen as potentially leveraging China's economic power to achieve diplomatic and security gains in the region. These responses were combined with very active bilateral U.S.-China diplomacy to keep the U.S.-China relationship on track and to manage expectations on both sides. A successful state visit for Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington in January 2011 indicated that this combination of firmness on defined issues and active bilateral diplomacy had left the bilateral U.S.-China relationship on reasonably solid footing.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Against this background, the president's November 2011 Asia trip highlighted that U.S. policy has now taken a significant step forward in four areas:</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><em><strong>Multilateral organizations</strong></em>. Over the past decade China invested substantial efforts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and South Korea), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Beijing negotiated a free trade agreement with ASEAN that provided for generous "early harvest" measures in the mid-2000s; the full agreement came into effect in 2010. This agreement, of course, excluded the United States. Beijing also supported the ARF as the key regional security forum, possibly because the ARF had demonstrated over many years that it would operate wholly by consensus and would not take up difficult specific issues.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Against this background, Obama in November 2011 brought to fruition his decisions to support decisively two different multilateral organizations. On the economic and trade side, the president declared that America hopes by December 2012 to see the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), now being negotiated, become a high-quality trade and investment platform that will include the major economies of the Asia-Pacific. The TPP is being structured around principles America champions in terms of transparency, protection of intellectual property, labor rights, environmental protection, and so forth (these could be considered to be "WTO plus"). While Obama noted that all who accept its principles will be welcome to join, the TPP principles differ greatly from those that guide most Chinese actions in the economic and trade arena. China is not among the initial group of countries negotiating to establish the TPP.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On the security side, America formally joined the East Asia Summit (EAS), and Obama used his inaugural participation to steer this new body toward focusing on difficult, concrete security issues in the region, especially maritime security. This was not at all to Beijing's liking, but most EAS participants supported the overall American approach.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In short, Obama moved boldly to shift the center of gravity among the key multilateral organizations in Asia, favoring those that include the United States and leading them to take approaches favored by Washington but are neuralgic for Beijing.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>Economics and trade</em></strong>. The Obama administration had a disappointing record on trade issues during its first two-and-a-half years in office. But in early November 2011 it finally achieved ratification of the free trade agreement with South Korea, and it then, as noted above, turned its focus to developing the TPP as a new trade and investment platform in the Asia-Pacific. This pair of initiatives has thrust Asia back into the center of U.S. economic and trade initiatives, in line with Obama's oft-repeated assertion that there is no region as vital as Asia to America's future economic prosperity. All this came amid rising economic and trade tensions with China -- tensions that are unlikely to subside during the coming year of electoral politics in Washington and succession politics in Beijing.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>Security</em></strong>. Obama declared unequivocally on this trip that he will protect America's Asian security investments from any future cutbacks in overall U.S. military spending. In Australia, moreover, he signed an agreement to allow rotational deployments of 2,500 marines in Darwin. Following a trip by new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta a few weeks earlier to the region, the president left no doubt that the U.S. military and broader security focus was now shifting from Iraq and Afghanistan to Asia and that this new posture will remain at the top of America's security priorities and will be protected from any future defense cuts.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>Democracy</em></strong>. A global democracy agenda had not been a prominent part of Obama's tenure, but this changed significantly with the 2011 Arab Spring. The president made clear on this trip that America will lead in Asia in promoting democracy and human rights, declaring in Australia that, "Other models have been tried and they have failed -- fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee. And they failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the ultimate source of power and legitimacy -- the will of the people." At his final stop, Obama announced that Hillary Clinton would visit Burma (Myanmar) in early December -- the first U.S. secretary of state in 50 years to do so -- to take the temperature of new reformist stirrings there and encourage progress toward more democratic governance. The new comprehensive strategy, in short, elevated the democratic component of American diplomacy in Asia.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Most of the specific initiatives unveiled on the president's November 2011 trip had their antecedents in 2010 or before. But whereas previously the United States selectively pushed back when it objected to Chinese actions and focused great attention on managing the overall U.S.-China relationship, the November trip marked a significant shift. Washington is still very much focused on sustaining a constructive U.S.-China relationship, but it has now brought disparate elements together in a strategically integrated fashion that explicitly affirms and promises to sustain American leadership throughout Asia for the foreseeable future.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China's Perceptions</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China, not surprisingly, is worried about these new developments. They in many ways reinforce China's abiding suspicions about the United States. In Chinese eyes, the United States has always been concerned primarily with protecting its own global dominance -- which perforce means doing everything it can to retard or disrupt China's rise. That America lost its stride in the global financial crisis and the weak recovery since then while China in 2010 became the world's second-largest economy has only increased Beijing's concerns about Washington's determination to postpone the day when China inevitably surpasses the United States to become the world's most powerful country.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Beijing, for example, sees basically hostile American efforts in the following spheres: promoting dissent in China in order to create instability that America can then fan via cyber activities into upheaval that will bring down the Chinese Communist Party's rule; pressing China to revalue its currency so as to increase destabilizing unemployment in China and direct Americans' attention away from the United States' own failures; creating problems for China by fanning fears about Beijing's intentions among its neighbors and encouraging those, such as Vietnam, that have traditionally harbored deep suspicions of Chinese ambitions; forging cooperation among countries -- especially the major democracies -- in Asia to create obstacles to China's achieving its rightful role as the major power in the region; challenging China's model of development as an alternative to the tarnished Western democratic model; and using measures such as the formation of the TPP to reduce the scope for internationalization of the renminbi, which China thinks is an important step in reining in America's abuse of the dollar's role as the global reserve currency. In sum, the president's Asia-wide strategy and some of the rhetoric accompanying it played directly into the perception of many Chinese that all American actions are a conspiracy to hold down or actually disrupt China's rise.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">China's leaders retain enough respect for American strength and capabilities that Obama's self-assured declaration of America's ongoing leadership role in Asia -- backed by ample evidence of comprehensive U.S. strategic thinking and diplomacy -- has at the same time at least raised the unwelcome possibility for Beijing of a significantly new context for China's own regional strategy.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">What Will Happen?</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The American press portrayed the Obama trip as affirming American leadership of Asia, challenging and trumping China at every turn. The fact that the United States' initiatives apparently received warm vocal support from nearly all major countries at the East Asia Summit reinforced this perception. But the reality is more complex, both as to what the president sought to do and as to the likely results.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>A more complex U.S. strategy</em></strong>. The Obama administration does not seek to confront China across the board. Rather, it has adopted a two-pronged approach: to reaffirm and strengthen cooperative ties with China; and to establish a strong and credible American presence across Asia to both encourage constructive Chinese behavior and to provide confidence to other countries in the region that they need not yield to potential Chinese regional hegemony.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The administration is thus continuing to make focused efforts to develop close personal ties between the key top officials in Washington and Beijing. Obama has met with Chinese President Hu 10 times (including their meeting in Honolulu) and with Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly. Clinton has made a special effort to engage her chief Chinese interlocutor, Dai Bingguo, on a personal level, regularly holding informal meetings with him that last for hours. And Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has established very close communications with his counterpart, Vice Premier Wang Qishan.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In these private meetings the spirit has been one of explaining each side's positions in terms of more than formal talking points in order to gain mutual understanding and increase mutual trust. The starting point has been mutual respect and recognition of the deep interconnected interests between China and the United States. These closed-door discussions have thus been designed to lessen the chances of unnecessary Sino-U.S. hostility. This quiet dimension of bilateral diplomacy seeks to manage U.S.-China tensions going forward and to set the tone and agenda for the many regular U.S.-China meetings across the two governments throughout the course of any given year.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>China's responses</em></strong>. China was by all accounts surprised at the scope and detail of the American tour de force in November. Its initial reaction has been mild, possibly in part because of private assurances received during meetings between the top leaders and also in part because of the political succession this coming year in Beijing. The Hu leadership wants to avoid any serious deterioration in U.S.-China relations and very likely does not want to generate a major internal review of U.S.-China relations during this very sensitive political year.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">However, China's leaders also do not want to fall seriously behind popular nationalist sentiment if that sentiment mushrooms over perceived American efforts to prevent a rising China from assuming its rightful place in Asia. This sentiment could increase pressure on the national leadership to push back against the assertion of America primacy in China's own backyard and to remind the United States of the changing real balance of power in Asia. Possibilities include, inter alia, escalation of tensions in general, reduced cooperation on issues such as sanctions against Iran and dealing with the unfolding succession in North Korea, and increased incidents in China's exclusive economic zone, none of which can be ruled out. Each can produce its own escalation of friction and distrust in U.S.-China relations. The military's role in Chinese politics is very murky but could also factor into these responses during this succession year. The Chinese succession thus can potentially move the situation in either direction, depending on internal dynamics there. Preventing a turn for the worse will require active, sustained, and carefully calibrated American diplomatic efforts.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>Internal administration shift</em></strong>. There is a relevant internal administration dynamic at play that is more difficult to pin down but may prove consequential. The Obama administration's China policy from its earliest days was shaped especially by the close cooperation between Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg and the senior director for East Asia on the National Security Council, Jeffrey Bader. These were the first two top officials dealing with China to be in place in 2009, and they developed very effective cooperation to maintain the leadership of the White House especially on China but also on related broader Asian policies.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">From late 2009 onward, there was a different strand of thinking in the State Department, supported by some in the Pentagon, that sought a tougher stance toward China and was more prepared to warn others in the region to be worried about China's growing capabilities and to band together to constrain Chinese initiatives. These two streams of policy were not in sharp conflict, but each side sought consciously to shape overall American policy and often proffered different tactical advice as various issues arose.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Messrs. Steinberg and Bader left the government in the spring of 2011. With their departures, there is no China specialist at the level of bureau chief or above at the State Department, the National Security Council, or the Pentagon. The White House briefing provided to journalists before the president's departure on his Asia trip more fully embraced the rhetoric (such as declaring an American "pivot" to Asia) and approach of those in the State Department who have sought a tougher line than at any time previously in the Obama administration. If this change in personnel has produced a substantive change in White House policy, that can prove to be a very significant development over time as new issues arise.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In this connection, it may be significant that Obama never uttered the term "pivot" during his Asia trip, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon speaks in terms of "re-balancing" rather than making a "pivot." Clinton, by contrast, has repeatedly termed America's policy a "pivot to Asia."</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Top Chinese officials have for a substantial time clearly perceived the differences within the U.S. government noted above and may react accordingly to signs that the tougher line has now won out.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>American credibility</em></strong>. A tougher line may in fact produce more constructive Chinese behavior if it convinces Beijing that America retains the capacity to lead in Asia over the long run and is willing to encourage China's ongoing development so long as that does not produce behavior that challenges America's overall position or vital interests in the region. China's leaders are, after all, very pragmatic. They are unlikely to "take on" the United States if America has adopted a strategically coherent Asia strategy that is widely respected and viewed as credible in the region.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Rhetoric and diplomacy, after all, can shape perceptions and expectations and thus are important determinants of foreign-policy outcomes. But over time credibility is crucial, and credibility requires demonstrably having the resources and capabilities to implement the overall strategy over the long run.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In this context, it is striking that Obama and Clinton talked in Asia as if Asians did not view the global financial crisis as "made in America," as if the American system of democracy has recently been performing splendidly, and as if the American military had all the resources necessary to sustain any type of deployment Washington wishes across the vast Pacific region. But none of these is true.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The biggest question in Asia is whether America will bounce back from its current fiscal crisis and soon get onto a path to fiscal health and future strength. The political meltdown over raising the debt ceiling in August 2011 did enormous damage to America's standing in Asia because it generated such a strong negative signal on exactly this issue. As the president was laying out his strategy toward Asia in November, the congressional "supercommittee" was failing to reach even a minimal agreement to present to the Congress as a whole -- a failure that was announced within days of the president's return to Washington.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">There thus may have been more than a little wishful thinking in the president's rhetoric during his November trip. While the president indicated that all countries would be welcome to join in Asian prosperity if they accepted the high standards being developed for the TPP, the reality is that at present it is China and not the United States that is the largest trade partner for every major economy in the region, and China does not operate according to these standards. No Asian country appears willing to do anything to jeopardize its economic ties with the rapidly growing Chinese economy, especially at a time of weak American growth and a very uncertain economic prognosis for Europe.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The U.S. military, moreover, is facing potential total budget reductions of over $1 trillion over the coming 10 years. Most Asian governments wonder whether this will, despite current protestations, adversely affect American military capabilities -- and the United States' willingness to use them -- in Asia. China's military, far weaker than that of the United States, appears set to enjoy double-digit annual budget increases for years to come.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In short, a tremendously important factor shaping the future American role in Asia will be how well the United States does in repairing its domestic economy and in demonstrating that, as has happened so often in U.S. history, the American system can bounce back from severe domestic problems stronger than ever before due to the changes the crisis has forced America to adopt.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong><em>China's trajectory</em></strong>. There is also the matter of China's own prospects. There is an impression when discussing Beijing's international role that China's growth momentum is unstoppable and that its system is on very firm ground domestically. But both of these are in fact in question. Beijing has already made clear that it must change its development model, as the model that has proved so successful in the past few decades has run its course and is now increasingly generating outcomes -- extreme disparities in wealth, pervasive problems in product and food safety, increasing corruption, catastrophic environmental degradation, decreasing returns to investment, widespread feeling that the system itself has become unfair, and so forth -- that are economically unsustainable and socially destabilizing. But there is sparse evidence to give confidence that the very tough political decisions required to effect this change -- decisions that will challenge vested interests in the corporate world and among some powerful local leaders -- will in fact be made during this time of succession politics in Beijing.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Indeed, the protracted nature of the succession warrants pessimism about substantial domestic reforms before about 2014, if then. Yet, China's political stability cannot be assured without the types of changes in the political system that have become very difficult -- perhaps too difficult -- to make. Should China experience major political unrest or a sharp disruption in its growth momentum, perceptions throughout the Asia-Pacific will shift in ways that can easily affect attitudes toward China's role and the U.S.-China balance in the region.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A pivot too far?</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The declaration of America's strategic pivot to Asia announced in November clearly sought to generate confidence in America's future leadership role in this region and respect for Washington's capacity to orchestrate this very impressive diplomatic tour de force. Many in Asia have been worrying about American decline. Obama projected American optimism, principles, determination, and leadership.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">This strategy has substantial potential benefits, but it is not nearly as certain a trumpet as the president and Secretary Clinton made it sound. Most importantly, the United States will not have the resources and capacity to fully meet the president's promises unless it addresses its domestic fiscal and related political problems far more effectively than recent experiences suggest is likely. Putting America's domestic house in order is a necessary condition for the success of the new Asia strategy. In addition, the Chinese may respond in increasingly challenging ways, especially as their domestic politics intrude.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Most countries in Asia, moreover, are determined to continue to expand their economic and trade relations with China even as they worry that Beijing will leverage its growing economic clout for diplomatic and security advantage. While they therefore want the United States to prevent China from successfully taking advantage of others in the region, no country wants to see a tension-filled U.S.-China relationship that creates pressure for everyone else to choose sides. They rather want to be able to maintain equally effective relations with China and the United States and to derive benefit from both the cooperation and the competition between the two giants in the region. The notion that the United States will shape the major outcomes in the region because countries there will welcome clear American leadership misunderstands these more complicated calculations around the region.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The United States had been responding to entreaties from its friends and allies in Asia by taking actions primarily on the diplomatic and security side until well into 2011. This ran the immediate risk that some countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, might succeed in dragging the United States into their own territorial disputes with China, a situation that Washington had wisely taken care to avoid in the past. More fundamentally, this broad approach ran the longer-term risk that Asia will increasingly become a cost center for the United States (providing security is expensive), while the region will continue to serve as a growing profit center for China (due to its vast economic engagement). Given America's fiscal plight, that is not a comforting or possibly even a sustainable trajectory.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Obama administration's pivot to Asia prospectively establishes a more balanced economic, diplomatic, and security approach. The recent U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement ratification and efforts to create the TPP are very important steps in this direction. But this new integrated Asia strategy risks overreach by creating expectations that Washington will not be able to meet, feeding suspicions in China that may lead to a far more irascible U.S.-China relationship, and assuming goals among other Asian countries that miss their more complex perceptions of American prospects and strategies in the region.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">It is therefore very important for American officials to keep tight control of their rhetoric so as to avoid unnecessary distrust and tension as they flesh out details of U.S. strategy. During the critical period coming up with North Korea, for example, U.S.-China communication and cooperation can prove extremely important. To the extent that American rhetoric feeds strategic distrust in Beijing, such cooperation on the issue of North Korea, which China regards as a major security concern, will be far more difficult to achieve.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">While significant progress in U.S.-China relations is unlikely during the coming year because of the succession/election taking place in both countries, therefore, the United States should not neglect the importance of enhancing the relationship with Beijing as part of any successful regional and global strategy. No amount of success among other countries in Asia will in itself produce the regional results that Obama seeks.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Indeed, both the United States and China must keep in mind that they are best served by adopting positions that engender a healthy respect in the other capital concerning capabilities and goals so that neither acts rashly and both have strong incentives to cooperate where possible. As of now, it is too soon to tell whether Obama's November trip has laid the basis for a truly more balanced, sustainable strategy in Asia.</span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/12/21-obama-asia-lieberthal" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qz6E1NBNPUE/UP3kmH-KDMI/AAAAAAAAGkE/jVKJBSRvyb8/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-42022840004246720502013-01-15T21:25:00.000-08:002013-03-05T11:27:01.074-08:00美国“重返”亚太与俄罗斯的应对<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">作者:</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 20px; text-align: center;">程春华</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; text-align: center;">《南京政治学院学报》2012年4期第65~71页</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> </span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><strong style="line-height: 28px;">【内容提要】</strong><span style="line-height: 28px;">俄罗斯学者认为美国“重返”①亚太的动因主要有<b>促进美国经济复苏、遏制中国、保持经济领导地位、平衡亚太力量对比、履行对盟友责任、在亚太保持主导地位</b>等方面的需要,在一定程度上反映了美国为维护既得利益与旧的世界秩序,而对新兴国家进行的围堵。俄罗斯学者指出,<b>美国“重返”亚太触犯了俄罗斯利益,对俄美关系、中美关系都有损害,加深俄美、俄中之间的“战略互疑”,使亚太局势更加复杂和不稳定</b>。</span></span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 28px;">为应对美国攻势,俄罗斯积极调整亚太战略与政策,加强与中国等亚太新兴国家的战略协作,以合作促进亚太地区和平、稳定与发展。</span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="line-height: 28px;"> </span></span><br />
<a href="" name="more"></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 【关 键 词】</span><span style="line-height: 28px;">美国“重返”亚太/跨太平洋伙伴关系协议(TPP)/俄美关系/中俄关系</span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><o:p></o:p></span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄罗斯科学院远东研究所弗拉基米尔·波尔加科夫指出,2009年中期奥巴马政府最初宣布美国“重返”亚洲(更确切地说是亚太地区)时,未在俄罗斯引起足够关注。俄外交部主办的《国际生活》杂志主编阿尔缅·奥卡涅相认为,2010年美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿在《外交政策》杂志上发表《美国的太平洋世纪》[1]之前,美国“没有在亚太地区实现战略目标的行动计划”[2]。俄罗斯学术界对美国“重返”亚太问题的观点反映在主要政治学和东方学杂志,如《全球政治中的俄罗斯》、《国际生活》、《远东问题》、《俄罗斯与亚太》、《今日亚非》等以及“现代俄罗斯政治”、“新东方评论”、“俄中评论”等学术网站上的大量文章中。俄政治学家和东方学学者们对美国“重返”亚太动因、影响和应对的观点立场,为我们研究该问题提供全新的视角和启发。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"><b> 一、美国“重返”亚太的动因</b></span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄罗斯学者主要从<b>经济原因、国际战略格局</b>等角度阐释美国“重返”亚太的动因。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 第一类观点指出,美国“重返”亚太是为了促进美国经济复苏、遏制中国、保持经济领导地位的需要。有学者指出,<b>美国从未离开亚太,此次强调“重返”亚太有与中国进行“经济冷战”的性质,也有加强盟友对其安全依赖和推销美国军火的经济考虑;美国“重返”亚太实质上是在用军事与盟友网络等实力来弥补经济实力的不足与担忧</b>,正如美国寄希望于以“<b>软实力</b>”与“<b>巧实力</b>”来弥补硬实力不足一样。俄科学院远东研究所副所长谢尔盖·卢佳宁认为,亚太经合组织两极化反映了中美在争夺亚太地区的经济主导地位,他说:“美国竭力争取‘重返’亚太地区,为此,它将争取在这一空间里<b>实施美国自己的共同市场方案</b>。2011年11月份举行的檀香山亚太经合组织峰会上,美国提出的<b>跨太平洋伙伴关系协议</b>(TPP)引发了热烈讨论。而且,还故意忘了邀请北京加入。”[3]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 关于TPP,俄学者指出其实际上是美国在亚太地区架空中国、削弱中国影响力的把戏。俄科学院国际安全研究所研究员阿列克谢·费年科认为,构建TPP是美国试图使亚太地区朝有利于美国利益方向发展的尝试,其主要动机一是在太平洋两边沿岸国家构建经济联系;二是削弱和架空东盟等地区一体化组织,防止东亚国家联合;三是美日想通过 TPP拉拢与中国签订自由贸易协定的东盟国家,削弱中国对东盟国家的经济影响,防止未来中国—东盟自由贸易区(CAFTA)机制的建立;四是破坏东盟10+3、10+6、东亚峰会等已被广泛认可和接受的政治框架的政治协商体系,澳大利亚、新西兰、日本更愿意参加美国主导的TPP框架,马来西亚、新加坡、越南等国正在建立代替东盟的TPP协商体系;五是通过TPP整合由美国主导的跨太平洋同盟体系,包括:美日同盟、ANZUS、美国—拉美伙伴关系(智利、秘鲁)等[4]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者指出,美国认为中国有地缘政治野心,希望推广自己的政治模式,这令美国担忧。历史学家伊戈尔·弗拉基米罗维奇指出,奥巴马出台新战略是为了阻碍中国发展,削弱中国在亚太地区的影响力[5]。外交学院鲍里斯·施梅廖夫认为:“美国政治和知识界精英们担忧中国经济地位增强会转变成全球政治影响力,成为美国的强大竞争者。因此,华盛顿在任何情况下都试图强调,美国世纪还远未结束。”[6]俄政治形势分析中心首席专家帕维尔·萨林强调,美国无法接受北京试图把经济实力转化为政治影响力的挑战,目前美国遏制中国的全球战略的着力点是经济为主、军事为辅、多管齐下,例如搞乱利比亚和苏丹首先冲击的是中国的经济利益[7]。波尔加科夫指出,俄学者实际上一致承认美国“重返”这一事实,并把它首先解释为美国的目的是加强已经摇摇欲坠的国际地位和威望。美国注意到了亚太国家在世界经济增长中的份量,所以希望把自己的亚太政策变成促进美国经济复苏的有效战略工具,“重返”亚太具有公开制衡“中国崛起”的考虑。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 另一类观点指出,美国“重返”亚太是为了平衡亚太力量对比、履行对盟友责任、在亚太保持主导地位。《全球政治中的俄罗斯》主编费奥多尔·卢基扬诺夫强调,部分亚太国家希望在美国帮助下获得某种保障,以避免由于中国强大所带来的各种风险,而这一图谋却被美国所利用,美国在亚太地区的主要外交宗旨是“加强同那些愿意制衡中国国家的关系,或与之结成新的同盟,如澳大利亚、菲律宾、新加坡、泰国和日本等部分传统盟友和越南、印度等新国家”,“中国有某种被包围的感觉”是千真万确的[8]。俄罗斯地缘政治问题科学院院长列昂尼德·伊瓦绍夫认为:“加强在新加坡的存在是美中军事对抗的一个组成部分。”[9]奥卡涅相强调,“很快我们将会看到旧有军事政治集团的加强或新军事政治集团的产生”,美国及其同盟可能发展成“亚洲北约”[2]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> “俄罗斯之声”指出,美国企图借助盟友和伙伴在亚太地区建造反华长城。“肩并肩”等军演的目的不仅是为了警示朝鲜,还有向中国施加军事政治压力的意图。高等经济大学阿列克谢·马斯洛夫说:“在上个十年,只以政治方式解决冲突,如今各方在冲突中保持军事威慑的概念重生。在该地区,有越来越多的东盟国家及其邻国加入到军演。”[10]美国还利用电影等文化软实力对中国进行渗透,如2012年4月登陆中国的好莱坞影片《超级战舰》大肆炫耀美日同盟军演的威风,对中国民众造成显著的负面心理冲击。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者把美国“重返亚太”看成维护其在亚太领导地位、遏制竞争者的先发制人的举措。谢尔盖·米赫涅维奇倾向于把美国在亚洲的行动看成预防措施,认为美国认为亚洲国家可能在中国领导下逐渐团结在一起,美国不能接受任何一个准备挑战其世界主导地位的国家发展壮大[11]。俄科学院美国和加拿大问题研究所副所长帕维尔·佐罗塔廖夫认为:“新国防战略是美国“重返”亚太政策的延续,即在该地区加强现有同盟并缔结新同盟,其主要目的是抑制中国。”[12]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><strong style="line-height: 28px;"> 二、美国“重返”亚太的影响</strong><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者认为,美国将亚太作为全球遏制中国的重要一环,同时加紧对叙利亚和伊朗施加战略压力,挤压中国国际空间,卡住中国能源咽喉,同时削弱乃至废掉俄罗斯核心军事力量[13]。美国“重返”亚太对俄美关系、中美关系及亚太局势均有深远的影响。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> (一)对俄美关系的影响</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 美国“重返”亚太触犯了俄罗斯的利益,加剧俄美矛盾,同时也促使俄罗斯向亚太倾斜。政治学家谢尔盖·米赫耶夫指出,美国积极推动建立TPP的主张,“既没有邀请俄罗斯也没有邀请中国加入。亚太经合组织不能继续作为美国向太平洋施加影响的工具,反对俄罗斯有关在亚太经合组织框架内建立技术转让基金会的倡议不仅旨在反莫斯科,也是在反北京。”[14]反导问题使俄美关系雪上加霜。波尔加科夫认为,莫斯科把在欧洲(这次是在波兰和罗马尼亚)部署美国的反导系统视为是对“平等安全”原则的破坏。普京在《成为强者:保障俄罗斯的国家安全》一文中指出,“必须在加强国家空—天防御体系方面迈出坚定步伐”,他解释说,“是美国和北约在部署反导系统问题上的政策迫使我们采取这个行动”。俄国防部副部长阿纳托利·安东诺夫也指出:“美国全球反导防御体系的组成部分在其他地区也具有针对俄罗斯的潜力。把反导系统的欧洲部分同阿拉斯加以及亚太地区的反导防御设施整合在一起,将提高美国的反导防御综合能力。”[15]普京强调向亚太进行军事倾斜,指出真正意义上的“远洋”海军的复兴,首先是在北方和远东地区海军力量的复兴,是俄当今最重要的任务方向之一。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 美国“重返”亚太等问题加深俄美的“战略互疑”。与有些专家认为中美关系存在“战略互疑”②类似,在普京眼中,或许俄美之间的“战略互疑”更加严重甚至“根深蒂固”。普京指出,美国的某些行为无助于巩固俄美双方的互信。美国企图在欧洲布置导弹防御系统的打算当然会引起我们的担忧,为什么这个导弹防御系统如此让我们担心呢?因为它涉及目前俄罗斯在该领域的战略核威慑力,破坏了数十年形成的军事政治平衡。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 波尔加科夫认为,“重启”或改善俄美关系的希望在于如下几方面的实现:推进关于限制进攻性战略武器的谈判③;美国放弃小布什政府制订的在捷克和波兰部署反导系统的计划;美国停止把格鲁吉亚和乌克兰等前苏联东欧国家拉进北约的计划。正如普京指出的那样:“在俄美关系上我们愿意同美国发展更加长远的关系,取得更具实质性的突破,但是条件是美国方面必须要切实遵守平等与相互尊重的伙伴关系原则。”[16]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> (二)对中美关系的影响</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者分析了中美关系的问题、现状与走向,及美国“重返”亚太对中美关系的影响问题,包括南中国海局势、领土争端等问题。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者指出,未来中美关系很可能在对抗中合作,若中美未能抑制双方关系中的冲突性因素,则会带来更多对抗。俄科学院远东研究所安德烈·达维多夫认为,中美关系首要问题不是经济因素,而是军事战略因素;双方处于一个带有竞争因素的全球伙伴模式形成时期[17]。波尔加科夫指出,美国重返“亚太”可能使中美关系的矛盾进一步加深;中国民众对美国的好感下降,在学术界对美国在亚洲政策的负面评价也占主流④。俄媒体注意到《中美战略互疑:解析与应对》报告提出的“若中美互不信任加剧,未来10年两国间可能爆发冲突”等观点,指出:“若该报告的预测变成现实,亚太地区将成为中美激烈对抗的战场。”[18]当然,俄学界也有对中美关系缓和抱有乐观看法。与基辛格“中美对抗是选择的结果而非必然”[19]的观点类似,俄外交学院院长叶夫根尼·巴扎诺夫认为(中美)可以成功避免严重对抗:“两国都明白,全球大多数问题都不能彼此孤立地或者通过对抗获得解决。于是就出现了一个很复杂的情形:一方面是斗争,另一方面是合作。”[18]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者认为,“台湾因素”在中美关系中的作用存在不确定性。维克托·特里丰诺夫认为,“华盛顿不打算放弃在中国台湾问题上的政策”,奥巴马当局向台湾大量出售美国最新武器就证明了这一点。同时,圣彼得堡大学国际关系亚娜·列克丘金娜注意到,由于台湾和大陆的接近,美台关系受到很大的削弱,“华盛顿和台北间的军事合作被缩简成仅仅出售武器了”,现在“白宫实施台湾政策受制于台湾当局的自我克制”[20]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者认为南海问题成为美国挑拨中国与东盟关系的楔子。列克丘金娜认为,这些争端(中国和东盟成员国在南中国海的领土争端)为美国“重返亚洲”政策创造了有利环境,一方面(使美国)扩大了与东盟的协作,另一方面抑制了中国日益增长的地区影响[21]。历史学家科洛托夫称:“现在中国南海进入了划分势力范围的阶段。中国有自己的重点,美国也有自己的重点。尽管在起草南海行为守则,但谁也不会遵守,一切问题将用武力粗暴强硬地解决。”[22]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄罗斯专家还注意到美国等西方正利用缅甸等国家加强对中国的遏制。战略研究所鲍里斯·沃尔洪斯基指出:“反对派在缅甸议会补选中获胜之后,中国、印度和西方为了自己在该国的利益开始启动新一轮大博弈;西方不遗余力地扶持昂山素季成为潜在国家领袖,以便在中国的‘软肋’插上一刀。”[23]俄科学院东方学所菲利克斯·尤尔洛夫说:“缅甸已经成为中国和西方世界利益碰撞的战场,斗争还将加剧。”[24]也有学者认为美国的插足对中缅关系的干扰有限,美国虽然在缅甸给中国带来停建密松水电站、威胁中缅油气管道、削弱对缅甸影响力等损失,但吴登盛政府为维护统治离不开中国的支持,因为缅甸现政府是中国的债务担保人,纵容民主派上台害人害己,中国在维护缅甸政局稳定方面具有美国不可比拟的优势[25]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> (三)对亚太局势的影响</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄罗斯媒体及学者对美国新军事战略调整、扩大在澳大利亚的军事存在、朝鲜半岛局势等问题表现出积极关注。俄罗斯外交机构“断定这是使亚太地区局势更加复杂化的行动”[26]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄科学院远东研究所维克托·特里丰诺夫指出,美国“重返亚洲”战略以继续加强美国在该地区军事存在和军事力量优势作为补充。在从其他地区收缩军事力量的情况下,美国将亚太地区调整为战略重心。总体可以预计美国在太平洋的政策是加强海军和空军力量;继续部署针对东亚的地区反导防御系统;强化在关岛和冲绳的军事基地;加大对亚太地区美国盟友的军事援助;在西南太平洋建立实质性的新型强大军事综合体;在澳大利亚达尔文地区部署2500名海军陆战队、附属舰只及航空兵力量。这一系列活动的实施都明显针对中国和南中国海地区,美国在南海奉行与中国公开对抗的政策[27]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 关于朝鲜半岛问题,俄科学院远东研究所朝鲜研究中心主任亚历山大·热宾把2010年朝鲜半岛局势的恶化完全归咎于美国,认为韩希望“加速朝鲜制度崩溃并建立对整个朝鲜半岛的控制,从而把自己的军事机器直接开进中俄边境”[28]。但大概在2011年中的时候,奥巴马政府意识到,对朝鲜直接进行武力施压的策略是行不通的。于是美国任命了新的主管朝鲜事务政策的国务卿特别代表和新的朝鲜问题六方会谈美国代表团团长,恢复了美朝间的接触[29]。2012年3月29日至30日,远东研究所与韩国国家研究院联合举办了“朝鲜半岛安全问题研讨会”,莫斯科大学朝鲜研究中心主任帕维尔·列沙科夫指出,不能寄希望于朝鲜政权崩溃(或“颜色革命”),而应积极期待并顺应朝鲜改革开放的进程,俄罗斯唯一的选择就是积极参与朝鲜有可能实行的改革开放,将对朝鲜被动的政策转向积极主动的务实睦邻合作政策[30]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄学者将美国“重返”亚太及相关行动视为亚太地区的“麻烦制造者”。《国防》杂志主编伊戈尔·科罗琴科指出:“不排除重演冷战时期亚太地区的紧张局面。但如果说以前亚太地区的军备竞赛是在苏美之间开展的,那么现在这场争夺地区领导地位的斗争则在中美之间进行。华盛顿近来无疑是在施展通过军事战略包围中国的战术。美国在企图削弱中国作为地区领导地位角色的同时,也在加强对这些同中国有领土争议的国家的外交支持,甚至企图在这一冲突中扮演中间人的角色。美国越是公开企图插足中国同邻国的领土纠纷,就越有可能让局势激化,直至产生军事冲突。”[31]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><strong style="line-height: 28px;"> 三、俄罗斯的应对方略</strong><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 为减少美国“重返”亚太的影响,俄罗斯积极调整亚太战略与政策,从政治、经济、军事、国际组织等多方面积极应对,以稳定亚太局势、借力亚太“东风”,为俄罗斯发展营造良好的国际环境。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> (一)应对美国“重返”亚太的思路</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 第一种主张可称为“助美制华论”,提出俄罗斯要在中美之间保持“中立”,甚至帮助美国制衡中国,实现俄罗斯国家利益最大化。持此种观点者有离间中俄关系的嫌疑,代表人物有西方驻俄罗斯的研究机构学者德米特里·特列宁等。第二种主张可称为“协作制美论”,认为美国在亚太影响力上升会损害俄罗斯利益,所谓“唇亡齿寒”,主张与中国等亚太新兴国家加强战略协作关系,制衡美国在亚太的影响力。代表人物有波尔加科夫、亚历山大·卢金、米哈伊尔·季塔连科等。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> “助美制华论”者预测俄罗斯在亚太局势的前景时认为,俄罗斯“既面临卷入超级大国冲突的风险”,又面临一种机遇,按中国谋略的说法就是“坐山观虎斗”、谋取“渔翁之利”[32]。莫斯科卡内基中心主任德米特里·特列宁认为,中国崛起对俄罗斯是严峻的挑战,特别是对西伯利亚地区;俄罗斯在历史上相继充当中国的“导师”、“敌人”,直至后来的“原料来源地”等角色;莫斯科应该避免单边倒向北京,为此必须加强同中国周边国家的关系,特别是和印度这样一个亚洲第二超级强国协作,以制衡中国,“莫斯科最好在中国的南海和钓鱼岛等领土争端问题上奉行中立政策”[33]64-65。针对俄罗斯利用美国、日本、印度、越南等国与中国的矛盾,以能源、军火的优势,提高其在亚太的地位,地缘政治问题研究院院长列昂尼德·伊瓦绍夫承认:“俄印加强伙伴关系将遏制中国的能量。”[34]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> “助美制华论”实质上是“中国威胁论”的翻版,反映了部分俄罗斯人对中国崛起的担忧,主张对中国实行合作与防范并重的政策,这些论调应当引起我们足够的重视,并设法予以消解。部分俄罗斯的担忧主要体现在担心中国在亚太影响力提升会削弱俄罗斯在亚太和中亚的地位,干扰俄罗斯构建“欧亚联盟”。东南亚问题研究专家德米特里·莫夏科夫认为,中国在亚太地区实行极度扩张性政策,投资活动进一步增加了亚太国家对中国的依赖,类似情况也出现在中亚某些国家同中国的关系中[35]。俄罗斯政治形势分析中心首席专家帕维尔·萨林指出,在美中亚太博弈中,俄罗斯应利用美国对中国能源的遏制,谋求扩大对中国的能源供应,增加俄罗斯的能源获利水平。他说:“美中冲突一旦激化,中国的海路能源供应很容易被美国掐断,俄罗斯可以利用唯一可从陆路对华供应能源国家的地位,提高俄罗斯在中国能源市场的份额。”[7]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> “协作制美论”者从战略上强调亚太对俄罗斯的重要意义与作用,认为俄罗斯的利益正聚焦在亚洲地区,应通过“重返”亚太(东进)真正落实“双头鹰”战略。波尔加科夫指出,从2011年至2012年初,俄罗斯对在亚太事务的关注度更强了。华盛顿在亚太地区恢复和加强与老盟友的关系,并新制定以“遏制”中国为目的的政策,这在某种程度上触及了俄罗斯的利益。俄国防与外交委员会主席谢尔盖·卡拉加诺夫称,“文化欧洲化”的俄罗斯未来在于“经济亚洲化”[36]。科学院东方学所东亚研究中心主任德米特里·莫西亚科夫说:“俄罗斯是太平洋国家,对于俄罗斯的整个国家来说,亚太地区都是非常有吸引力的。”[37]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> “协作制美论”得到俄罗斯大部分学者赞同,主张加强俄中等新兴国家间战略协作,及金砖国家、上海合作组织等多边框架内的协作等政策,以平衡美国及其同盟的影响。波尔加科夫认为,“美国重返亚洲”,美国在该地区军事实力的增强,以及华盛顿挑起的中美在东亚和东南亚地区两国关系的复杂化,毫无疑问都严重危及俄罗斯的利益;必须保持和完善同中国的战略协作伙伴关系,同时也不拒绝同美国和整个西方建立和睦的建设性关系。外交学院亚历山大·卢金认为,“正由于同中国和其他亚洲伙伴的联系,俄罗斯才处于世界影响力的核心”,“北京在其复杂的伙伴关系中把俄罗斯看成平衡同美国和欧洲竞争的伙伴,也视为中国对外政策独立性的保障[38]。俄科学院远东研究所所长米哈伊尔·季塔连科院士坚称,俄罗斯和中国“需要彼此作为伙伴,他们的睦邻协作关系是彼此领土完整和主权的相互保障[39]。但是对于俄中结盟,大部分俄罗斯学者则持保留态度。俄罗斯地缘政治问题专家康斯坦丁·西夫科夫指出,俄中结盟实际上可以覆盖整个欧亚大陆;从军事政治方面看,这样的同盟将坚不可摧;但更多的观点认为,此种讨论为时尚早[40]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> (二)应对措施:调整亚太战略与政策</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> “协作制美论”也得到俄罗斯高层决策者的支持。普京在其外交竞选纲领《俄罗斯与不断变化的世界》一文中特别提到了亚太地区在世界事务中作用的提升,并阐述了对俄中关系的看法。普京指出:“俄罗斯需要一个繁荣和稳定的中国,中国也需要一个强大和成功的俄罗斯。”[41]普京称,印度是亚太地区的另一个重要的战略合作伙伴;同时还应加强联合国、金砖国家、二十国集团、八国集团、上海合作组织、东盟、亚太经济合作组织等多边机构的作用[41]。俄罗斯著名政治学家、《全球政治中的俄罗斯》杂志主编费奥多尔·卢基扬诺夫认为,普京强调了俄罗斯更加关注中国和整个亚洲,当然,这里也有对开发西伯利亚和远东的考虑[42]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 鉴此,俄罗斯积极调整亚太战略与政策,反映俄罗斯式“重返”亚太的“东进”战略逐渐成型。俄《2020年战略报告》中提到中国对俄罗斯经济的推动作用,建议一方面需要加快俄罗斯经济增长,另一方面要利用新的俄中合作机会。提交普京智囊——瓦代尔俱乐部会议的报告《东进:俄罗斯和亚洲还是俄罗斯在亚洲》明确了俄罗斯的“东进”战略,即在顾及其他亚太地区事务参与者利益的同时,俄罗斯必须进一步加强同亚洲国家,特别是中国的经贸往来和政治合作;俄罗斯在该地区大国形象的全面确立,应在俄罗斯亚洲战略的实施中起到重要作用[43]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 在安全方面,俄罗斯实行一种相对中立与全方位合作的政策,以回应美国的军事战略调整。拉夫罗夫认为,俄罗斯有充分的理由被认为是亚太地区军事政治稳定和持续发展的重要因素;俄罗斯同该地区国家之间不存在无法通过建设性对话调解的问题;中国、印度和越南是俄罗斯在亚太地区的战略伙伴;俄罗斯正在积极发展与日本和韩国的关系[44]。强化安全领域的中俄战略协作是稳定亚太棋局的重要环节。关于2012年4月24日俄中“海上联合—2012”军演,远东研究所专家安德烈·达维多夫指出:中俄两国突然进行海军合作,问题就在于南中国海形势的激化。此外,美国和菲律宾也在那里搞军演。俄中军演在某种程度上是对这些事实做出的一定反应。俄军事分析家根纳季·叶夫斯塔菲耶夫上将认为:“美国把自己的军政力量重心转移到亚太地区,准备与中国对抗。今天在亚太海域发生的许多事件在某种程度上正是与这种对抗紧密相连。”[45]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 俄罗斯进一步重视多边场合下的亚太外交。俄罗斯外长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫指出,2011年俄罗斯强化了针对亚洲的政策,这不是迫于现实政治形势,而是为了逐步实现“提升我国在亚太地区地位的战略方针”,包括把俄罗斯,首先是把东西伯利亚和远东地区同亚太地区的一体化有效融合。俄罗斯在金砖集团模式下加强了平等互利和多层面合作并发展了同亚洲主要国家的关系,特别重视与中国和印度发展战略合作伙伴关系,加深了同日本、韩国、东盟以及亚太地区其他国家的多层面合作,与美国一道参加了东亚峰会[46]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 展望未来,俄罗斯将进一步参与“东盟+1”、东亚峰会、东盟安全论坛、金砖国家会议、朝鲜半岛“六方会谈”、上海合作组织等亚太多边机制的活动。与东盟进行多边能源合作是俄罗斯加强在亚太经济影响力的重要手段。新加坡国际关系研究所所长西蒙·泰等在《全球政治中的俄罗斯》杂志发文指出,俄罗斯以往对东南亚及东盟的兴趣不是很大,因此俄罗斯要通过东盟加强与东南亚国家的关系[47]。莫斯科亚太研究中心叶甫根尼·卡纳耶夫指出,在不久的将来,特别是在东西伯利亚—太平洋运输管线于2012年投入使用之后,俄罗斯将在保障亚太地区能源安全方面发挥越来越大的作用;俄中斯科沃罗季诺—大庆输油管线的运营将使俄罗斯可能向东南亚出口石油[48]。拉蒙·佩德罗萨表示,俄罗斯与东南亚地区贸易、能源、旅游往来日益紧密,俄罗斯与东盟关系或将进入蜜月期[49]。</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> 2012年9月弗拉迪沃斯托克亚太经济合作组织(APEC)峰会的筹备工作已经开始,将促进俄罗斯加速远东地区经济发展计划的实现,并使俄罗斯更积极地融入亚太地区的经济生活以及一体化进程中。梅德韦杰夫在《一体化为发展,创新为繁荣》一文中写道,打击恐怖主义和跨国犯罪是俄罗斯2012年在担任亚太经济合作组织轮值主席国期间的首要任务;建议亚太经合组织成员国在战胜自然和人为灾害方面加强合作;亚太经合组织经济体需要加强努力,提高对灾害的警惕性[49]。远东研究所专家安德烈·沃罗金认为,对于作为亚太议会论坛主席国的俄罗斯来说,主要的任务是要更积极地融入到亚太地区。他说:“如果考虑将俄罗斯纳入到亚洲自由贸易区,将为俄罗斯的发展打开一扇富有前景的大门。”俄罗斯亚太研究中心维切斯拉夫·阿米洛夫认为:“俄罗斯想利用外来投资、外国知识、和国际贸易的优势,来发展本地区的社会经济。对于伙伴国家来说,我们的优势首先在于自然资源和旅游资源。俄罗斯有可能与本地区其他国家构建互利的链条。而议会之间合作的加强,是对俄罗斯作为亚太经合组织峰会主办国工作的一种很好的补充。”[50]</span><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> </span><strong style="line-height: 28px;"> 【注释】</strong><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><br style="line-height: 28px;" /><span style="line-height: 28px;"> </span><span style="line-height: 28px;">①由于美国从未离开亚太,美国“重返”亚太的提法具有强调和标新立异的意味,有学者认为应称“重构”,美国学者则开始用“再平衡”代替。“再平衡”包括:美国军队再平衡其全球力量,将力量从其他地区调到亚洲,并在亚太地区内部实现再平衡,减少集中在东北亚的力量,将其部署到全地区比较分散的地方。参见外媒:美国亚太政策寻求“再平衡”〔EB/OL〕http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-05/04/c_123075386.htm。</span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><br /></span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><br /></span><span style="line-height: 28px;"> ②中国学者王缉思与美国学者李侃如在《中关战略互疑:解析与应对》的报告中归纳出中美战略互疑的三大来源。参见王缉思,李侃如.中美战略互疑:解析与应对〔N〕.东方早报,2012-04-05。</span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><br /></span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><br /></span><span style="line-height: 28px;"> ③美俄1991年签署的《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》(又称《第一阶段削减战略武器条约》,START-I)于2009年12月5日失效,续约谈判于2009年4月启动,双方于2011年初签订了新一轮《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》。</span><span style="line-height: 28px;"><br 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<span style="background-color: white; font-family: 宋体; line-height: 28px;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>程春华,北京大学国际关系学院博士后研究人员</i></span></span><br />
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<a href="http://www.cssn.cn/news/643598.htm" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yXrtQf75Cb0/UPYZkEt2nGI/AAAAAAAAFp4/VAB-hdRigAU/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: 宋体; line-height: 28px;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i><br /></i></span></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-83128861318277537942013-01-15T20:37:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:15.972-08:00Hillary Clinton:美国的太平洋世纪(America's Pacific Century)<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">Hillary Clinton</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2011年11月</span></span></span>FOREIGN POLICY</span><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><img border="0" height="162" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-gPWG3lANsIg/UPYtY_ClkwI/AAAAAAAAFrE/VqIIWB1NMfc/s200/Hillary_Clinton_official_Secretary_of_State_portrait_crop-479x386.jpg" width="200" /></span></a></div><em style="background-color: white; color: #252525; font-family: 'Lucida Grande', Arial, Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 20px;">The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.</em><br /><span style="background-color: white; color: #1f1f1f; line-height: 23.149999618530273px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over t<b>he next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region</b>.</span></span><br /><a name='more'></a><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics</b>. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, <b>a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits</b>.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, <b>our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home</b>. For more than six decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these "come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments. We must do so again.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions -- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep -- credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S. Government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of competing headlines in other parts of the world.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As Secretary of State, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">What does that regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed" diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets -- to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this effort, the Obama Administration is guided by three core principles. First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region, demonstrates how the Obama Administration is giving these principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement, including a contribution from the Japanese Government of more than $5 billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional security challenges, as well as information sharing to address cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies Agreement that will enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have agreed on a plan to ensure successful transition of operational control during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership. From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As we update our alliances for new demands, we are also building new partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course, China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral issues, from security to energy to human rights.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look to Beijing to overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime security and cybersecurity.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China Sea.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as assurances that the $50 billion of American capital invested in China will create a strong foundation for new market and investment opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance, predictability, and broader prosperity.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues that a deep respect for international law and a more open political system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to grow in the years ahead.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests. There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future -- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in understanding each other's perspectives and interests.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Even as we strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace, stability, and prosperity.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of international law.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution, setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual, regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and valued member of the global marketplace.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of "minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are setting our sights as well on enhancing coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects international stability and commerce but also advances our values.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Our emphasis on the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific. The region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim totaled $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much that favors us as we think through this repositioning.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out: They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these principles and showing the world their value.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more open markets, fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Asia's remarkable economic growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats it poses to the region and beyond.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In the last decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources, there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century opportunity for us.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is already having profound global consequences, and the United States is committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms. Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of these regions demands American engagement and leadership.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #252525; line-height: 20px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.</span></div><br /><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yXrtQf75Cb0/UPYZkEt2nGI/AAAAAAAAFp4/VAB-hdRigAU/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a><br /><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><br /><div style="border: 0px; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="color: #990000; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: large;"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 28px;">希拉里·克林顿:</span><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 28px;">美国的太平洋世纪</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">随着伊拉克战争接近尾声以及美国开始从阿富汗撤军,美国现在处于一个转折点。在过去10年中,我们向上述两个战区投入了巨大的资源。在今后10年中,我们对在哪里投入时间和精力需要做到灵活并有系统性,从而让我们自己处于最有利的地位,以保持我们的领导作用,保障我们的利益,推进我们的价值观。因此,今后10年美国外交方略的最重要的使命之一将是把大幅增加的投入——在外交、经济、战略和其他方面——锁定于亚太地区。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">亚太地区已成为全球政治的一个关键的驱动力。这个地区从印度次大陆一直延伸到美洲西海岸,横跨太平洋和印度洋两个大洋,由于交通运输和战略因素而日益紧密地联系在一起。亚太地区的人口几乎占到世界总人口的一半。这个地区拥有很多全球经济的重要引擎,也有最大的温室气体排放国。该地区有我们的一些重要盟国,还有中国、印度和印度尼西亚等重要的新兴强国。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">在亚太地区建设一个更成熟的安全和经济架构以增进稳定和繁荣之时,美国对这个地区的承诺至关重要。这将有助于建立起上述架构,同时使美国受益,让我们在整个世纪继续发挥领导作用,正如我国在二战过后致力于建立一个全面、持久的跨大西洋的机构和关系网络的努力已获得多倍收益,而且我们还在继续受益。现在正是美国作为一个太平洋大国作出同样投入的时候,<b>这条战略路线是巴拉克.奥巴马总统在本届政府就任之初便确定的</b>,现在已经产生效益。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">由于伊拉克和阿富汗仍处于过渡时期,我们本国也面临着严重的经济挑战,<b>美国政坛上有些人叫我们不要重新定位,而是掉头回家</b>。他们寻求减少我们的国外参与,主张优先解决紧迫的国内问题。这些冲动是可以理解的,但也是受到误导的。那些说我们不能再继续参与全球事务的人完全是本末倒置——不参与的后果远非我们所能承受。从为美国企业打开新市场到遏制核扩散,再到保持商务和航运的自由通行,<b>我们在国外的工作正是我们国内繁荣和安全的关键所在</b>。60多年来,美国顶住了此类“回家”论调的牵引力和这些论点所隐含的零和逻辑。我们必须再次这样做。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在我们的边界之外,人们也在揣测美国的意图,不知道我们是否愿意继续参与并发挥领导作用。在亚洲,他们问我们是否真的会长期驻留,我们是否有可能再次因别处发生的事件而转移注意力,我们是否能够作出——并保持——可信的经济和战略承诺,以及我们是否能够以行动来落实这些承诺。答案是:我们能够而且一定会这样做。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">利用亚洲的增长和活力是美国的经济和战略利益的核心,也是奥巴马总统确定的一项首要任务。亚洲开放的市场为美国进行投资、贸易及获取尖端技术提供了前所未有的机遇。我国国内的经济复苏将取决于出口和美国公司开发亚洲广阔和不断增长的消费基群的能力。在战略上,无论是通过捍卫南中国海的航行自由、应对北韩的扩散问题还是确保该地区主要国家的军事活动的透明度,保障整个亚太地区的和平与安全对全球的发展越来越至关重要。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">正如亚洲对美国的未来极其重要一样,一个积极参与的美国对亚洲的未来也极其重要。该地区渴求我们的领导作用和我们的商业贸易——也许比现代史上任何时期都更迫切。我们是在该地区拥有一个强大的联盟网络的唯一大国,没有领土方面的野心,却有维护共同利益的长期业绩。与我们的盟友一起,我们几十年来保障了地区安全——在亚洲的海上航道巡逻并维护稳定——这反过来又帮助创造了经济增长的条件。我们通过刺激经济生产力、增进社会权益及扩大人民与人民之间的联系,已经帮助整个地区数十亿人融入全球经济。我们是一个主要的贸易和投资伙伴、让太平洋两岸的工人和企业受益的创新源泉、每年接待35万亚洲学生的东道国、以及开放市场的先行者和普世人权的倡导者。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">奥巴马总统在整个美国政府部门领导了一项多方面的、坚持不懈的努力,充分支持我们在太平洋地区不可替代的作用。这常常是一种默默无闻的努力。我们的很多工作并没有成为头版新闻,不仅因为工作的性质——长期投资不如眼前的危机更引人注目——还因为世界其他地区不断爆出头条新闻。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">作为国务卿,我打破传统,在首次正式出国访问时便前往亚洲。在随后的七次行程中,我有幸亲眼看到该地区发生的迅速转变,突显了美国的未来与亚太地区的未来是多么紧密地交织在一起。从战略上转向该地区,在理念上与我们保障和保持美国的全球领导力的总体努力一致。这一转变的成功要求两党必须保持并增进关于亚太地区对我们国家利益的重要意义的共识;我们寻求发扬几十年来两党历届总统和国务卿所开创的参与世界事务的深厚传统。这还要求必须明智地推行一项连贯一致并能兼顾我们各项决策的全球性影响的区域战略。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">这种区域战略是个什么样子?首先,它要求长期地致力于我所说的“前沿部署”(forward-deployed)外交。这意味着继续把我们的各种外交资源——包括我们最高级别的官员、我们的发展专家、我们的跨部门团队和我们的永久资产——分派到亚太地区的每个国家和每个角落。我们的战略必须顾及并适应在亚洲各地不断出现的迅速和显著的变化。鉴于这一点,我们的工作将遵循六个关键的行动方针:加强双边安全联盟;深化我们与新兴大国的工作关系,其中包括中国;参与区域性多边机构;扩大贸易和投资;打造一种有广泛基础的军事存在;促进民主和人权。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">由于我们独一无二的地理特点,美国既是大西洋国家,也是太平洋大国。我们对与欧洲的伙伴关系及其一切成果感到自豪。我们现在的挑战是建立跨太平洋的伙伴关系和机构网,使之与我们的跨大西洋网络一样持久,并与美国的利益和价值观一致。对于我们在所有这些方面的努力,这是一个试金石。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们与日本、韩国、澳大利亚、菲律宾和泰国的条约联盟是我们转向亚太战略的支点。这些联盟已经确保了半个多世纪的地区和平与安全,为该地区引人注目的经济崛起构建了有利的环境。在安全挑战不断演变之际,它们充分利用我们的地区存在,增强我们的地区领导力。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">尽管这些联盟非常成功,但我们不能仅满足于维持这种关系,而需要不断更新以适应日新月异的世界。在这方面,奥巴马政府以三项核心原则为指引。首先,我们必须在我们联盟的核心目标上保持政治共识。其次,我们必须确保我们的联盟具有灵活性和适应能力,以便成功应对新的挑战和把握新的机遇。第三,我们必须保证我们联盟的防御能力和通讯基础设施在运作上和物质上能够切实阻遏各种各样的国家和非国家实体的挑衅。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">与日本的联盟是该地区和平与稳定的基石,它表明奥巴马政府如何贯彻这些原则。从航行自由到开放市场和公平竞争,我们对稳定的地区秩序和清晰的通行规则怀有共同的愿景。我们已达成一项新的约定,其内容包括由日本政府出资50多亿美元,以确保美国军队长久驻防日本,同时扩大联合的情报、监测和侦察活动,从而阻遏对地区安全的挑战并迅速作出反应,以及共享情报以应对网络安全威胁。我们已缔结开放天空协定,用以增进企业接触和民众联系;启动关于亚太事务的战略对话,并作为阿富汗的两个最大捐助国携手合作。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">同样,我们与韩国的联盟正在加强,操作上越来越一体化,并且继续发展两国的联合能力,以阻遏和应对北韩的挑衅。我们已就一项计划达成协议,确保操作控制权在战时成功过渡,并预期《韩美自由贸易协定》(Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement)将获顺利通过。通过我们在20国集团(G-20)与核安全峰会(Nuclear Security Summit)的合作,以及我们在海地和阿富汗的共同行动,我们的联盟已走向全球化。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">我们也在扩大与澳大利亚的联盟,把我们的关系从一种太平洋伙伴关系扩展到跨越印度洋和太平洋的伙伴关系,实际上,这已经是全球性的伙伴关系。从网络安全到阿富汗,从阿拉伯觉醒到加强亚太的地区架构,澳大利亚的建议和投入都是不可或缺的。在东南亚,我们正在续延和加强与菲律宾和泰国的联盟,例如增加舰船到访菲律宾的次数,通过我们在棉兰老岛(Mindanao)的联合特别行动队(Joint Special Operations Task Force)确保成功训练菲律宾反恐部队。在我们历史最悠久的亚洲条约伙伴泰国,我们正努力建立太平洋地区的区域人道主义和赈灾活动中枢。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在根据新的需要更新联盟关系的同时,我们也在建立新的伙伴关系以解决共同面临的问题。我们主动扩展与中国、印度、印度尼西亚、新加坡、新西兰、马来西亚、蒙古、越南、文莱和太平洋岛国的关系,这些都是更广泛的努力的一部分,旨在确保美国在该地区奉行更全面的战略和参与。我们正邀请这些新伙伴与我们一起构建一套基于规则的区域及全球秩序并参与其中。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">当然,这些新伙伴中最引人瞩目的国家之一是中国。与以往获得发展的许多国家一样,作为美国帮助建立和努力维续的基于规则的开放系统的组成部份,中国也实现了繁荣发展。今天,与中国的关系是美国有史以来必须管理的最具挑战性和影响最大的双边关系之一,需要进行审慎、稳定、动态的管理。我们对中国的方针是立足现实,注重成效,忠实于我们的原则和利益。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">众所周知,担忧和误解仍然在太平洋两岸徘徊不去。我们国内的一些人把中国的进步视为对美国的威胁;而在中国的一些人担心美国会试图遏制中国的发展。我们反对上述两种观点。事实是,一个欣欣向荣的美国对中国有利;一个欣欣向荣的中国也对美国有利。通过合作而不是对抗,我们两国均能显著获益。但是,不能仅靠愿望来建设两国关系。它需要我们双方更加始终如一地把积极的言词转化成有效的合作,而且更关键的是,我们必须履行各自的全球责任与义务。今后我们之间的关系是否能发挥潜能正是取决于这些因素。我们也必须坦诚对待我们之间的分歧。在我们从事我们必须为之共同努力的紧迫工作时,我们将坚定并果断地解决这些问题。同时,我们也必须避免那些不切实际的期望。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在最近的两年半中,我的重点工作之一是确定并扩大我们两国具有共同利益的领域,与中国一起努力建立互信,并鼓励中国在解决全球性难题时采取积极行动。这也是财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)和我启动两国间战略与经济对话(Strategic and Economic Dialogue)的原因,这一对话把两国的数十个机构汇集到一起,磋商最为紧迫的双边问题,包括安全、能源和人权问题在内,是两国政府间迄今最具深度与广度的对话。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们还努力增加透明度,降低两国军队之间发生误判与失误的风险。美国与国际社会看到了中国进行军事现代化及扩充军备的努力,我们希望中国澄清这样做的意图。两国军队之间的交往可增进透明度,双方都将从这种持久和实质性的交往中获益。因此,我们期待北京克服时有的勉强态度,与我们一起努力建立一个可持久的军队与军队间的对话机制。此外,我们必须共同努力来加强战略安全对话(Strategic Security Dialogue),这一对话把军队和文职领导人汇集到一起,讨论诸如海事安全和网络安全等敏感问题。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在我们共同努力建立互信的同时,我们决心与中国一起共同应对至关重要的地区性与全球性安全问题。因此,我经常——往往是在非正式场合——与我的中国同行戴秉国国务委员和杨洁篪外长会面,就北韩、阿富汗、巴基斯坦和伊朗问题以及南中国海的开发等重要挑战进行坦率磋商。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在经济领域,美国与中国必须密切合作以保障全球未来的强劲、可持续且平衡的发展。在全球经历了金融危机后,美国与中国通过20国集团有效地合作,合力把全球经济从濒于崩溃的境地挽回。我们必须继续增进这种合作。美国企业需要公平的机会向中国日益扩大的市场出口,扩大出口将能增加在美国本土的就业机会,同时保证美国在中国的500亿美元投资能够为有助于增强在全球的竞争力的新的市场和投资机会奠定一个稳固的基础。同时,中国企业希望能够从美国购买更多的高科技产品,在美国进行更多的投资,并获得与市场经济同等的准入条件。我们能够为实现这些目标共同努力,但中国仍然需要采取重要的改革步骤。具体而言,我们正在努力要求中国停止对美国和其他外国公司或它们的创新技术的不公平的歧视行为;撤除对本国企业的优惠待遇;并终止那些不利于甚或盗取外国知识产权的行为。我们希望中国采取步骤,允许人民币对美元以及对中国其他主要贸易伙伴的货币的汇率更快地升值。我们相信,这些改革将不仅有利于我们两国(这些改革步骤确实将有助于中国实现其包括扩大内需在内的五年计划目标),同时还将有利于全球的经济平衡和可预见性以及更广泛的繁荣。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">当然,我们已在公开和非公开场合十分明确地表示了我们对人权的严正关注。当我们看到有关公益律师、作家、艺术家和其他人员被拘留或失踪的报道时,美国以公开和非公开的方式表达我们对人权的关注。我们向我们的中国同行指出,严格遵守国际法和实行更开放的政治体制将为中国奠定基础,带来更大的稳定与增长,并将增强中国的合作伙伴的信心。否则,中国将给自身发展造成不必要的限制。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">说到底,美中关系的发展没有指导手册可循。然而,利益攸关,不容失败。我们在前进过程中,将继续把同中国的关系置于一个更广泛的地区性的安全同盟、经济网络和社会纽带的框架内。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们将与之密切合作的主要新兴大国包括印度和印度尼西亚。这两国也是亚洲最具活力的重要的民主大国。 奥巴马政府谋求同两国发展更广泛、更深入和更明确的关系。从印度洋经马六甲海峡到太平洋的这一海域分布着世界上最活跃的贸易和能源航道。印度和印度尼西亚两国人口总和已占世界总人口的近四分之一。它们是全球经济的关键动力,是美国的重要合作伙伴,并正在日益成为该地区和平与安全的核心贡献者。它们的重要性很可能在未来与日俱增。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">奥巴马总统去年对印度国会表示,印度与美国之间的关系是21世纪具有决定意义的伙伴合作关系之一,并且基于共同的价值观和利益。双方都仍有一些障碍需要克服,有一些问题有待回答;但是,美国对印度的未来作出的战略性预测是:印度在国际舞台上发挥更大作用将有助于推进和平与安全;印度向世界开放市场将为实现地区乃至世界进一步繁荣铺平道路;印度的科学技术进步将改善人民生活并在各地促进人类知识进步;印度充满活力、多元的民主体制将带来实际成果,改善本国人民的生活,同时激励其他国家走上相似的开放与宽容之路。因此,奥巴马政府扩大了我们的双边关系;积极支持印度的“东向”(Look East)努力,包括与印度和日本的新三边对话;并且勾画出一个以印度为支柱的经济更融合、政治更稳定的南亚和中亚地区的新愿景。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们也在与印度尼西亚缔结新的伙伴合作关系。印尼是世界第三大民主体,是世界上穆斯林人口最多的国家,同时也是20国集团成员。我们已恢复了对印尼特种部队的联合培训,并与该国签署了数项卫生健康、教育交流、科学技术及防务协议。今年,应印尼政府之邀,美国将以奥巴马总统为代表首次参加东亚峰会(East Asia Summit)。不过,还有一段路程要走——我们必须共同努力消除一些官僚障碍、历史遗留的猜疑以及在理解彼此视角与利益上的某些差异。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">即便在我们强化这些双边关系的时候,我们也强调了多边合作的重要性,因为我们认为,解决亚洲如今所面临的这类复杂的跨国挑战需要一系列有能力采取集体行动的机构的参与。亚洲建立起一个更有力、更协调的地区构架将会加强规则与责任体制,包括保护知识产权和确保航运自由,而这将为有效的国际秩序奠定基础。在多边环境下,负责任的行为会赢得合法性并受到尊重,同时让我们可以共同向破坏和平、稳定和繁荣的人追究责任。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">因此,美国已经采取行动全面接触或参与该地区的多边机制,如东南亚国家联盟(Association of Southeast Asian Nations,ASEAN)和亚太经合组织(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,APEC)等。我们知道,我们与地区机制的合作旨在辅助而不是取代我们的双边关系。该地区要求美国在这些机制的议程制定中发挥积极作用——而这些机制富有效力且积极负责也同样符合我们的利益。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">因此,奥巴马总统将于11月第一次参加东亚峰会。作为一项基础工作,美国已在雅加达设立了新的美国驻东盟使团,并与东盟签署了《友好合作条约》(Treaty of Amity and Cooperation)。我们把制定一项更加注重结果的议程作为重点,这对于解决南中国海争端的努力起到了推动作用。在2010年于河内举行的东盟地区论坛(ASEAN Regional Forum)上,美国帮助展开了一项地区性努力,保护各国不受阻碍地进入南中国海及在其间通航,支持在南中国海海域划定领海界限的关键国际规则。鉴于世界二分之一的商用货轮行经这片水域,这是一项影响重大的努力。在过去一年中,我们为保护我们在通航稳定和自由的切身利益方面取得了长足进步,并为对南中国海提出所有权要求的各方展开持久的多边外交铺平了道路,努力确保按照国际法既定的原则和平解决争端。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">我们还努力加强亚太经合组织,使之成为一个致力于推进整个太平洋地区的经济一体化和贸易联系的实质性领导机构。在该组织去年大胆呼吁建立亚太自由贸易区之后,奥巴马总统将于今年11月在夏威夷主持召开2011年亚太经合组织领导人会议。我们致力于巩固亚太经合组织作为亚太地区首屈一指的区域经济机构的作用,制定经济议程,从而带动发达和新兴经济体共同推动开放的贸易和投资,同时建设能力并加强监管机制。亚太经合组织及其从事的工作有助于扩大美国的出口以及在美国创造并扶持高质量的就业机会,同时促进整个亚太地区的经济增长。亚太经合组织还提供了一项关键性手段,推进释放妇女所拥有的经济增长潜能的广泛议程。在这方面,美国致力于与我国的合作伙伴共同采取雄心勃勃的步骤,以加速“参与时代”(Participation Age)的到来——届时每一个人,不分性别或其他特征,都成为为全球市场做出贡献的重要成员。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">除了对这些规模较大的多边机制的承诺外,我们还付出了巨大努力,发起并召开一系列“小型多边”会议,即希望解决具体问题的国家召开的小型会议,例如我们发起的湄公河下游行动计划(Lower Mekong Initiative)。该计划支持柬埔寨、老挝、泰国和越南的教育、卫生和环境项目。再如太平洋岛国论坛,我们在论坛上努力支持其成员应对从气候变化到过度捕捞及通航自由等带来的挑战。我们还着手寻求与蒙古、印度尼西亚、日本、哈萨克斯坦和韩国等不同国家建立新的三边关系的机会。我们也希望在亚太地区的三大强国中国、印度和美国之间推进协调和接触。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">通过所有这些不同的方式,我们力求塑造并参与一个反应迅速、灵活、有效的区域性架构,并确保它与一个更广泛的全球架构连通,该架构不仅保护国际稳定和国际商贸,而且能推进我们的价值观。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们对亚太经合组织的经济工作的重视与我们把经济治理方略提升至美国外交政策一大支柱的更广泛的承诺是一致的。经济进步日益依赖牢固的外交关系,而外交进展则取决于牢固的经济关系。注重增进美国的繁荣也自然而然地意味着更高度地注重太平洋地区的贸易和经济开放。该地区的产出已超过全球总产出的一半,该地区的贸易也占全球总贸易的将近一半。在我们力争实现奥巴马总统到2015年将出口翻一番的目标之时,我们正在寻求在亚洲扩大商务的机会。去年,美国对太平洋沿岸地区的出口总额为3200亿美元,支撑着85万个就业岗位。因此,在我们审议此次重新定位时,有很多对我们有利的因素。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">当我与我的亚洲同行们交谈的时侯,总会有一个主题突显出来:他们仍然希望美国在亚洲地区蓬勃发展的贸易和金融交往中成为一个参与其中并发挥创造性作用的合作伙伴。在我与我国各地企业界领导人的交谈中,我了解到向亚洲蓬勃的市场扩大我们的出口和投资机会对美国是多么的重要。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在今年3月在华盛顿以及后来于7月在香港举行的亚太经合组织会议上,我阐述了我认为健康的经济竞争应当具备的四个特征:开放、自由、透明、公平。通过我们在亚太地区的参与,我们正在帮助落实这些原则,并向世人展现出它们的价值。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们正在谋求达成新型的贸易协议,使之在开拓新市场的同时提升公平竞争的标准。例如,《韩国与美国自由贸易协定》(Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement)将在五年内取消美国95%的消费品和工业出口产品关税,支持大约7万个美国就业岗位。仅消除关税一项就可能为美国出口产品带来100亿美元以上的增长,并促使韩国经济增长6%。它将为美国汽车公司和员工打造出公平的竞争环境。所以,无论你们是美国机械制造商,还是韩国化学品出口商,这项协定都减少了阻碍你们获得新客户的壁垒。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们在建立跨太平洋伙伴关系(Trans-Pacific Partnership)方面也取得了进展。它将使太平洋地区的经济体——无论是发达还是发展中经济体——汇聚一起,形成一个统一贸易体。我们的目标不只是取得更大的增长,还要取得更好的增长。我们认为,贸易协议需要包含对工人、环境、知识产权和创新的严格保护。它们还应该促进信息技术的自由流动和绿色技术的推广普及,提高我们的监管体系的协调性和供应链的效率。我们取得的进步最终要以人民的生活质量为衡量尺度——要看男女公民能否有尊严地工作、获得体面的报酬、抚养健康的家庭、教育子女、并且能够掌握机会改善自己和下一代的命运。我们希望,具有高标准的跨太平洋伙伴关系协议能够成为今后各种协议的一个基准——并且发展成带来更广泛的地区互动的平台,最终形成亚太自由贸易区。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">取得我们贸易关系中的平衡需要有双向的承诺。这是平衡的本质所在——它不能单方面强加于人。因此,我们正在通过亚太经合组织、20国集团和我们的各种双边关系提倡进一步开放市场、减少出口限制、增加透明度、以及对于公平的整体承诺。美国的企业和工人需要对他们在一个公平竞争环境中经营抱有信心,从知识产权到自主创新——一切都有可循之规。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">亚洲经济在过去10年里的非凡增长及其在未来持续增长的潜力依赖于长期的安全与稳定,美国军队——包括5万多名在日本和韩国服役的美国男女军人——为提供这项保障做出了贡献。今天这个快速变化的地区所面临的各种挑战——从领土和海事争端、对航行自由的新威胁、直至自然灾害加剧的影响——要求美国奉行一个在地理分布上更合理、运作上更具弹性、政治上更可持续的军力态势。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们正在把与东北亚地区传统盟友的基地安排现代化——我们对此的承诺坚如磐石;与此同时,我们正在加强我们在东南亚和印度洋地区的存在。例如,美国将在新加坡部署美国濒海战斗舰(U.S. Littoral Combat Ships),我们还在研究增加我们两国军队协同训练和行动机会的其他途径。美国和澳大利亚今年同意探索如何扩大美国在澳大利亚的军事部署,以增加更多的联合训练和演习机会。我们还在审视如何能够增加我们在东南亚和印度洋地区的行动通道及深化我们与盟国和合作伙伴的接触。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">如果我们要适应在该地区面临的新挑战,如何把印度洋和太平洋之间日益增长的关系变成一个操作性理念是我们需要回答的一个问题。在这一背景下,在整个地区作出更广的军事部署将提供极为重要的有利条件。美国将能更好地支持人道救援;同样重要的是,与更多的盟国和伙伴开展合作将提供更强大的保障,以应对各种威胁或破坏地区和平与稳定的行为。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">与我们的军事力量或经济规模相比,我们作为一个国家所拥有的最有影响力的资产是我们的价值观的巨大威力,特别是我们对民主与人权的坚定不移的支持。它显现了我们最深厚的民族性格,是我国外交政策的核心,包括我们向亚太地区的战略转移。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在我们深化与在这些问题上和我们持有不同观点的伙伴的接触时,我们将继续敦促他们实施改善国家治理、保护人权和推进政治自由的改革。例如,我们向越南明确表示,我们发展战略伙伴关系的强烈愿望要求它必须采取步骤进一步保护人权和推进政治自由。再如缅甸,我们决心对那里侵犯人权的行为追究责任。我们密切关注内比都(Nay Pyi Taw)的局势发展及昂山素季(Aung San Suu Kyi)与政府领导层之间不断增加的互动。我们向缅甸政府强调,必须释放政治犯,推进政治自由和人权,同过去的政策决裂。至于北韩,平壤政权一贯漠视其人民的权利,我们继续有力地公开谴责北韩对地区与世界构成的威胁。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们不能也不会寻求将我们的制度强加给别的国家,但我们坚持认为,某些价值观是普遍的——为包括亚洲在内的全世界每个国家的人民所珍视——这些价值观是建设稳定、和平和繁荣的国家不可或缺的条件。最终,应由亚洲人民来追求自己的权利和愿望,就像我们在全世界看到的一样。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在过去10年中,我国外交政策经历了转型,从处理后冷战时期的和平红利到履行在伊拉克和阿富汗作出的巨大承诺。随着这两场战争逐渐平息,我们将需要加快转折,以适应新的全球现实。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们知道这些新的现实要求我们创新、竞争和以新的方式发挥领导作用。我们不应减少对世界事务的参与,而是需要奋勇向前,继续发挥领导作用。毫无疑问,在资源稀缺的时期,我们需要明智地使用这些资源,以期获取最大的回报。这就是为什么亚太地区在21世纪为我们提供真正的机遇的原因。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">当然,其他地区依然十分重要。我国多数传统盟国所在的欧洲仍然是我们首先依赖的伙伴,在几乎每一个紧迫的全球挑战中都与美国并肩努力,我们也正为更新我们的同盟架构投入资源。中东北非人民正在规划一条新的道路,并已产生意义深远的全球影响。随着这一地区发生深刻变化,美国正致力于与之建立积极长久的伙伴关系。在经济与政治发展方面,非洲在未来年代中拥有尚未挖掘的巨大潜力。另外,我们在西半球的邻国不仅是我们最大的出口贸易伙伴,而且在全球经济与政治事务中也正在发挥越来越大的作用。所有这些地区都需要美国的参与和领导。</span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们已经做好发挥领导作用的准备。我知道,有一些人对我们能否在世界上长期保持力量表示怀疑。我们以前就听到过这种言论。越战结束时曾出现一个盛极一时的全球评论员行业,他们竭力宣扬美国在退却,这种论调每几十年就出现一次。但是,无论美国在何时经历挫折,我们都通过发明和创新渡过难关。在现代史上,我们的复兴能力是无与伦比的。它植根于我们的自由民主和自由创业模式,今天,这个模式仍然是人类有史以来最强大的繁荣与进步的源泉。不管我去哪里,人们都告诉我世界依然期待美国发挥领导作用。我们的军力遥遥领先,我们的经济规模远超世界上任何其他国家。我们的工人拥有最强的生产力,我们的大学饮誉全球。因此,毫无疑问,美国有能力在本世纪保障和延续我们的全球领导地位,正如上个世纪一样。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在我们向前推进、为今后60年在亚太地区的参与奠定基础之际,我们不忘过去60年中主导了这种参与的两党传统。目前,我们专注于在国内必须采取的步骤——增加储蓄、改革金融体系、减少对举债的依赖、化解两党的争议——以获得和保持我们在国外的领导地位。</span></span></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><br /></div><div style="border: 0px; color: #323e32; line-height: 21px; list-style: none; margin-bottom: 5px; padding: 0px; word-break: normal; word-wrap: normal;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">这种转折远非易事,但我们在过去两年半的时间里已经为之铺平了道路,我们有决心完成这个转折,这是我们这个时代最重要的外交努力之一。</span></span></div><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13.63636302947998px; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"><br /></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-30439745887479907232013-01-09T05:42:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:17.665-08:00约瑟夫·奈:The World in 2030 <div style="text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">作者</span><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #414142;">约瑟夫·奈</span><span style="color: #414142; font-size: small;"> </span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> 2013年1月9日</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #414142; line-height: 15px;">Project Syndicate</span></span></div><a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-international-order-in-20-years-by-joseph-s--nye" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="112" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wmeeIxuRqc0/UO107iOgLhI/AAAAAAAAFHU/H6QGBFeHX2Y/s200/Joseph+Nye.jpg" width="200" /></a><br /><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">CAMBRIDGE – What will the world look like two decades from now? Obviously, nobody knows, but some things are more likely than others. Companies and governments have to make informed guesses, because some of their investments today will last longer than 20 years. In December, the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) published its guess: <a href="http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf">Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds</a>.</span></span></div><a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The NIC foresees a transformed world, in which “no country – whether the US, China, or any other large country – will be a hegemonic power.” This reflects four “megatrends”: individual empowerment and the growth of a global middle class; diffusion of power from states to informal networks and coalitions; demographic changes, owing to urbanization, migration, and aging; and increased demand for food, water, and energy.</span><br /><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Each trend is changing the world and “largely reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia’s weight in the global economy, and ushering in a new era of ‘democratization’ at the international and domestic level.” The US will remain “first among equals” in hard and soft power, but “the ‘unipolar moment’ is over.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It is never safe, however, to project the future just by extrapolating current trends. Surprise is inevitable, so the NIC also identifies what it calls “game-changers,” or outcomes that could drive the major trends off course in surprising ways.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First among such sources of uncertainty is the global economy: will volatility and imbalances lead to collapse, or will greater multipolarity underpin greater resilience? Similarly, will governments and institutions be able to adapt fast enough to harness change, or will they be overwhelmed by it?<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Moreover, while interstate conflict has been declining, intrastate conflict driven by youthful populations, identity politics, and scarce resources will continue to plague some regions like the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. And that leads to yet another potentially game-changing issue: whether regional instability remains contained or fuels global insecurity.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Then there is a set of questions concerning the impact of new technologies. Will they exacerbate conflict, or will they be developed and widely accessible in time to solve the problems caused by a growing population, rapid urbanization, and climate change?<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The final game-changing issue is America’s future role. In the NIC’s view, the multi-faceted nature of US power suggests that even as China overtakes America economically – perhaps as early as the 2020’s – the US will most likely maintain global leadership alongside other great powers in 2030. “The potential for an overstretched US facing increased demands,” the NIC argues, “is greater than the risk of the US being replaced as the world’s preeminent political leader.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Is this good or bad for the world? In the NIC’s view, “a collapse or sudden retreat of US power would most likely result in an extended period of global anarchy,” with “no stable international system and no leading power to replace the US.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The NIC discussed earlier drafts of its report with intellectuals and officials in 20 countries, and reports that none of the world’s emerging powers has a revisionist view of international order along the lines of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union. But these countries’ relations with the US are ambiguous. They benefit from the US-led world order, but are often irritated by American slights and unilateralism. One attraction of a multipolar world is less US dominance; but the only thing worse than a US-supported international order would be no order at all.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The question of America’s role in helping to produce a more benign world in 2030 has important implications for President Barack Obama as he approaches his second term. The world faces a new set of transnational challenges, including climate change, transnational terrorism, cyber insecurity, and pandemics. All of these issues require cooperation to resolve.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy argues that the US must think of power as positive-sum, not just zero-sum. In other words, there may be times when a more powerful China is good for the US (and for the world). For example, the US should be eager to see China increase its ability to control its world-leading greenhouse-gas emissions.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has referred to the Obama administration’s foreign policy as being based on “smart power,” which combines hard and soft power resources, and she argues that we should not talk about “multipolarity,” but about “multi-partnerships.” Likewise, the NIC report suggests that Americans must learn better how to exercise power with as well as over other states.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">To be sure, on issues arising from interstate military relations, understanding how to form alliances and balance power will remain crucial. But the best military arrangements will do little to solve many of the world’s new transnational problems, which jeopardize the security of millions of people at least as much as traditional military threats do. Leadership on such issues will require cooperation, institutions, and the creation of public goods from which all can benefit and none can be excluded.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The NIC report rightly concludes that there is no predetermined answer to what the world will look like in 2030. Whether the future holds benign or malign scenarios depends in part on the policies that we adopt today.</span><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-international-order-in-20-years-by-joseph-s--nye"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Qb9qPIhXEBA/UO1w8mxWOHI/AAAAAAAAFGQ/wuBjqXItxOg/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span style="color: #990000; font-size: large;">约瑟夫·奈:2030年的世界 </span></span></div><br /><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">20</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">年后世界将会怎样?显然这个问题没有人能回答,但发生某些情况的概率较高。企业和政府必须根据现有情况作出猜测,因为今天的某些投资将会延续到</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">20</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">年以后。</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">12</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">月,美国国家情报委员会(</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">NIC</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">)发表了题为《全球趋势</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">2030</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">:另类世界》的预测报告。</span><br /><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">国家情报委员会预测未来世界将脱胎换骨,<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>无论美、中还是其他大国,任何国家都不能再成为霸权力量</b>。<span lang="EN-US">”</span>这是以下四大<span lang="EN-US">“</span>趋势<span lang="EN-US">”</span>的体现:个人授权和全球中产阶级成长;国家权力分散到非正式的网络和联盟;城市化、移民和老龄化造成的人口结构变化;以及日益增长的粮食、水及能源需求。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">各项趋势都在改变世界,并<span lang="EN-US">“</span>在很大程度上逆转<span lang="EN-US">1750</span>年以来西方的历史性崛起,恢复亚洲在全球经济中所占的地位,并在国际和国内迎来<span lang="EN-US">‘</span>民主化<span lang="EN-US">’</span>的新时代。<span lang="EN-US">”</span>美国仍将在硬实力和软实力两方面首当其冲,但是<span lang="EN-US">“‘</span><b>单极时代<span lang="EN-US">’</span>已经不复存在</b>。<span lang="EN-US">”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">但凭借当今趋势预测未来从来都谈不上准确。出人意料的情况不可避免,因此国家情报委员会还指出了所谓的<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>意外因素</b><span lang="EN-US">”</span>,也就是能以出人意料的方式导致主流趋势偏离的结果。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">全球经济是首当其冲的不确定因素:经济波动和失衡能否导致崩溃,多极化能否加强经济的弹性?同样,政府和机构能否迅速适应变化并为我所用,还是会被淹没在应接不暇的变化之中?<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">此外,尽管国与国间的冲突日益减少,但青年民众、身份政治和稀缺资源所导致的国内矛盾却将持续困扰中东、南亚和非洲。这将继而引发有可能改变全局的另一个因素:能否抑制地区动荡,还是为全球局势火上浇油。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">此外还有与新技术影响有关的一系列问题。它们是会加剧冲突,还是能及时完成研究和推广以解决人口增长、快速城市化和气候变化所导致的问题?<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国未来扮演的角色是<b>最后一个能改变全局的因素</b>。在国家情报委员会看来,<b>美国实力的多面性表明即使中国最早于<span lang="EN-US">2020</span>年代在经济上超过美国,也很可能无法撼动<span lang="EN-US">2030</span>年美国和其他大国同处全球领导地位</b>。国家情报委员会指出,<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>美国在日益增长的要求面前过度扩张的潜在风险远大于其世界杰出政治领袖地位旁落的可能性</b>。<span lang="EN-US">”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">这对世界各国来讲是福是祸?在国家情报委员会看来,<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>美国力量的崩溃或突然撤出极有可能导致全球陷入长时间的无政府状态</b>,<span lang="EN-US">”</span>,<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>美国稳定和领导国际体系的作用无可取代</b>。<span lang="EN-US">”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">国家情报委员会同<span lang="EN-US">20</span>个国家的知识分子和官员探讨了这份报告的早期版本,称世界上没有哪个新兴国像<b>纳粹德国</b>、<b>日本帝国</b>或<b>苏联</b>那样修正主义地看待国际秩序。<b>但这些国家与美国的关系却非常暧昧。他们受惠于美国领导的世界秩序,但同时对美国的傲慢无礼和单边主义颇有微词</b>。多极化世界的优点之一是美国的主导地位有所削弱,但唯一逊于美国所主导国际秩序的是根本没有国际秩序。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">到<span lang="EN-US">2030</span>年美国在创造良性世界中所起的作用对奥巴马总统的第二任任期具有重要的意义。世界正面对着<b>气候变化、跨国恐怖主义</b>、<b>网络风险</b>和<b>流行病</b>等一系列新的跨国挑战。所有这些问题都需要合作才能解决。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">奥巴马<span lang="EN-US">2010<span lang="EN-US"><span lang="EN-US">年国家安全战略</span></span></span>指出<b>美国应当将实力视为正和而非零和</b>。换句话讲,<b>中国强大有时可能对美国(和世界)都有好处</b>。比如,<b>美国应当乐于见到中国对其领先世界的温室气体排放加强控制</b>。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国国务卿希拉里<span lang="EN-US">·</span>克林顿曾经谈到综合硬实力和软实力的<span lang="EN-US">“</span>巧实力<span lang="EN-US">”</span>才是奥巴马政府外交政策的基础,并提出我们应当重视<span lang="EN-US">“</span><b>多边伙伴关系</b><span lang="EN-US">”</span>,<b>而不是<span lang="EN-US">“</span>多极化<span lang="EN-US">”</span></b>。同样,国家情报委员会的报告表明美国人必须更好地学会如何针对他国并与他国一道行使权力。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">可以肯定,在国与国军事关系所引发的问题上,了解如何结成联盟并平衡力量意义事关重大。但最精心的军事安排恐怕也对解决世界全新跨国问题无能为力,而这些问题给成百上千万人带来的安全威胁丝毫不亚于传统的军事事务。解决这些问题需要合作、体制,还需要能让所有人受益的公共利益得到弘扬。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">国家情报委员会报告就此顺理成章得出结论,<b><span lang="EN-US">2030</span>年的世界局势如何并不存在既定的答案</b>。未来是美好还是黯淡将部分取决于我们今天所实行的政策。</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><br /><div data-line-id="2bee930246f86fe811add288" style="background-color: white; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 15px; margin-top: 5px; padding: 0px;"><strong>翻译:Xu Binbin</strong></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-international-order-in-20-years-by-joseph-s--nye/chinese" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Qb9qPIhXEBA/UO1w8mxWOHI/AAAAAAAAFGQ/wuBjqXItxOg/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div data-line-id="2bee930246f86fe811add288" style="background-color: white; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 15px; margin-top: 5px; padding: 0px;"><strong><br /></strong></div><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 15px;"><br /></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-4907328394652887942013-01-09T01:51:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:17.750-08:00John Kerry:US-China Partnership Important For Economic Stability, Growth<span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">John Kerry</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2011年10月6日</span></span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 22.378787994384766px; text-align: justify;">John Kerry</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> 網站</span><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:RoUqPhWPrKgJ:www.kerry.senate.gov/press/release/%3Fid%3Dcfcf0459-2884-47ca-88b8-519feffb8f71+&cd=1&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&gl=tw" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="125" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-18kOffp6zoU/UO1wNUVEO8I/AAAAAAAAFGI/p2BBN2f9JcI/s200/john+kerry.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><span style="color: #333333; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) today spoke from the floor of the United States Senate to address the current debate surrounding the Chinese currency bill.</span><br /><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">“China is an important partner of the United States in a lot of ways. It's also a major investor in the United States,” said Sen. Kerry. “So I don't think that we're here to rupture that relationship. I think we're here to send a message to the Chinese about the urgent need to repair it. We want a mutually beneficial partnership, an equitable partner that will pay dividends for both countries and I believe if we listen to each other and work in good faith we can make that happen, and we can enter into a better framework of cooperation that inures to the benefit and the stability and the leadership demands of both of our countries.”</span></span><br /><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><em style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The full text of his speech, as delivered, is below:</span></span></em></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I’ll use under the one hour. I won't use all of that by any means. Mr. President, this is obviously an issue that's more complicated than the debate here may have indicated at all moments, at least. And I think that there are complicated and long-standing frustrations that have built up in a lot of senators and a lot of people in America that bring us here to this moment on the floor.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have a reluctance to see us engage in an effort that I think can put other efforts at risk in certain ways. But on the other hand, I have voted to allow and help this legislation to reach the point of post-cloture because I think it's an important debate because I think China needs to carefully think about and process the substance of what people are saying here on the floor of the United States Senate.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">This is a very complicated relationship with enormous interests on both sides for us to avoid confrontation in a lot of different ways, a lot of different kinds of confrontation. Trade, physical confrontation in the South China Sea and the straits and elsewhere, confrontations over human rights in Tibet and other issues. There are a lot of issues at play. But with respect to the trade issue, China has a huge interest in the United States of America being able to export more effectively to China. China has an interest in its middle class growing in its purchasing power and expressing that purchasing power through consumption.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">One of the things China needs is its own higher level of domestic consumption. It's saving too much. And one of the reasons it saves too much is it doesn't have a safety net structure of any kind really. So people do save. That’s the nature of life there. But at the same time China, I think, is seeing a slowdown of its own economy now. And one of the reasons for the slowdown in China's economy is the fact that we have had a slowdown in our economy and in our ability to consume the goods brought in from China, so it all is interconnected. China's also our biggest banker, and China is critical to our ability to deal with our current economic challenge in many ways, and Europe's, I might add, both Europe and the United States would benefit significantly with a new trade relationship with China. And that's what I want to talk about for a moment.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">I believe in trade. I have supported trade here. I don't believe in unequal trade. I don't believe in unfair trade. I believe in enforcing the agreements we have. If you look at NAFTA, for instance, NAFTA had side agreements, side agreements on the environment, side agreements on labor standards, and they were never enforced. And people have a right to be angry if they see an agreement that's made and then parts of it are enforced, parts of it are not, and they see their job go overseas, whether it's in North Carolina or Georgia or Massachusetts or Ohio or any other place in our country. So I think it's important to have trade that's fair and sensible. You're not going to grow your economy trading with yourself. No way. Particularly if your overall population growth isn't growing that fast and you're a mature economy, economics just doesn't work that way. You need you are in you need newer markets and other places to expand. So I think that it's important for us to recognize that the world's trading system only works if the participants treat each other fairly.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Over the last decade, our national debate on the costs and benefits of trade has intensified, and frankly the uneasy alliance, the uneasy -- I think I would call it sort of uneasy consensus that had been created from the 1980's forward with respect to trade is being frayed right now, is being frayed for understandable and clearly definable reasons. The American worker is not seeing their wages go up. There are a lot of reasons for that. The unfairness of our tax code, the inability of people in America today to be able to bargain the way they used to and the lack of an NLRB and a Court that upholds the rights of labor to be able to negotiate, a whole bunch of reasons why people are disadvantaged today. And one of them is the fact that you have this unfair competition. So in order to keep the consensus which allows Americans to say yeah, trade is a good thing, it's got to be a good thing, and to be a good thing, it's got to be fair and it's got to result in people's lives being improved by it, meaning their wages go up, their jobs can get better, their opportunities are greater.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Everything has been working in the opposite direction, and I think that's why so many of our colleagues feel a responsibility to come to the floor on this legislation and make sure that China and others hear from the American people loudly and clearly. We did this before on a vote that we took on currency legislation back in 2005. I think China heard us then, and China began slowly to allow the value of its currency to begin to fluctuate rather than keeping it pegged tightly to the dollar. China's taken measures. China's -- in fairness, China's currency has appreciated over the course of the last few years. Some argue exactly how much, somewhere in the vicinity of 27%, maybe 7% the last year, but it's not fast enough. It's still not fair enough. And the fact is that there are other Chinese trade tactics that contribute to our increasing trade deficit with china, not just currency.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Unfortunately, our efforts through multilateral institutions, nobody can point a finger at the United States and suggest that we haven't played by the rules or that we haven't gone to the global institutions in order to try to resolve these differences. We have gone to the World Trade Organization, and we have won sort of step by step, slowly but slowly. But if your tactic is to just keep in this highly mercantilistic focus of China to keep on taking advantage of everything you can and you get a little nibble here and there at the W.T.O., a little nibble over there, that's really just an inconvenience on the road to a kind of trade domination that is bad for everybody. So that's why I’m here today, that's why I have voted for this legislation to come to the floor to have this debate.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">This debate is an imperfect stand-in for the broader discussion that we need to have about our economic relationship with China. The truth is that our bilateral relationship is both filled with promise and plagued by complex challenges that we have to overcome for the good of both countries. The Chinese market is a huge and growing opportunity for American firms, obviously, and despite the hurdles to entry -- and there are hurdles -- China is still our fastest growing export market today. People better think about this as we go forward. I am convinced that the key to America pulling itself out of this economic challenge we're in today and the key to Europe pulling itself out is for the United States and Europe to actually work out almost formally a new and better relationship with respect to trade with China as well as with the other fast-developing countries -- Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, India. Because if those societies will allow us adequate entry to market, and if those societies will purchase more from Europe and the United States, then we will export more, manufacture more, come out of the economic doldrums, and that reverberates to China's benefit also because their investments in the United States become more secure because our debt goes down because we have a stronger economy and because we're watching more in return from them. What goes around comes around.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">So my hope is that we can agree on fair terms and conditions for trade with these rising powers, and if we do, we will create jobs. It's the fastest way we have to create jobs and pull out of our economic doldrums today. The simplest, fastest, most obvious way to do this is to be able to access those other markets rapidly with American goods and begin to restore confidence to the marketplace so that people believe they will get a larger return on investment and begin to reinvest in job creation and in the marketplace. The current trade model that we're operating under with massive U.S. trade deficits, enormous Chinese trade surpluses is not only unfair, it's unsustainable. So we have got to rebalance that relationship. China's own leaders need to understand that their country's long-term economic health absolutely cannot rest on a subsidized foundation of subsidized exports fueled by an indebted American consumer and the credit card of the American consumer. That is a deathly unvirtuous to use our former chairman of the fed's comments about virtuous and unvirtuous cycles -- it's about as unvirtuous as you could get in that economic relationship.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Now, conflict, in my judgment, is not the best way to resolve our tensions, but making clear how we feel and what we think the reality is and what's important in our relationship is critical. Some of our colleagues have come to the floor to argue that our two countries are already in a trade war. Others have come to the floor to say that this bill is going to trigger one. Mr. President, I don't agree with either of you. I don't think either one of those views are correct. If we were in a real trade war with our largest lender, let me tell you they would be doing a heck of a lot more damage than the misalignment of currency is currently doing to us. And the specific remedy proposed in this legislation is neither as dramatic nor as offensive as some people have said. This is a pretty carefully structured piece of legislation, and I think the language has been chosen in a thoughtful way, and I think the remedies that are available under this bill are not as dramatic as some would suggest. It doesn't propose raising tariffs on all Chinese goods. It only proposes increasing tariffs on those Chinese goods that receive an unfair advantage from an undervalued currency and then compete with American-made goods here in the U.S. It's a pretty limited and targeted message, and that's within our rights. That's within our rights. And if the yuan is properly valued, that will simply not be necessary. That's China's decision, China's choice.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">I would much prefer a negotiated, multilateral solution, as I described, involving this new relationship, the new trade relationship, if you will, on a global basis which I think would send an extraordinary message to a beleaguered Europe, where Greece, as we all know, is basically fundamentally insolvent, needing some kind of a managed structured transition hopefully that avoids a greater crisis in Spain and contagion in their banking system which clearly needs recapitalization, clearly needs more than $440 billion that was put on the table, clearly needs some kind of a rescue fund with some very tight kinds of requirements, not dissimilar to what we did in the united states in 2008, 2009 out of sheer necessity. My hope is they will do that, but nothing would do more to send a message of confidence about the future of job growth than to have this new trade understanding and relationship where responsible partners are behaving responsibly and accepting responsibility for the global marketplace that we all operate in. Not just exploit it but support it. Protect it, nurture it.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Beyond the currency, there are many other sources of tension in our economic relationship, and they need to be resolved, Mr. President. China does not protect our intellectual property in its market adequately, and that's almost a euphemism. The violations of intellectual property rights, the outright theft on some streets and communities within China, billions of dollars of American design and -- designed and marketed and developed property is shocking, and in addition to that, China imposes artificial regulatory barriers to the entry of many of our goods. It fails to crack down on cyber-attacks, and it has executed a thinly veiled effort to appropriate key foreign technologies. On each of these issues and others, we have been going to the W.T.O., we have been bringing cases and we have been winning those cases, and as I have said, that is not a substitute for this larger fix in the relationship that is critical. I believe that overcoming market access challenges are actually where we ought to be focusing our efforts in China, and also in the other large fast-growing markets, and that, as I have said several times, is really the answer, the quick answer, if you will. We can develop goods, we can invest in companies here, but if we can't sell the goods to more than ourselves, we have got some serious limits on us, and I think it's important for us to be fighting for that market access.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">I believe that to increase our exports, we're going to have to increase our competitiveness here at home and we're going to have to convince our partners to lower their tariffs, remove discriminatory regulatory restrictions on our exporters, protect intellectual property, use scientific standards as the basis for allowing our agricultural goods to enter and recognize that trade in services is becoming as important to the modern economy as trade in goods. And we need to make the case that doing all of these things is not to the advantage of one country or another. It’s to all of our shared advantage because of the nature of the global marketplace that we live in. Countries like China, India and Brazil are stakeholders whether they want to admit it or not publicly, they are stakeholders in the West's economic success. They need access to our consumers. They need access to our investors. They want to make deals over here. They want to have joint ventures. They want to own companies. And their businesses and citizens will benefit from strong, sustainable growth in the world's largest economies.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; margin-bottom: 20px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">China is an important partner of the United States in a lot of ways. It's also a major investor in the United States. So I don't think that we're here to rupture that relationship. I think we're here to send a message to the Chinese about the urgent need to repair it. We want a mutually beneficial partnership, an equitable partner that will pay dividends for both countries and I believe if we listen to each other and work in good faith we can make that happen, and we can enter into a better framework of cooperation that inures to the benefit and the stability and the leadership demands of both of our countries. We both sit on the security council of the United Nations. We both have remarkable responsibilities through our economic power. We are still the largest economy on the face of this planet, maybe three times larger than China still, even as China is growing. China will surpass us, and with that reality of where China stands today economically comes a major responsibility. No country has exercised that responsibility through all of the last century and into this century, I think, with greater sense of purpose and responsibility than the United States. And I think hopefully China will embrace the notion that its new economic power brings with it that same shared responsibility, and I hope we can engage in the creation of that kind of mutually beneficial relationship. Mr. President, I reserve the balance of my time and yield the floor.</span></span><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:RoUqPhWPrKgJ:www.kerry.senate.gov/press/release/%3Fid%3Dcfcf0459-2884-47ca-88b8-519feffb8f71+&cd=1&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&gl=tw" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Qb9qPIhXEBA/UO1w8mxWOHI/AAAAAAAAFGQ/wuBjqXItxOg/s1600/%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99%E4%BE%86%E6%BA%90.jpg" /></a></div><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background-color: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></span></span></div>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-34463802461198691192013-01-08T03:49:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:17.920-08:00布热津斯基:美国的双重角色与中国 <span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">布热津斯基</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2013年1月8日</span></span></span><span style="line-height: 25px; text-align: -webkit-right;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">东方早报</span></span><br /><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.dfdaily.com/html/8762/2013/1/8/923870.shtml" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="100" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-F-CsgiJCjVU/UOv4aNuhaOI/AAAAAAAAFC0/pz9CGCmqIUc/s200/Brzezinski.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在人类历史的第一个五百年(距今1500多年前),欧洲相对文明地区的政治主要由<b>罗马帝国东西两个不同部分的共存体所主导</b>。首都大部分时候都设在罗马的西帝国,饱受了掠夺性野蛮冲突的困扰。随着部队以广泛和昂贵的防御工事永久驻军在海外,<b>政治上过度扩张的罗马在第五世纪中叶逐步走向破产</b>。同时,基督徒和异教徒之间的分裂冲突削弱了社会凝聚力,重税和腐败也减弱了罗马的经济活力。</span></div><a name='more'></a><br /><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在公元476年,随着罗穆卢斯·<b>奥古斯都</b>(编注:Romulus Augustus,<b>西罗马帝国的最后一位皇帝</b>)被野蛮人打败,彼时已垂死的西罗马帝国正式崩溃了。而同期,<b>东罗马帝国</b>(不久后成为<b>拜占庭帝国</b>)不仅在其外交和安全政策上更为成功,而且在城市化和经济发展上也表现出了更多的活力。<b>罗马陨落后,拜占庭继续蓬勃发展了几个世纪</b>。它夺回了部分老西部帝国,虽然后来也经历了不少冲突,但<b>拜占庭一直存活到15世纪奥斯曼土耳其帝国的崛起</b>。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 这种历史转向的重要性,是21世纪世界的动态对比点。罗马15世纪中叶的可怕劫难并没有破坏拜占庭理想的前景,因为在那时候,世界被划分成地理上孤立、政治和经济上互相绝缘的不同部分。一家的命运并不会直接和立即影响到他家的繁荣。今天,由于快速的通信和即时的金融交易,距离不再那么相关,经济上、金融上和军事上最先进的地区的福祉正变得越来越相互依存。和1500年前不同,在我们的时代,<b>西方和东方的有机关系可以是相互合作也可以是相互破坏</b>。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 因此,美国在未来几十年的主要挑战和地缘政治上的迫切任务在于其<b>自我复兴</b>以及<b>促进一个更大更重要的西方</b>,<b>同时在东方保持复合的平衡</b>,这样才能建设性地适应中国不断上升的全球地位和避免全球性混乱。如果没有由改造了的美国所促进的稳定的欧亚大陆的地缘政治平衡,那么对社会福祉乃至最终人类生存的至关重要的问题的进展将会被拖延。<b>在亚洲,尤其是中国、印度和日本之间的国家间的竞争,将导致更严重的地区紧张局势,最终使得中美两国之间的敌意加深,双方都受到损害</b>。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 此外,美国扩大西方使其成为世界上最稳定最民主区域的成功努力,将会寻求将权力与原则结合起来。一个合作的更大的西方,从北美延伸到欧洲再到欧亚大陆, 包含俄罗斯和土耳其,将会在地理上触及日本(亚洲第一个成功拥抱民主的国家)和韩国。这种更广泛的范围将会在其他国家中提升其核心原则的吸引力,从而在未来的几十年中<b>鼓励一个全球民主政治文化的多种形式逐渐出现</b>。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 与此同时,美国应该继续与充满活力、金融上有影响力但存在潜在冲突的东方合作。如果美国和中国能够在广泛的问题上容纳对方,亚洲稳定的前景将会大大增强,特别是如果<b>美国同时能够鼓励其主要的太平洋同盟——日本与中国之间达成真正的和解,以及减轻印度与中国之间逐渐增长的对抗</b>。美国的东方政策必须考虑到,追求一个稳定的亚洲平衡并不能只局限于以中国为中心,集中和北京发展特殊伙伴关系,这是可取的。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 要有效地回应欧亚大陆的东西方部分,<b>美国必须采用双重角色</b>。<b>在西方,美国必须是更大更广泛的联合体的促进者和担保人</b>,<b>在东方,美国必须是主要权力之间的平衡器和调解人</b>。但是,要有信誉和能力来追求两者的成功,美国需要向世界展示其有决心在国内改造自我。<b>撇开越来越令人质疑的统计假设说</b>,目前美国的国家经济增长率将在未来几十年无限期地继续下去,美国必须更重视其他方面的国力,比如创新、教育、明智地平衡军队和外交的能力、政治领导的质量以及民主生活方式的吸引力。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国作为复兴了的西方的促进者和担保人要取得成功,密切的美欧纽带、美国对北约的持续承诺、小心谨慎的美欧管理,<b>一步一步地(可能用不同方式)拥抱土耳其和一个真正民主化俄罗斯融入西方将会是必要的</b>。美国必须鼓励欧盟更深层次的统一,并在敦促欧洲增强其自身政治和军事活动的同时,通过在欧洲安全方面保持活跃确保其地缘政治的相关性。英国、法国和德国(欧洲的中央政治、经济和军事同盟)之间的密切合作应该持续并拓宽。此外,不断扩大的俄国-法国-波兰就欧洲东部政策的磋商(这对于欧盟的东部和解和扩张是至关重要的),必须加强和扩大。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 在维护西方团结的同时从战略上拉入俄罗斯,<b>法国-德国-波兰“魏玛三角</b>”可以在促进和巩固波兰和俄罗斯之间正在进行但仍然脆弱的和解中发挥建设性的作用。法国和德国对此和解的支持,将不仅加强波兰的安全意识,而且安抚俄罗斯,在整个过程中有更大的欧洲参与。只有到那时,俄罗斯-波兰才可能真的达成全面的更为理想的和解,正如德国-波兰组合已经成为的那样,这两个和解到那时将会对欧洲更大的稳定有所贡献。但是为了使波兰-俄罗斯和解有效和持久,必须由政府层面转向社会层面,通过广泛的民间联系和各种各样的联合教育措施。政府的权宜和解——而不是根植于流行态度的基本改变,将不会持续太久。1939年,希特勒在德国的纳粹政权和斯大林在苏联俄国的政权获得了如此盛大的和解,但是两年后双方开动了战争。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 相比之下,<b>二战后的法德友谊尽管是由最高层发起的</b>(戴高乐将军和阿登纳总理都扮演了历史角色),但也在社会和文化水平上成功地得到了促进。甚至法国和德国各自的国家叙述也在根本上兼容,为真正的睦邻友好关系乃至一个和平联盟的坚固基础奠定了坚实的根基。在波兰-俄罗斯的例子上也需要完全相同的进程,一旦取得了势头,它会产生自己的积极的国际效应。而且,波兰此后就可以不仅在向俄罗斯开放欧洲大门上,也可以在鼓励乌克兰和白俄罗斯各自往相同的方向推进上,扮演关键角色,这样也增加俄罗斯做出相似举动的兴趣。理想的扩大西方的历史进程因此必须在战略上得到指导并打下坚实基础。它必须由一个更大的大西洋联盟做后盾,在这个联盟中,波兰和与法国发展更密切友谊的德国真正成为合作伙伴。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 上述种种将要求美国和欧洲的坚持不懈和战略性审查。俄罗斯自身将必须进化以符合欧盟的标准。但长久来说,俄罗斯将不会想要失去这个机会,特别是如果土耳其和欧盟在处理当前的障碍上取得进展。此外,很大一部分俄罗斯公众就欧盟成员身份上走在了政府前面。德国国际广播服务德国之声2011年早期在俄罗斯做的一项调查问卷显示,23%的俄罗斯人认为俄罗斯应该在未来2年内成为欧盟的一部分,16%的人认为应在未来2-5年内,9%的人认为应在未来5-10年,6%的人认为要更久些,28%的人不确定,仅仅18%的人断然反对。然而,尽管他们偏好欧盟成员身份,但俄罗斯公众一般并不知道要成为欧盟成员所需要符合的严格的资格标准。在最好的情况下,正如土耳其的情况,获准的过程很可能将会推进,停滞,然后突然再次向前,可能是阶段性的,而且可能要通过过渡性安排。不过,在这个时候,试图勾画一个最终扩大了的西方的确切的政治架构的详细蓝图还为时过早。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 然而,如果美国不促进一个更为统一的西方的出现,那么将会发生可怕的后果。<b>欧洲历史的怨恨可能将被唤醒,可能会出现新的利益冲突,短视的竞争伙伴关系也会开始形成</b>。俄罗斯可以引起分歧地开发其能源资产,并受西方不统一的鼓舞,寻求快速地获取乌克兰,唤醒自己的帝国野心,并造成更大的国际混乱。在欧洲的被动下,个别寻求更大商业机会的欧洲国家可能会寻求和俄罗斯的和解。我们可以设想一个场景,俄罗斯和德国或意大利因为自身的经济利益发展特殊的关系。英国那时候将以对摇摇欲坠的、政治上有争议的欧盟消极反应而和美国更接近。当法国和英国对德国产生怀疑,而波兰和波罗的海国家又拼命地恳求增加美国的安全保证,法英两国也将会更接近彼此。这一切的结果将不会是一个新的更有活力的西方,而是一个逐渐分裂的、前景缩水的西方。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 此外,这样一个<b>处于分裂的西方无法自信地与中国就全球系统相关性进行竞争</b>。到目前为止,中国还没有明确表达一个声称其近期表现为全球适用的思想教条,而认识到在其他问题上的妥协有时候是不可避免的(比如说,和俄罗斯的武器控制),美国一直小心地不使意识形态成为其与主要国家关系的核心重点。美国和中国都明智地在全球事务中拥抱“<b>建设性的合作伙伴关系</b>”的概念,<b>美国尽管批评中国违反人权,但非常小心不在整体上污蔑中国的社会主义经济制度</b>。但是即使在如此少的对抗性的背景下,一个更大的复兴的西方将会处于一个更好的环境,如果其不带意识形态热诚和平地与中国竞争,后者的体系就其解决如今政治觉悟的群众的愿望的努力上,对于发展中国家来说是一个更好的模式。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 但是如果<b>焦虑的美国</b>和<b>过度自信的中国</b>滑向政治敌意的可能性增加,极有可能双方将会在相互毁灭性的意识形态冲突中对峙。美国将会争辩说中国的成功是建立在独裁之上的,对美国的经济福祉具有破坏性。而中国会将美国的信息解释为企图破坏,甚至可能使得中国的体系破碎。同时,中国会越来越作为对西方主权的一种拒绝向世界展示自己,将西方主权与强者贪婪剥削弱者的时代联系起来,在意识形态上吸引那些已经在历史叙述上对西方整体上特别是最近对美国高度敌意的第三世界国家。因此,美国和中国出于明智的自身利益,共同的意识形态上的自我约束将会对双方都好。双方应该抵制普及其各自社会经济制度的显著特征和丑化对方的诱惑。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 关于亚洲稳定的长期问题,美国必须发挥<b>平衡器和调解人</b>的角色。因此,<b>美国应避免直接军事介入亚洲</b>,应设法调和关键的东亚国家之间——特别是中国和日本之间的长期仇恨。在新东方,指导美国政策的基本原则必须是,只有在以条约为基础的美国部署是长期国际环境的一部分的指示下,美国才会在亚洲大陆从事回应敌对行动。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 从本质上说,美国作为地区稳定平衡器介入亚洲,<b>应该复制英国在19世纪和20世纪初在欧洲内部政治上扮演的角色。通过调停冲突和抵消潜在对手间的权力失衡,美国可以也应该在帮助亚洲避免区域统治的斗争上成为关键的角色</b>。美国要这么做,就应该尊重中国在保持远东大陆稳定上特殊的历史和地缘政治角色。与中国就地区稳定进行严肃的对话,将不仅能帮助减少美中对抗的可能,而且还能减少中国和日本间、中国和印度间,甚至在某种程度上减少中国和俄罗斯之间,就能源和中亚国家状态的失算的可能性。因而美国在亚洲的平衡介入最终也符合中国的利益。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 与此同时,美国必须意识到亚洲的稳定不再能够由非亚洲的势力所施加,至少(特别是在尚无定论的朝鲜战争、失败的越南战争、2003年无端的伊拉克攻击和经久的阿富汗冲突后)是美国军事力量的直接应用。事实上,美国增强亚洲稳定的努力将可能证明是一种弄巧成拙——将美国推入昂贵的其近期战争的重复——甚至导致20世纪在欧洲发生的事情的重演。<b>如果美国在和印度(或其他的大陆国家)一起塑造反中国联盟中变得积极起来,或者促进日本反中国军事化,那么美国可能会引发危险的相互怨恨</b>。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 作为一个在亚洲的平衡器和调解人的美国政策的指导原则必须是这样一个概念,即除履行其对日本和韩国的义务外,美国不应该允许自己被卷入亚洲大陆大国之间的战争。现实情况是,尽管这样的战争会削弱支持者,至关重要的美国利益不会受到威胁。但是就日本和韩国而言,作为二战的结果,<b>美国已经在这两个国家了防守了五十多年。如果美国长期以条约为基础的承诺的持久性出现任何疑问,这些国家的独立和自信将会和美国在太平洋的角色一起粉碎</b>。此外,日本作为一个离岸岛国,在这方面其和美国的关系——作为美国在远东的主要同盟——多少让人联想起美国和英国的纽带,特别是在二战期间以及冷战的那些不确定的年份中。最近分裂的韩国是那种关系的扩展,如果美国对其承诺保卫两个国家的严肃性变得不可靠,那么美国将损害自身在远东的长期利益。不过,美国可以在促进关键选手间的克制上扮演建设性的角色,因而通过对地区权力平衡的积极的政治、外交和经济支持,来避免以发动一场战争的代价保护日本或韩国。这样做将不仅增强美国的政治影响力,也会促进更大的亚洲稳定。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国的东方调停人的角色将至关重要,特别是对于日本和中国之间的关系。美日关系以及通过美日关系促进中日和解,应该是发展美-日-中合作三角的共同努力的跳板。这样的三角将从一个建设性的基础上提供框架,来处理中国加强了的区域存在导致的战略担忧。中国人知道美国对日本的承诺是毫不动摇的,两者之间的纽带是深刻和真诚的,日本的安全直接依靠在美国身上。日本人也知道与中国的冲突将会是互相毁灭性的,因此美国与中国的交往对于日本的安全和福祉是间接的贡献。有了这样的动力,中国将不会把美国对日本安全的支持看作是一种威胁,日本也不会将追求更密切和全球更广泛的美中伙伴关系——接近于非常不正式的地缘政治G-2安排的效果——看作是一种对其自身利益的威胁。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 简单地说,美国在亚洲的积极角色不仅在促进地区稳定,更重要的是,创造一个美-中关系和平、合作地进化的环境,最终发展成为广泛的政治和经济的全球伙伴关系上也是必要的。事实上,美国和中国之间的关系很可能成为,世界上人口最多、经济最有活力的欧亚大陆将国内成功与地区稳定融合的能力考验。</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 美国已在历史上展示了自己在受到挑战时崛起的场面。但是21世纪的世界所呈现的挑战与过去非常不同。世界现在几乎在任何地方都已经是政治觉醒的——数百万人为追求更好的未来骚动不安。随着东方一些新的壮志满筹的国家迅速崛起,世界也正经历着全球势力的分散。今天的世界更少地受到某一单一权力的支配,甚至如美国一样军事强大、政治有影响力的权力。但是,因为<b>美国还不是罗马,中国也不是拜占庭</b>,一个稳定的全球秩序最终将依靠美国改造自我的能力、作为振兴了的西方的促进者和担保人,以及作为正在崛起的新东方的平衡器和调解人的明智举动。■</span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px;"><br /></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px; text-align: left;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><i> (作者系美国前总统国家安全事务助理。本文为作者2012年新著《战略憧憬——美国和全球实力的危机》的结论部分《美国的双重角色》,经作者授权摘译、刊登;《东方早报·上海经济评论》记者金蓓蕾译。</i></span></div><div style="line-height: 25px; margin-top: -10px; text-align: left;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><i><br /></i></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a 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/></i></span></div>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-66827031917115416252013-01-08T01:17:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:18.341-08:00马建福 :部分香港人不认同中国的分析<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">马建福</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2013年1月7日 </span></span><a href="http://home.blshe.com/" style="background-color: white; color: #0a527b; line-height: 18px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: center; text-decoration: initial; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;">博联社</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #0a527b; line-height: 24px;">博客</span></span><br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://home.blshe.com/space.php?uid=11558&do=blog&id=76069" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="139" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jXzeguSBfEw/UOvja0n6PkI/AAAAAAAAE_0/1dp8KJjkSzs/s200/%E9%A9%AC%E5%BB%BA%E7%A6%8F+.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在香港生活五年,对于香港人的认同,还真了解一些。</span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">我们中国大陆人有时候会把香港看做像大陆某个省市一样的地方,用“自己觉得应该是”的思考路径做出判断。然后对于都是“中国人”的香港人的说法和做法不理解。最近有关香港人是否为中国人的讨论又开始了,我写点东西,也算是对香港人的一种感谢。在那边生活五年,所见所闻,的确有一定的依据。<a name='more'></a></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> </span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>香港人的多重身份</b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">香港人不像我们大陆人就只有一个身份证,或者一个护照,<b>香港很多人都是双重甚至多重国籍</b>。他们曾经是<b>英联邦殖民下的圈中的成员</b>,他们去<b>加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰</b>……等很多国家都是不需要签证直接前往的,而且他们也在这种认同下拿到了这些国家范围内的护照,去哪里都是特别自由。从人种上看,和我们一样,都是中国人,<b>但是他们从概念上认同“中华”,对今天的“中国”则不是很认同</b>。认同与否,我们必须接受这一点,他们不是很认同大陆,与国家状况、民众的经济水平等等诸多因素有关,而我们也不能强迫香港人一定要认同中国和中国大陆以及中国人的身份。</span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> </span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>香港人为什么不愿?</b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">文化与政治是一个人或一个群体实现认同的核心因素。我在香港生活,<b>媒体的宣传,基本上都是“挑刺”,全面暴露大陆“恶”的一面</b>,让香港人觉得大陆真的是四处有雷,人们真是水深火热啊。尽管香港也有类似“文汇报”、“大公报”的正面宣传,但是香港人对这些媒体也是不认同的,他们基本上阅读的报纸是明报,苹果报和太阳报等。<b>媒体的宣传其实也是一种洗脑的过程,大面积负面报道,而且长期坚持,让香港人觉得那些都是事实</b>,都是毫无置疑的。<b>说起大陆,他们极为反感</b>,是因为在国际上,在香港,他们都觉得有失脸面。</span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> </span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>大陆人在香港的行为</b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">大陆人到香港,没有遵从入乡随俗,入境问禁的习惯,而是怎么舒服怎么来,或者说用“主人翁”的精神在香港做事。让香港人总觉得他们不会像大陆人那样做。诚然,香港人把部分大陆人在香港的行为看做是所有中国人的行为,有些言过其实。不过大陆人在香港的言谈举止,的确让香港人接受不了。香港过去150多年经过英国殖民文化的洗刷,已经形成了独具香港特色的文化与社会制度,日常生活中人的交往和习惯都是有着英国文化的深刻印记,突然回归大陆,他们自然接受不了,再加上又有那么多大陆人纷至沓来,让香港人有一种被侵犯的感觉。所以对大陆人基本上都是有些厌烦反感和讨厌的。</span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> </span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>国际负面影响和经济发展</b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>国际上对中国的报道也是只说坏不说好</b>。<b>长期的话语力量,把歪曲的确给说成了事实</b>。香港人的媒体信息传播途径总是<b>美国之音</b>,<b>英国BBC</b>或者<b>欧美国家操控的粤语媒体</b>,所有的报道,使香港人在回归之前如惊弓之鸟,纷纷移民离开。如今的确有回巢现象,不过都是像迁徙的候鸟一样,来来去去不停走动,随时准备远离而去。这些年大陆的经济发展,也促进了很多香港人经济上的大力发展和改观,<b>香港人不会认为这些感恩于国家的政策</b>,而是觉得自己弄潮时,抓住了好机会。与中国大陆人对党中央和国家的感恩感完全不一样。个人主义和自我奋斗的思想,使香港人的观点是,国家是为民众服务的,国家无论做什么,都是应该。其实这也无可厚非。</span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> </span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>殖民影响难以一时改变香港人的认同</b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">一个地方被殖民150年,人换了多少茬,今天的香港人的文化习惯,法律制度,风土人情,交际方式等等纯粹是香港式的,极具本土特点。香港今天的样式,<b>在香港本地人看来,是的确应该感恩于英国佬</b>,他们在这个地方设立了好的制度。但是我们大陆人听到这样的说法时,非常气愤。其实<b>香港人根本没有“中国”的概念</b>,他们认为邻国有个社会主义国家,1997年之前的确是这么认为的。时至今日,还有一些人还是这么认为的。我们如果自以为是的要香港人如何如何作为,确实有些强人所难。<b>改变这种认同,不是一蹴而就,真的需要几代人,甚至十几代人的交往互动,更需要中国不断的完善和发展</b>,让香港人感觉祖国的伟大,人民的热爱和共产党治理下的国家繁荣富强,让世界各国都趋之若鹜。让香港人也能够在华夏文化中享受中华文化,才有可能。</span></div><div style="line-height: 21px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-all; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><br /><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;">作者簡介:回族,穆斯林,人类学博士,宁夏人,北方民族大学教授,主要从事穆斯林文化与社会研究。</span></span><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://home.blshe.com/space.php?uid=11558&do=blog&id=76069" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5nQcvt2Tr0w/UOt_H_pDD2I/AAAAAAAAE9s/o35r6var1EM/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: Trebuchet MS, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-6088920786974197942012-12-27T02:32:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:22.282-08:00李侃如:美国“向东转”易说难为<span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="color: #333333;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">李侃如</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2012年2月29日 </span></span></span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #666666; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 16px; text-align: right;">The Brookings Institution</span><br /><br /><div class="lede" style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 20px;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/zh-cn/research/articles/2011/12/21-obama-asia-lieberthal" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="131" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-QbJd7VctGu0/UNwfhDw675I/AAAAAAAAECg/SnTIdFLemQ0/s200/%E6%9D%8E%E4%BE%83%E5%A6%82.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><div style="color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">不久前,朝鲜领导人金正日突然离世,美国深刻意识到——不仅要与美国的盟友合作,还要在处理亚洲重大威胁时与中国携手。这也是为什么美国实现亚洲整体战略平衡至关重要。</span></div></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">事实上,<b>奥巴马政府对亚洲的总体态度在2010至2011年期间,发生了相当大的演变</b>。而奥巴马前一段前往火奴鲁鲁、澳大利亚、印度尼西亚等参加一系列重要会议,充分展示了这一结果。此行成效非凡,其信息经得起仔细推敲,清晰地传达出协调一致的外交、军事和经济战略,覆盖面从印度次大陆到东北亚,并将深刻塑造美中关系。<b>其核心思想是:美国在未来几十年将在亚洲扮演领导者角色</b>。</span></div><a name='more'></a><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>美国媒体将这一思想描绘为仅仅意在亚洲对抗中国,但寓意远为复杂得多</b>。总统阐述的这一战略有多少现实性?对美中关系和两国在亚洲的角色会有怎样的影响?美国是否有资源兑现这一历史性的“转向”?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">奥巴马亚洲政策有什么变化?</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">奥巴马上任时自诩“美国首位太平洋总统”,宣称小布什政府对亚洲地区事务关注过少,提出美国应当恢复并加强其在亚洲的传统参与水平。当中国在2010年和2011年的亚洲政策趋于强硬时,奥巴马政府也加快动作,美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的军事参与大幅减少。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">特别是2010年间,美国对中国在该地区的动作反应迅速。针对朝鲜核试验以及其对韩国发起的致命挑衅,奥巴马明确支持首尔,施压中国以压制平壤,并不顾中国的强烈反对,在黄海开展海军军演以警告朝鲜。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在东北亚和中国南海,奥巴马政府正式明确了在涉及中国领土争端中的中立态度,但采取的实际立场不出所料引起了北京的怀疑。当日本在钓鱼岛附近海域拘捕了中国渔船船长后,美国国务院确认说,美日同盟覆盖这一水域,因为争议岛屿在日本政府的实际控制下。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">南中国海周边各国的领土主张针锋相对,掀起新一轮口水战,使得美国国务卿希拉里在越南河内举行的东盟地区论坛上申明美国的重大利益,即在该地区航行的自由,保持该地区向正常商业活动开放。同时,希拉里表示美国愿意协助建立解决领土争议的合作机制,美国认为所有国家的领海主张都应以领土特征为充分支撑。中国对华盛顿疑似欲插手领土争端感到愤怒,并申明北京不认为该地区的自由航行面临任何威胁。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">2010年,在以上和另外一些问题上,<b>美国对中国有意无意地利用其经济实力对该地区的外交和安全利益的各种行动分别做出了反应</b>。这些反应与美中之间活跃的双边外交交织在一起,保证了美中关系不离正轨,并控制着双方预期。中国国家主席胡锦涛2011年1月在华盛顿成功进行了国事访问,这表明在具体事务上的强硬和双边外交上的积极相结合,为美中关系奠定了合理的固有步调。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在此背景下,奥巴马总统在2011年11月的亚洲之行凸显了美国的政策已经在四个方面迈出了重要一步。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>一是多边组织</b>。在过去十年里,中国在东盟、<b>东盟10+3</b>(东盟+中国、日本和韩国)、<b>东盟地区论坛</b>(ARF)上付出了巨大努力。中国与东盟的自由贸易协定为21世纪中期提供了一系列慷慨的“<b>早期收获计划</b>”措施,2010年中国-东盟自由贸易协定正式生效。这一协定当然不包括美国。北京还支持东盟地区论坛成为重要地区安全论坛,可能是因为它多年来都是完全通过协商一致运作,并且搁置棘手的具体问题。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在此背景下,奥巴马在2011年11月把他坚决支持两个不同多边组织的决定付诸实践。在经贸方面,奥巴马宣布美国希望在2012年12月前达成<b>跨太平洋伙伴关系协议</b>(TPP),成为将亚太主要经济体囊括在内的高质量贸易和投资平台,谈判目前正在进行中。TPP的构架围绕着美国所拥护的透明、保护知识产权、劳动权益、保护环境等原则(可视作升级版WTO)。尽管奥巴马指出任何认同这些原则的国家都可以加入,但TPP原则与中国在经贸领域的大多数行为指导原则大相径庭。中国并不在协商建立TPP的发起国之列。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在安全方面,美国正式加入了东亚峰会(EAS),奥巴马更利用他首次出席峰会的机会将这一新机构的关注焦点导向了该地区棘手的具体的安全事务上,特别是海洋安全。这完全不是北京方面乐见的,但绝大多数EAS参会国支持美国总体策略。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">简而言之,奥巴马采取了大胆的行动以改变亚洲多边组织的重力中心,对那些将美国纳入范围内的组织示好,引导它们采取为华盛顿所喜闻乐见而令北京深感头疼的策略。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>二是经济和贸易</b>。奥巴马政府在就职后的头两年半,在贸易问题上无所建树。 但在2011年11月初,与韩国签订的自由贸易协定终于获得通过。如上所说,这将焦点转移到将TPP建设为亚太新贸易和投资平台上来。这两项措施令亚洲重回美国经贸战略的中心,体现了奥巴马反复重申的一点:<b>对美国未来经济繁荣而言,没有什么地区比亚洲更重要</b>。所有这些是在一个并不良好的环境下取得的:美中经贸关系紧张加剧,而且在2012年华盛顿选举和北京换届的背景下,这种紧张也不可能会消退。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>三是安全</b>。奥巴马在此行中明确宣布他将确保美国亚洲安全投资不受未来美国总体军事开支削减的影响。在澳大利亚,他还签署了一份协议,允许向澳大利亚北部港市达尔文轮流派驻2500名海军。美国新任国防部长利昂·帕内塔几周前访问了该地区,奥巴马之行则毫无疑问地表明,美国军事和更大范围的安全焦点正从伊拉克和阿富汗转向亚洲,而且这一新定位将始终是美国安全战略的重中之重,并不受未来国防预算削减的影响。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在2011年11月的访问之后,奥巴马政府随即于2012年1月在军事预算约束的情况下,发布了美国未来国防战略,其中详尽阐述了新的联合作战介入理念。两份文件都进一步确认了美国军事力量将维持其克服任何国家在本国领海之外拒绝或束缚美国军事资产活动的能力。这些文件还强调美军在亚洲的力量将更为轻巧,而不会因任何将来的军事预算约束而降低实力。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>四是外交</b>。全球民主议程在奥巴马上任后并未占据显要位置,但这一点在阿拉伯之春发生后出现重大改变。奥巴马在此行中明确声称,美国将在亚洲引领民主和人权进步,他在澳大利亚宣称:“<b>其他模式已经尝试过并宣告失败——法西斯主义和共产主义,一个人的统治和一个委员会的统治。他们都失败在一个简单原因上:无视权力和执政合法性的最终来源,即人民的意志</b>。”在最后一站,奥巴马宣布希拉里将访问缅甸,这是美国国务卿首次访问缅甸——去感受新改革运动的热潮,并推动民主治理的进步。简言之,新的综合战略提升了民主在美国亚洲外交中的分量。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">其实,奥巴马在2011年11月出访期间宣布的<b>大多数新政策早在2010年或更早就已有雏形</b>。但美国之前在反对中国行动的时候,还会有选择性让步,着眼于处理美中整体关系,不过11月的出访则表明了一种重大转变。华盛顿仍然致力于保持建设性的美中关系,但现在已经连点成线,形成整体战略,明确地主张并保证在可见的未来美国在亚洲的领导性位置。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">中国的反应</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">不足为奇,中国对这些新动向感到担忧。这些动向从各种角度加强了中国对美国一直以来的疑虑。在中国看来,美国总是首先考虑保护其全球支配力。这也就意味着美国会阻碍或破坏中国崛起。美国在全球金融危机中掉队了,此后复苏迟缓,而<b>中国则在2010年一跃成为世界第二大经济体</b>,这让北京更加担忧华盛顿会一心一意地拖延中国超越美国、成为世界头号经济体的那一天到来。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">北京觉得美国在以下领域所采取的行动心怀不轨:如鼓励中国的异见活动,企图制造不稳定,然后通过网络活动煽动动乱,推翻共产党执政;施压中国进行人民币升值,从而增加中国的不稳定性失业,转移美国人对本国失败的注意力;在中国的邻居中煽动关于其意图的恐惧,从而为中国制造麻烦,并鼓励越南等一些对中国长期心怀猜忌的国家;与亚洲国家,特别是主要民主国家携手合作,为中国谋求相匹配的地区大国身份制造障碍;质疑中国发展模式能否取代失去光环的西方民主模式;采取建立TPP等方法,挤压人民币国际化的空间,而这在中国看来是制衡美国滥用作为全球储备货币的美元能力的重要措施。总之,奥巴马总统的泛亚洲战略以及与之相伴的一些言辞让许多中国人深信,美国所有的行为都是抑制或实际上破坏中国崛起的阴谋。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">中国领导人对美国的实力和能力保有充分的重视。奥巴马自诩美国在亚洲始终占据领导地位——以全面的美国战略思维和外交为后盾,但同时增加了一种有违其初衷的可能性,即为中国自己的地区战略提供了全新的语境。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">接下来会发生什么?美国媒体将奥巴马亚洲之行描绘为巩固了美国的亚洲领导地位、处处挑战并战胜了中国。美国的举动显然得到东亚峰会上几乎所有大国的热情声援,这也加强了这种看法。但事实要复杂得多,不管是奥巴马总统的真实诉求,还是可能的结果。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">更为复杂的美国战略</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">事实上,奥巴马政府并未试图越界与中国对立。相反,它采取了双管齐下的政策:明确并加强与中国合作关系;在亚洲建立强大、可信赖的美国存在,既能正面鼓励中国作出建设性行为,也能让该地区其他国家有信心不必向中国作为潜在的地区强权而低头。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">奥巴马政府仍在继续致力于发展华盛顿与北京高官之间的紧密的个人联系。奥巴马已经与胡锦涛主席会面十次,包括在火奴鲁鲁的会面,与温家宝总理多次会面。希拉里个人也为增进与她的主要中方接洽人戴秉国的接触而付出了格外努力,双方定期举行持续数小时的非正式会谈。财长盖特纳与中国副总理王岐山也建立了密切交流。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">这些私下会谈的精神在于能比正式谈判更细致地解释各自的立场,从而赢得相互理解、增加互信。谈话的基础是相互尊重并承认中美间难以切断的利益关系。这些关门会谈旨在减少中美之间不必要敌对行为的几率。双边外交这一鲜为人知的侧面是试图管理美中今后摩擦的发展,为各种美中会议定调并确定议程。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">无论如何,中国都对美国总统十一月强势出访亚洲的范围和面面俱到感到惊讶。最初的反应是轻微的,可能部分是因为双方领导人在会议期间做出的私下保证,部分是因为北京在2012年将迎来换届。胡的领导集体可能想避免出现任何严重的美中关系恶化,可能不想在一个非常敏感的政治年对美中关系进行重大内部回顾。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">然而,倘若美国试图遏制崛起的中国在亚洲获得匹配的地位的种种做法令民族主义情绪蔓延,中国领导人也不能对这种颇得人心的情绪无动于衷。这种情绪会让中国领导层倍感压力,必须抵制美国在中国后院耀武扬威,并提醒美国注意亚洲变化着的真正力量均势。提醒的方式有很多可能性,其中包括整体提升紧张程度,在诸如对伊朗制裁,处理朝鲜政权衔接等问题上减少合作,在中国专属经济区增加事件等——哪个都不能排除。军方在中国政治中的角色非常不明了,但在这个换届年也有可能影响中国的反应。中国的领导换届可能让情况朝两个相反的方向发展,这取决于内部的力量变化。避免情况向反面发展需要美国做出积极、持久、定位准确的外交努力。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">而同时,<b>美国政府内部的相关变量,很难说清但又极其重要</b>。奥巴马政府的中国政策最早主要是由密切合作的<b>副国务卿詹姆斯·斯坦伯格</b>和国家安全委员会东亚事务高级主管<b>杰弗里·贝德</b>制定的。这是在2009年上任的与中国打交道的最早的两名高官。他们卓有成效的合作,不仅在中国政策上,还在相关更广泛的亚洲政策上确保了白宫的主导权。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">从2009年末往后,<b>美国国务院里出现了一缕不同的思想</b>,并获得了<b>五角大楼</b>一些官员的支持,<b>他们欲对中国采取更为强硬的立场</b>、打算警醒该地区其他国家提防中国日益增长的实力、团结一致采取限制中国的行动。这两派政策的冲突并不激烈,但各方都有意谋求塑造美国整体政策,并经常在各种问题出现时提出不同的策略及建议。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">斯坦伯格和贝德先生于2011年离开政府。在他们离开后,在<b>美国国务院、国家安全委员会或五角大楼就没有局长或以上级别的中国专家了</b>。奥巴马亚洲之行动身前,白宫发给记者的新闻通稿比以往更充分地展现了国务院中那些支持采取比过去更强硬态度的官员的措辞,如宣布美国“转向”亚洲的政策和态度。若人员变动已经给白宫政策带来实质变化,那么当新的问题随着时间出现时,会证明这是一个重大动向。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在这里,<b>值得注意的是奥巴马在亚洲之行中从未说过“转向”(pivot)这个词</b>,<b>国家安全顾问汤姆·多尼伦说的是“再平衡”而不是“转向”</b>。相反,是<b>国务卿希拉里不断声称美国将“转向亚洲”</b>。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">中国高层官员早已明确地认识到<b>美国政府内部的分歧</b>,可能会根据强硬路线占了上风的迹象做出相应反应。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国可信度与中国的轨迹</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">如果美国能让北京相信,美国仍将长时间保持领导亚洲的能力,并且只要中国的行为不挑战美国在亚洲的整体地位或核心利益,美国愿意支持中国的持续发展。这种偏强硬的路线可能会促进中国的建设性行为。毕竟,中国领导人是相当务实的。如果美国采取了战略一致的亚洲战略,并能在该地区赢得广泛尊重和信任,那么中国不太可能直接挑战美国。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">虽然措辞和外交可以影响人们的看法和预期,但是长时间来看,可信度是至关重要的,它要求一个国家能展示具有长期实施整体战略的资源和能力。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在这种情况下,奥巴马和克林顿在亚洲侃侃而谈令人惊讶,<b>仿佛亚洲人并不认为全球金融危机是美国制造的,仿佛美国的民主体系最近表现出色,仿佛只要华盛顿想在太平洋地区进行任何形式的军事派遣,美国军方就有资源实现。但事实并非如此</b>。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>亚洲最大的疑问是美国是否能从当前的财政危机中反弹</b>,并迅速走上通往健康财政、强大未来之路。2011年8月因提高债务上限引发的政治灾难对美国在亚洲地位造成巨大打击,它恰恰在这个问题上释放了一个强烈的负面信号。当11月奥巴马阐述他的亚洲战略时,国会预算“超级委员会”甚至无法就减赤计划达成一丁点的共识能够呈交国会——这个失败在奥巴马访亚回府的几天内就宣布了。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">因此,<b>奥巴马亚洲政策所描绘的图景难免有点一厢情愿</b>。尽管奥巴马表示说只要接受TPP设计的高标准,所有国家都欢迎加入共创亚洲繁荣,<b>但目前的现实是,该地区所有主要经济体的最大贸易伙伴是中国而不是美国</b>,而中国并不愿按照这些标准行事。似乎没有国家愿意拿他们与快速发展的中国经济的关系来冒险,特别是在美国增长疲弱、欧洲前景堪忧的情况下。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">另外,<b>美国国防在未来十年可能面临着超过1万亿美元的预算削减</b>。<b>大多数亚洲政府困惑的是这是否会削弱美国在亚洲的军事力量</b>,以及美国在亚洲动用军事力量的意愿,尽管美国目前否认这一点。中国的军力远不及美国,但在未来若干年国防预算似乎都将以两位数增长。简言之,塑造美国未来亚洲角色的重要因素是美国如何提振国内经济,并证明,也是美国历史曾多次证明的,即由于危机迫使美国进行改变,美国的制度能从比以往更为严重的问题中触底反弹。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">当然,中国自身发展前景也是个问题。当谈到北京的国际角色时,人们总有种印象,中国的增长势不可挡,其体制在国内具有坚如磐石的基础。但以上两点都值得推敲。北京已经表明必须改变其发展模式,因为这种在过去几十年获得成功的模式已经走到尽头,越来越多地带来导致经济不可持续发展和社会不稳定的后果——财富分配极度不均,普遍存在的产品和食品安全问题,腐败加剧,灾难性的环境恶化,投资回报下降,普遍认为制度不公正等等。然而,几乎没有证据显示在本次北京领导人换届过程中,有能改变上述现状的强力政治决策出台,以对腐败集团和一些大权在握的地方官员的既得利益构成挑战。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">确实,领导人换届的长期性让人们对2014年前实质性国内改革抱有悲观情绪。没有政治体制的变革,中国政治稳定就无法确保。这种变革已经变得很难,可能已经太难了。如果中国遭遇重大政治动荡或发展势头戛然而止,整个亚太地区的看法将发生变化,自然而然地影响对中国角色和中美两国地区均势的态度。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">转向过度?</span></strong></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">去年11月宣布的美国的亚洲转向战略显然意在增强外界对美国未来在该地区领导地位的信心,以及对华盛顿筹谋这一令人瞩目的外交大动作的尊敬。在许多亚洲国家担心美国走向衰落之时,奥巴马表现了美国的乐观情绪、原则、决心和领导力。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>这一战略可能确有不少益处,但并不像奥巴马和希拉里宣扬的那样十拿九稳</b>。更重要的是,除非美国能以更快的效率解决其国内财政和相关政治问题,否则美国就不可能有资源和能力兑现奥巴马的承诺。安顿好国内事务是美国新亚洲战略成功的必要条件。而且,中国可能会以更加挑战性的姿态做出回应,特别是当其国内政治介入的时候。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">此外,大多数亚洲国家都想继续拓展与中国的经贸关系,即便他们担心北京会利用其日益增强的经济力量谋求外交和安全利益。尽管亚洲其他国家希望美国能够阻止中国利用该地区,但没有国家想看到一个剑拔弩张的美中关系,<b>让他们不得不面临二选一的压力。事实上,他们更想从两个地区大国间的合作与竞争中得利</b>。<b>那种“亚洲国家欢迎美国领导,美国决定该地区未来”的想法把围绕亚洲的各种复杂考量简单化了</b>。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">直到2011年前,美国在对亚洲友邦和盟友的恳求都会首先采取外交和安全方面的行动作为回应。<b>这种做法最直接的风险是,越南和菲律宾一些国家也许会成功地将美国卷入他们与中国的领土争端,而这一局面是华盛顿此前一直小心避免的</b>。本质上,这种一刀切的方式会带来长期的风险,如果安全是昂贵的,那亚洲将日益成为美国的成本中心,而成为中国日益增长地利润中心,鉴于其广泛的经济参与。在美国深陷财政泥沼的情况下,这种做法不会让美国感到舒服,甚至可能无法持续。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">奥巴马政府的亚洲转向有望建立一个更加均衡的经济、外交和安全策略。最近通过的美韩自由贸易协定和建立TPP的努力都是朝向该目标的重要行动。<b>但这一新的统一的亚洲战略可能会走过头,会产生华盛顿无法满足的预期,并加剧中国的疑心从而导致更多美中关系之间的摩擦,以及错误估计亚洲其他国家对美国在该地区前景和战略的复杂认识和他们各自的目标</b>。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">因此,美国官员注意严格控制自己的措辞非常重要,这样才能在详细解说美国战略时避免不必要的疑虑和不安。比如说,在朝鲜政权交接的关键时期,美中交流和合作就显得极为重要。若美方措辞加剧了北京方面的不信任,那就很难实现朝鲜问题上的合作,这一问题被中国视为重大安全问题。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">由于2012年中美两国都要面临换届或选举的问题,两国关系不太可能取得重大进展,美国则更不能忽视加强中美双边关系对地区和全球战略成败的重要性。与亚洲其他国家取得的成功再大,也无法实现奥巴马追求的地区目标。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">总之,美国和中国都必须记住,他们采取的立场若能产生对彼此能力和目标的相互尊重,对双方都有利。这将避免任何一方鲁莽行事,且会相互乐意在任何可能的时候进行合作。现在要判断奥巴马政府亚洲政策转向是否为一个更加均衡、可持续的亚洲战略打下了基础,还言之过早。</span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/zh-cn/research/articles/2011/12/21-obama-asia-lieberthal" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nBMl4Yt3vxM/UNumvGYSsHI/AAAAAAAAD7E/w4DNOs_Xecg/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-79723912443023260012012-12-26T03:18:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:23.039-08:00唐寅初:美对遏华失败有准备 中国也应最坏打算<span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="color: #333333;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">唐寅初</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2012年12月26日</span></span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"> </span><span style="font-family: 新細明體, serif;">新华网</span><br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://military.china.com/news/568/20121226/17602807.html" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="129" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ds0i2xGSpJk/UNrcyBqs7bI/AAAAAAAAD6E/XVEJYJx2I80/s200/%E5%94%90%E5%AF%85%E5%88%9D.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国战略重心东移现在还是继续演进的过程中,还没有全部到位,这个过程中还有很多不确定因素,连美国恐怕都不能完全预见到。我们来回顾一下,从美国的战略名称定义的变化,可以看出它的战略还不是很成熟的,还有可变的因素。</span></div><a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span><br /><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"> </span>应该说冷战结束以后,我们经历了三个十年。第一个十年,美国战略重心仍然是欧洲,这是毫无疑问的,主要目的是挤压前苏联战略势力范围。第二个十年,发生了<span lang="EN-US">9.11</span>事件,美国把大量资源、精力投入中东,但是战略重心还是在欧洲。现在已经进入第三个十年的第二年了,应该说美国看到了世界大趋势正在发生变化,亚太地区的政治、经济、外交等正在发生重大变化,成为全球力量正在上升的地区。在这种背景下,美国出于自己的全球利益,出于巩固自己的霸权地位,把战略重心移向亚太地区。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"> </span>美国全球战略有一个地区战略,叫亚太战略,它取了好几个名字。第一个说是“重返亚洲”,后来又说美国早就在亚洲存在,不存在重返的问题。过了一段时间,也就是今年的<span lang="EN-US">6</span>月份,美国国防部长在新加坡安全论坛上明确指出:美国在亚洲战略再平衡。这说明什么问题?美国自己内部也有争议。有很多估计,第一,欧洲人听了不乐意,特别是中欧国家像波兰,一看美国把战略中心转到亚太地区,他们很失落。第二对中国有很大刺激,你跑到亚洲干什么,不是针对中国吗?第三东亚一些国家也产生一些不安定的情绪,美国来了,中美如果搞对抗,会影响地区经济安全形势。这种情况下,美国改成亚太再平衡战略,这个战略是用新名词掩盖它的战略意图。这个名词也有点中性,说再平衡就可以说并没有指向谁。现在美国官方或者学术界都一口咬定亚太再平衡战略并没有扼制中国的企图。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"> </span>美国再平衡战略到底平衡什么?到目前为止,美国官方或者学术界没有一套系统性的、权威性的说法。但是根据国内外学术界一些专家分析,我梳理了一下大概有几个平衡。第一,从全球范围来看,向亚太地区倾斜。第二,从亚太本身来看,从过去更多关注东北亚,现在向东南亚或者南海地区、南亚地区转移,更多的关注南边地区。第三,从军事手段来讲,它的布局很明显要加强空海一体战的平衡。第四,美国对东亚国家或者美国盟友国家,也要搞平衡,即平衡中美关系与美国跟其他盟友或者东亚国家的关系。这种平衡不管怎么说,都不能脱离它的本质。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">一,就是要到亚洲来巩固它的主导地位或者霸权地位。简单来说有三条:<span lang="EN-US">1.</span>着眼于亚太地区有利经济态势,要寻求经济利益,巩固它的主导权。<span lang="EN-US">2.</span>把矛头指向中国的和平崛起,因为它根深蒂固认为,中国的和平发展最终结果是要挑战美国的霸权地位,它要千方百计地限制中国的和平发展,或者不让你崛起。<span lang="EN-US">3.</span>美国有一种宗教思想,认为美国的利益是全球的,是上帝赋予这个使命,要求美国维持世界的秩序,主导世界的秩序。小布什当政的时候曾经说:我是上帝的儿子,我的任务就是领导美国管理好世界。美国人普遍有这种思想:我们是上帝的子民,我们跟你们中国人、其他人都不一样,美国是来拯救人类的。所以美国的对外战略,从独立战争到现在,就四个字:拓展扩张。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 二,是美国战略意图对中国遏制到底是什么程度?跟过去的接触加扼制有区别吗?我的结论是有区别,扼制的程度在加强,但是没有根本性的区别,还是有两面性,搞对冲战略。它一方面跟我们合作,另一方面又防范我国,如果遏制不住中国,它也有最坏的打算。我想我们也应该有这样的准备。中美关系是一个动态的关系,不仅仅取决于美国,还要取决于中国。所以对中美关系,我们要向更深层次的问题进行思考。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 三,是应对美国战略调整,中国有什么优势和制约因素,对这个问题也要有清醒的估计、实事求是的估计。第一,中国的和平崛起、中国的发展,只要把自己内部的事情搞好了,我相信世界上任何一个国家,包括美国,没法儿扼制中国,这是关键因素。第二,美国战略重心东移,或者说再平衡,不能不顾及中东、欧洲的问题。目前中东问题很多,伊拉问题、叙利亚问题、埃及问题,美国没法儿全身而退,所以到<span lang="EN-US">2020</span>年,美国<span lang="EN-US">60%</span>的海空力量调到亚太地区,能不能如期实现也是一个问题,还要看这些热点地区的发展状况。第三,经济上中美有相互依存的关系,但是这个关系是脆弱的,是不对称的,我们处在一个比较弱的地位,美国处在比较强势的地位。在美国当前经济情况困难的情况下,这一条是比较有利的因素。如果在经济上中国不行了,美国失去了中国这个市场,对它的经济还有利吗?这是它必须要考虑的。所以美国对中国的定位:不是敌人也不是朋友。这个定位跟过去冷战时期美国对苏联的全面扼制政策是不一样的。美国在对中国的关系中,有时候强调合作,有时候强调扼制,但是美国对我们的遏制在加强。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 中美关系能否健康、稳定发展,主要问题在美国。我们在这方面也有许多工作要做。</span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">作者為前驻</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif;">美</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">国国防武官<span lang="EN-US">,</span>少将<span lang="EN-US">,</span>中国国家安全论坛高级研究员</span></i></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://military.china.com/news/568/20121226/17602807.html" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-23Sk-pmRdUk/UNp6nLi_N9I/AAAAAAAAD1s/nIfE2QBg98g/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></i></span></div>版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-84972336436443493162012-12-26T02:41:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:23.202-08:00任卫东:美国重返亚太,中国必须也完全能够顶住压力<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;">作者:</span><span style="line-height: 22.378787994384766px;">任卫东</span><span style="line-height: 22.393938064575195px;"> 2012年12月26日</span></span></span><strong style="background-color: #fefefe; color: #181818; font-weight: normal; line-height: 20px; margin: 0px 20px 0px 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: middle;">人民日报海外版</strong></span><br /><a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-12/26/c_114156975.htm" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="200" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-g0DMnNZKceU/UNrUB9OIyBI/AAAAAAAAD5M/mbrYtQVRAAE/s200/1352082059948.jpg" width="200" /></a><br /><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国全球战略调整即重返亚太以来,中美战略关系和中国安全环境发生历史性重大变化。这种变化绝非出自某届总统的个人偏好或两国之间的所谓战略误判,而有其必然的战略根源,是美国全球战略进入新阶段的必然结果。</span></div><a name='more'></a><br /><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 从地缘政治角度看,自冷战结束以来,美国全球战略大体经历了两大历史阶段:头<span lang="EN-US">10</span>年即上世纪<span lang="EN-US">90</span>年代,战略重点是消化东欧,主要方式是北约东扩和欧盟东扩;新世纪头<span lang="EN-US">10</span>年,战略重点是在中东和中亚扩张,主要方式是发动阿富汗和伊拉克两场战争,策动以独联体国家为主要对象的颜色革命,以及实施大中东民主化计划。美国的总目标是全面控制欧亚大陆,而扫清这些外围的目的是为最终制服中俄铺平道路。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 新世纪第二个<span lang="EN-US">10</span>年开始前后,美国在中亚、中东的战略任务告一段落。尽管阿富汗和伊拉克战争极不顺利,但美国成功推翻了阿富汗和伊拉克的反美政权,扶植起亲美政权。所以,美国战略重点从中亚、中东转向东亚完全是按既定计划实施的战略步骤,不存在乱了方寸、没有章法的问题,只是中国崛起的势头进一步加强了其战略重点转移的必要性、紧迫性而已。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">自战略重点调整以来,美国在东亚的一系列战略举措,概括起来就是政治上围着中国搞统战,军事上针对中国搞部署,经济上瓦解中国影响力。东亚是全球最具经济活力国家特别集中的地区,实际上,东亚也已成为中国影响力最大的地区。出于霸权主义的地缘政治需要,美国决不允许在大西洋和太平洋的对岸出现不受美国控制的、统一的地缘政治板块。经过二战和冷战,美国在大西洋对岸成功地做到了这点,现在则试图通过新型冷战在太平洋对岸也实现同样目标。另外,中国最发达和繁荣的城市集中在东南沿海地区,在这一地区最容易对中国经济造成重大伤害。而且中国对外贸易和能源供应的最主要通道是海上航线,控制了西太平洋经马六甲至印度洋一线就等于掐住了中国的经济命脉。所以,将战略重点放在亚太特别是东亚,对美国来说必要,对中国来说致命。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 战略重点转向亚太,意味着美国已将中国作为其现阶段全球战略的主要目标,这就把中国推上了风口浪尖的位置,退无可退,躲无可躲,只能针锋相对。值得警惕的是,美国不会对中国只搞单纯的遏制,即阻止中国影响力的扩展。从美苏冷战的历史经验看,遏制的背后必然伴随着谋杀。美国在非洲排挤中国经济利益和政治影响力,在中东卡中国的能源咽喉,在中国周边寻找和扶持牵制力量,更在东亚直捣中国安全和发展要害,再加上从内部进行的渗透、演变和分裂,<b>这已经不是简单的以阻止扩张为目的的遏制</b><span lang="EN-US">(contain)</span>,而是以操控乃至窒息为目的的扼制<span lang="EN-US">(choke)</span>。对此,只强调办好自己的事,只从内部进行体制改革是不够的,必须给予地缘政治上的有力回应。<span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> 太平洋关系与大西洋关系有本质的不同,中国不可能成为美国的盟国。摆在中国面前的出路只有两条,要么顶住外部压力,独立自主地在未来多中心化的世界格局中占有一席之地;要么步苏联的后尘,再经历一次劫后余生的摧残。斗争的尖锐性自不待言,但<span lang="EN-US">5000</span>年来的文化底蕴和<span lang="EN-US">63</span>年来的革命建设成就应该使中国能够战胜挑战。</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><br /><div style="list-style: none; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px; overflow: visible !important; padding: 0px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><i>作者為中国现代国际关系研究院研究员</i></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-12/26/c_114156975.htm" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-23Sk-pmRdUk/UNp6nLi_N9I/AAAAAAAAD1s/nIfE2QBg98g/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div style="list-style: none; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px; overflow: visible !important; padding: 0px;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: x-small;"><i><br /></i></span></div><br />版主http://www.blogger.com/profile/06341264511109701409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-527346611667979103.post-35361237377109024042012-12-11T02:05:00.000-08:002013-02-20T21:56:30.672-08:00杰弗里·贝德:美国“重回亚太”政策<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">作者:</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 22px;">杰弗里·贝德 (Jeffrey Bader) </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;">田方萌 2012年12月11日 </span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #343434; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 22px;">《南都讯》</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; line-height: 22.393938064575195px; text-align: justify;"> </span></span><br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/zh-cn/research/interviews/2012/12/11-us-asia-bader" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="148" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-u0cqqFwDCio/UNwdDnKRc0I/AAAAAAAAEBk/H3bPNPlkUiQ/s200/%E6%9D%B0%E5%BC%97%E9%87%8C%C2%B7%E8%B4%9D%E5%BE%B7%EF%BC%88Jeffrey+Bader%EF%BC%89.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">一个月前,美国当地时间2012年11月7日,巴拉克·奥巴马如愿连任美国总统。再次当选后的第一次出访,奥巴马选择了东南亚,美国“重回亚太”战略再次受到中国舆论关注。时间追溯至1995年,还在竞选伊利诺伊州参议员的奥巴马在芝加哥遇见了一位“中国通”——— 在中国居住过、有着丰富外交经验的外交家、中国及台湾问题的研究者杰弗里·贝德 (Jeffrey </span><span style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 1.5;">Bader)。</span></div><a name='more'></a>2009年,奥巴马入主白宫后不久就将这位曾给他留下深刻印象的“中国通”收入麾下,任命其为美国安全委员会东亚事务高级主管。在美国安全委员会两年的时间里,贝德成为奥巴马政府东亚政策制定与实施的建议者与参与者。他了解美国“重回亚太”政策的制定与实施背景,他参与安排并跟随奥巴马在2009年对中国的访问,见证并亲历胡锦涛与习近平到访美国,他是近年中美关系的局内人。20 12年,贝德推出新书《奥巴马与中国崛起———一个局内人视角下的美国亚洲政策》,详述美国亚洲政策内幕。近日,贝德以布鲁金斯学会外交事务资深研究员身份在清华大学发表演讲,随后接受了南方都市报的专访。<br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国媒体曲解了国家政策与外交关系</span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在杰弗里·贝德11月29日这场并不长的演讲与问答中,他用了数十分钟来抱怨美国媒体对于美国外交报道的“肤浅”。在演讲的开头他便提及《纽约时报》对于奥巴马连任后访问缅甸的报道,在这篇报道中,这次访问被解读为美国在与中国争夺在亚洲的影响力。“实际上无论奥巴马去亚洲哪个国家,都会被报道为与中国竞争”,贝德称。而对于被持续关注的美国“重回亚太”政策,他表示自己并不喜欢“战略向亚太‘转移(Pivot)’”这一说法,他认为正确的说法应该是战略“再平衡(rebalance)”,他甚至指出,前者是媒体传播的误读。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>一位听众提问</b>:能否介绍美国“重回亚太”这一政策定义和出台背景,这一政策是否会重新定义中美关系的未来?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德</b>:我想我得从2009年1月说起,那时我们在通盘考虑世界局势,考虑美国所拥有的资源和美国自身的利益,发现我们以往的政策低估了亚洲的重要性,高估了中东局势对于美国的影响。这只是当时的想法,我们并没有给这个新的决定起什么名字。在这种观察与思考之下,大概一个月后,国务卿希拉里·克林顿踏上她的亚洲之旅,这次访问包括了一些亚洲的重要国家,中国、日本、韩国等,这可能是我们第一次发出这样的信号,即我们今后首要的任务应该是应对亚洲区域。随后我们与东盟签订协议,合作进一步加深。这一系列步骤都是在强调我们将更关注东亚。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">实际上,在奥巴马于2011年11月参加东亚峰会前,我从没有听到过“转移(Pivot)”这个词,这并不是由国务卿提出的,而是美国政府内部负责媒体沟通的那些官员最先开始使用的。这个词是这样传播开来的:奥巴马在这次访问期间,有个新闻团队跟着他,我们听到外界和公众把这次访问演绎为一次成功的访问,而这些评价包括词语的使用都是源于奥巴马新闻团队的信息,但我认为基于这些信息的新闻报道常常是非常肤浅的。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">再举个例子,2009年我曾跟奥巴马到中国访问,就我个人来讲,那次访问很成功,完成了很多重要议题,比如军事交流、联合声明等。但在媒体的报道中,这次访问简直就是一场灾难,所有媒体都围着我们问,中国崛起了,美国没落了,中国持有了这么多的美国国债怎么办……最后所有这些问题的答案又被媒体报道成了同一个样子———美国衰落了,中国崛起了。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">也许我的回答偏离了你的问题,但我想让你知道“转移(Pivot)”这个词是怎么来的。实际上我们所说的是亚太“再平衡(rebalance)”,指的是美国看到了亚洲是最有活力的地方,所以想把有限的资源从其他地方转移到这一地区,而中国正好也在这一地区。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都:</b>你在演讲中表示,公众意见与媒体正在曲解官方的原意,你认为公众媒体正在影响国家政策么?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>是的,我对于美国媒体的态度一直都很苛刻。同时,我完全支持美国媒体在公众舆论监督中的中心作用。因此我对他们苛刻的方式并不是想把它们赶开,而是承认每个人表达反对意见的权利。我相信意见与声音多多益善,人们有判断正误的能力。我认为美国媒体对于中国的报道过去并不太好,但正在慢慢好转,变好的一部分原因是媒体的爆发式的发展,过去我们只有几种报纸和杂志作为报道事实的官方声音,但现在我们有多种多样的媒体,有了基于网络的媒体,还有一群人常常到中国去。因此关于中国的大量报道与从前比也越加客观与综合。也许你还是会看到一些简单化的报道,但从全局来看,你能获知一切,能看到真相。在现在的时代,已经不可能用一种简单观点说服民众,在网络时代,你有很多方式发表自己的看法,了解事实的真相。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">军事只是战略“再平衡”很小一方面</span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">与美国其他学者反复重申的一样,贝德强调东亚“再平衡”政策并不针对中国,中美需要通过增加战略透明、继续加强在经贸方面合作、推进人文交流等方式建立起中美之间的互信。同时,他强调“再平衡”的关键因素是政治与经济而非军事。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都:</b>为什么奥巴马连任后第一个出访的国家选择了缅甸?美国总统首次访问该国是否反映了接下来四年美国在亚洲的政策走向?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>在2009年奥巴马的第一任任期时,他有一个清晰的概念,即美国要对那些已经“松开了拳头”的敌人伸出手去,也就是说,在小布什推行了八年的“要么是朋友要么是敌人”的外交政策后,奥巴马想要推行一套不同的理念,即“即使你对美国不友好,美国也不会以同样方式回敬。相反,美国将试图和你处理分歧,解决矛盾,美国将不做‘你是邪恶’的这一假设”。而缅甸即是那些可能对美国不友好的国家之一,近年来缅甸发生了一些以改革和开放为形式的重要变化,奥巴马想通过访问来示范美国将如何开始和那些曾经被称为“敌人”的国家发展关系,他想要向缅甸的领导人重构新的不同于以往的关系。对缅甸的访问是一次成功的访问,而缅甸也正在发生好的变化,比如开始选举,放开了对媒体的限制,周边环境较过去也宽松许多。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都</b>:提到美国的“重回亚太”和再平衡,人们更关注于军事战略和部署的平衡,但应该如何处理军事战略与扩大经贸合作可能存在的矛盾?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>我认为在美国的“再平衡”战略中,经济和政治的因素其实是最为核心的,军事因素已吸引了我们太多的注意力。是的,美国的军力资源是有向东亚的调整,但这一政策确实是基于美国由于财政原因裁减军费开支的基础上的,我们没有增加在这一地区的预算,只是保证在这一地区的军费没有减少。必须承认,美国的军力确实在增长,但在我们关于东亚“再平衡”的通盘考量中,军事只是很小的一个方面。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">中美关系完全不同于美苏关系</span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">在中美关系定位的讨论中,G 2(两国集团)与C 2(两国协调)的讨论还未落定,2008年,中国国家主席胡锦涛访问美国时又提出了“新型大国关系”,此后,多位中国高层在各个场合也都曾提起过这一概念,但美国方面在公开场合却甚少对此作出回应。究竟正在快速发展的中国应与美国这一传统大国建立起的是一种什么样的关系?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都</b>:美国政府对于“新型大国关系”这个概念怎么看?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德</b>:正如你说到的,这是由胡锦涛主席在公开场合提到的概念。美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿也几次在公开场合提及了同一想法,并强调了我们都应致力于建立这一新型国家间关系。我相信中美双方对于这一概念有着相同的理解,即这种关系意味着无论传统大国还是新崛起国家,我们都是大国。在国际关系历史上,传统大国和新崛起大国总是容易发生冲突,但是我们不允许这样的历史再次发生在中美之间,因为我们之间如此相互依赖,我们的利益如此相互联系和重叠,若关系处理不好,我们都无法承受其带来的高昂代价。在新世纪,我们不允许重复过去的模式,我想这是胡锦涛主席和美方对于这一概念的共识。中美两国应该共同搭建这一概念,并使其充实。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都:</b>你在演讲中提到中美之间与美苏之间的关系完全不同,如何理解?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>无论从哪个方面来看,中美关系都不是也不会遵照美苏关系的范式发展。因为美苏关系是一种纯粹建立在军事、政治竞争之上的关系,而尼克松访华以来,中美就从未有过或致力于发展这种形式的关系,因此中美关系和美苏关系是完全不一样的。中国是美国北美外最大的贸易伙伴,美国对中国有巨大的投资,而中国对美的投资也在不断增长,中美人民之间的相互交流访问,科学技术之间的合作,特别是大学之间的合办项目,人员互通已经成为中美两国关系最坚实的基础,这一点也是同美苏关系完全不同的。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都:</b>你还提及中美之间要建立互信,最现实的目标是需要战略透明,我们该如何实现这一目标?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>就两国的军事关系来说,我认为需要更多的互动与交流,两军联合演习是一个好的方法,因为两国之间的最核心的不信任是源于军事的不信任,两军之间更多的交流和透明化将有效消减不信任。此外,建立更为牢固的合作关系也是建立互信的重要方式,中美在世界范围内有很多重要挑战要面对,例如朝核问题、叙利亚危机、阿富汗局势等,这些问题都会影响包括中美在内的整个世界局势,因此中美需要证明我们能够一起处理这些问题,在此过程中,中美间将建立起信任,反之互信将无法建立。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><b><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">美国民众对中国存刻板印象</span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">随着中美两国换届的完成,两国关系的政策延续性成为外界普遍关心的问题。贝德在演讲中表示,在第二任任期内,奥巴马政府还会延续以往的对华战略,即正确对待中国的崛起,同时也会督促中国越来越多地在国际社会中承担大国责任。他同时相信,中国也会保持对于美国政策的延续性。正如贝德所称,在中美关系中,他是一个乐观主义者。同时,他对于中国面临的问题也有自己的看法。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>听众提问</b>:美国对于中国的政策近些年是否有变化?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德</b>:在外界看来,中美关系在2010年似乎突然变得紧张了……一些人觉得美国修改了原有政策,实际上没有。政策常常会发生调整,这并不是因为我们产生了误解或者抱有不切实际的幻想,而是因为有紧急事件的发生。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">中国方面也一样,政策也具有延续性。2010年,中国国务委员戴秉国发表过一篇文章,强调中国还是要坚持邓小平“韬光养晦”的外交政策,发表这样的文章并不是偶然的,实际上是因为包括他在内的整个中国领导层都看到了两国关系中存在的问题。在文章中他作出了非常正确的判断,他非常清楚中国的崛起会给世界带来什么影响,所以邓小平的决策目前来看仍是正确的。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">实际上在中美两国政府内部,官员在对待中美关系时都是温和而稳定的,我们曾经应对过各种各样的危机,中美关系中很多的问题都是由来已久的,比如对台军售。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都:</b>今年2月,你在《外交政策》杂志刊文分析了习近平访美及其背后的中国现实情况,文中你多次提到了中国的“复杂性”,你能解释一下“复杂性”最突出体现在什么地方?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>当我在美国民众前提及中国的“复杂性”时,我实际上是要打破美国民众对于中国的刻板印象。实际上,中国政府运作体系远比他们所想的复杂,它涉及来自中央与地方的众多持不同立场的利益相关者,它需要这些相关者为了最终结果进行商讨与妥协,中国依然需要面对一群富人、一个巨大的中产阶层以及一个仍然贫困的大众阶层。中国像是几个国家的结合体,既是经济发达的国家又是经济落后的国家。美国人对此尚不十分了解,这是我所说的“复杂性”,这是中国领导人需要面对的挑战。很多美国人只看到了中国的成功之处,他们看到美国商场里的中国制造产品,他们认为中国是一个富有而有实力的国家,实际上中国同时也是一个贫穷而有弱点的国家,所以我试图将这些复杂性解释给美国民众,这非常重要。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>南都:</b>这种复杂性将如何影响中美关系?</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>贝德:</b>很多国家包括一部分美国人都看到了中国强大的力量,并会为中国将如何使用这种强大的力量而焦虑。但我曾交谈过的中国人包括中国领导人似乎更多地关注中国所面临的问题,而不是抓住一切机会向外扩展自己的影响力。是的,中国想要扩展国家影响力,但更吸引他们注意力的仍是中国国内所存在的问题。因此可以说美国受益于中国的“复杂性”,这意味着中国的主要挑战仍然来自国内,中国需要机会去处理自己的国内问题,我想我们不应制造外部压力而让中国感到恐惧,让它违背自己的初衷。</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-weight: bold; line-height: 22px;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">《南都讯》记者娜迪娅 吴瑶 发自北京</span></span></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/zh-cn/research/interviews/2012/12/11-us-asia-bader" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nBMl4Yt3vxM/UNumvGYSsHI/AAAAAAAAD7E/w4DNOs_Xecg/s1600/%25E8%25B3%2587%25E6%2596%2599%25E4%25BE%2586%25E6%25BA%2590.jpg" /></a></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #343434; line-height: 1.5; margin-bottom: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-weight: bold; line-height: 22px;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></span></span></div><br /><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; 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